No Absolute Bar On Appointment In Armed Forces When Acquittal In Moral Turpidute Case Was Due To Benefit Of Doubt: Punjab & Haryana High Court
The Punjab & Haryana has made it clear that acquittal on the ground of "benefit of doubt" in moral turpitude, cases is not an absolute bar for appointment in the Armed Forces.The petitioner was appointed as constable in the Indo=Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) on compassionate grounds, however, his appointment letter was cancelled because he disclosed that he was implicated in a POCSO...
The Punjab & Haryana has made it clear that acquittal on the ground of "benefit of doubt" in moral turpitude, cases is not an absolute bar for appointment in the Armed Forces.
The petitioner was appointed as constable in the Indo=Tibetan Border Police Force (ITBP) on compassionate grounds, however, his appointment letter was cancelled because he disclosed that he was implicated in a POCSO case wherein he was acquitted.
After examining the instructions issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in 2012 on the basis of which petitioner's appointment letter was cancelled, Justice Jagmohan Bansal said, "As per instructions, if there is acquittal, a candidate who was implicated in an offence of moral turpitude, may or may not be appointed in the Armed Forces. In the instructions, the expression “generally” has been used which shows that there is no absolute bar on the appointment where acquittal is on the ground of benefit of doubt. The competent authority in such cases can consider case of a candidate."
These observations were made while hearing the plea filed by Deepak Kumar seeking the setting aside of an order whereby the respondent authorities cancelled his appointment letter.
The father of the petitioner joined ITBP as a Constable in 1989. He passed away in duty in 1996. The petitioner in 2012 filed an application seeking an appointment on compassionate grounds which was later accepted and an appointment letter was issued in 2022.
The petitioner pursuant to the appointment letter appeared before the competent authority in 2022 and disclosed he had been implicated in a criminal offence and was later acquitted.
It was submitted that the petitioner's appointment letter was cancelled on the grounds that he had been acquitted in a criminal case by extending the benefit of the doubt, and as such, in terms of the instructions dated 01.02.2012 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, he could not be retained in the force.
Considering the submissions, the Court noted that the petitioner had been implicated in an offence punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act.
It was found that the trial Court while passing judgment of acquittal specifically considered the question of age of the prosecutrix and returned a finding the prosecution had failed to prove that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the time of the alleged occurrence, thereby acquitting the petitioner.
It further noted that the Trial Court had further adverted that in their deposition, both the prosecutrix and her mother had not supported the prosecution case.
The Court summarised the following principles established by the Supreme Court through various rulings:
I. If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude extending benefit of reasonable doubt, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee."
II. In case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has right to consider antecedent and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.
III. Yardstick to be applied in cases where appointment sought relates to a law enforcement agency ought to be more stringent than those applied to a routine vacancy, it said.
Further, adding that the petitioner had voluntarily and truthfully disclosed the fact of his concluded criminal case, the Court said, there was no concealment on the part of the petitioner."
Justice Bansal further noted the respondent had not examined the antecedents of the petitioner and that his appointment letter had been cancelled on the sole ground that he was acquitted on the benefit of the doubt.
It was found that the respondent had not considered the nature of the alleged offence, the age of the petitioner and the age of the prosecutrix at the time of the alleged offence.
Placing reliance on Bhag Singh vs. Punjab & Sind Bank Baldev Singh, [2005] and Joginder Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh, [2015], the Court opined, "there was acquittal of the petitioner and respondent though was not bound to continue petitioner in the service yet being public authority was duty bound to thoroughly examine case of the petitioner."
In light of the above, the plea was allowed and the impugned order was set aside, directing the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for an appointment within 4 weeks.
Appearance: Sanjiv Kumar Aggarwal, Advocate and Ojas Bansal, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Indresh Goel, Sr. Panel Counsel for the respondents.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (PH) 15
Title: Deepak Kumar v. Union of India and others