Court Can't Allow Criminal Justice System To Be Misused To Avenge Failed Relationship: Punjab & Haryana HC Discharges Man Accused Of Rape On Pretext Of Marriage
The Punjab & Haryana High Court has upheld the discharge of a man accused of committing rape on his partner under the pretext of marriage, observing that the woman consensually cohabited.Justice Harpreet Singh Brar observed that "The petitioner (alleged rape victim) was consensually cohabitating with respondent no. 2 (accused-partner) and it was only due to a dispute that arose later in...
The Punjab & Haryana High Court has upheld the discharge of a man accused of committing rape on his partner under the pretext of marriage, observing that the woman consensually cohabited.
Justice Harpreet Singh Brar observed that "The petitioner (alleged rape victim) was consensually cohabitating with respondent no. 2 (accused-partner) and it was only due to a dispute that arose later in time that the FIR...was registered. As such, this Court cannot allow the criminal justice system to be misused to avenge a failed relationship."
The Court was hearing a plea of an alleged rape victim challenging an order of a Rohtak Court wherein it discharged the accused from offences under Sections 376(2)(n), 109, 406, 506 of the IPC.
It was alleged that the woman was raped by her partner under the pretext of marriage, and after the parties entered into a compromise in the Panchayat, the boy agreed to bear her responsibility. It was also stated that the accused took the woman to a temple, and pretended to marry her, but neither cohabited with her nor returned the money he had earlier taken.
The counsel for the petitioner argued that the woman was medico-legally examined wherein it was concluded that happening of sexual intercourse with her cannot be ruled out.
A perusal of the panchayat compromise would indicate that the man had categorically admitted to having done sexual intercourse with the petitioner on the pretext of taking her to Canada, added the counsel.
After hearing the submissions, the Court said, the trial Court, at this stage, is only to form a presumptive opinion with regard to the existence of the factual ingredients breaching the threshold of the offence alleged.
Justice Brar said that, at the stage of formation of opinion under Sections 227, 239 and 240 Cr.P.C., the trial Court is not required to weigh the probative value of the material brought on record in the golden scale or to presume the prosecution story as gospel truth.
Reliance was placed on Shashikant Sharma and others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 1037, wherein the Apex Court held that, if the necessary ingredients of an offence are not made out from the admitted evidence of the prosecution, then the Court is not obligated to frame a charge for such an offence against the accused.
In the present case, the Court noted that the petitioner lived with the accused "even before solemnising a marriage in view of the compromise."
Adding that after marriage, the petitioner and her partner started cohabitating in a rented accommodation, the Court without commenting on the legitimacy of the marriage, opined that the petitioner was "consensually cohabitating" with the accused and "it was only due to a dispute that arose later in time that the FIR was registered."
The Court referred to Shivankar v. State of Karnataka (2019), in which it was observed:
"Though we are not here concerned with the question whether the appellant and the complainant-respondent No. 1 were, in fact, married, we have no doubt that they lived together like a married couple even according to the complainant.In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it is difficult to sustain the charges levelled against the appellant who may have possibly, made a false promise of marriage to the complainant.”
In light of the above, the Court upheld the decision of the trial court to discharge the accused.
Anshuman Dalal, Advocate with Amit Kumar, Advocate for the petitioner.
Vikas Bhardwaj, AAG, Haryana.
Title: XXX v. XXX
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (PH) 116