Limitation Act | It Is Not Length Of Delay But Explanation Which Is Relevant For Considering Condonation: Punjab & Haryana High Court
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has observed that in the plea for condonation of delay under Limitation Act, "It is not the length of delay (sought to be condoned) but explanation thereof which is relevant for consideration by a Court."Justice Sumeet Goel explained that, "A liberal approach, undoubtedly, ought to be accorded to a plea for condonation of delay made under Section 5 of...
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has observed that in the plea for condonation of delay under Limitation Act, "It is not the length of delay (sought to be condoned) but explanation thereof which is relevant for consideration by a Court."
Justice Sumeet Goel explained that, "A liberal approach, undoubtedly, ought to be accorded to a plea for condonation of delay made under Section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 so as to further the cause of substantial justice. The concept of substantial justice essentially includes in itself the desirability of adjudication of a claim of the litigant on merits thereof rather than rejection of the same, at the threshold, on account of being barred by limitation."
The Court further clarified that however, adoption of such liberal approach cannot be stretched to mean that a prayer (for condonation of delay) ought to be granted sans reasonable explanation therefor.
An applicant (seeking condonation of delay) has to bring forward cogent, credible and lucid reason(s) to substantiate such a plea. In case such reason(s) is not scrutable, a Court would well be within its discretion to decline such plea (for condonation of delay). In other words, inexplicable delay ought not to be condoned, it added.
Justice Goel also summarised the following principles:
- A Court ought to grant an application seeking condonation of delay when no negligence, inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to such applicant and/or such delay has occurred on account of circumstances beyond reasonable control of such applicant.
- Law of limitation does not require an applicant (seeking condonation of delay) to furnish an exhaustive explanation on 'day to-day basis' for such delay. A Court while dealing with a plea for condonation of delay need not undertake such a pedantic approach.
- In appropriate cases, a Court may consider imposing costs while granting an application for condonation of delay. However, the quantification of costs so imposed, must reflect the same being commensurate to the lis in issue as also attending circumstances therein.
- The factum; of non-applicant(s) or even strangers having altered their position(s) relying upon the applicant not having filed an appeal/revision etc. within stipulated time and resultant effects thereof; will indubitably be a pertinent factor for consideration of a plea for condonation of delay.
- A plea for condonation of delay by the State as also its instrumentalities has to be accorded a more liberal approach since the machinery involved in their working is impersonal in nature & hidden factors working therein cannot be given a complete amiss.
- The discretion of a Court, while considering a plea for condonation of delay, will be exercised in view of peculiar facts/circumstances of an individual case. It is neither prudent nor feasible to fix any exhaustive guidelines for exercising such judicial discretion. On the contrary, it would be perilous to lay down such general criteria for governing such discretion. Needless to emphasize that exercise of such judicial discretion/power ought to be within the four corners of well settled principles of justice, good conscience and fair play.
These observations came in response to the plea seeking condonation of 398 days delay in filing the accompanying revision petition.
The main revision petition was filed challenging the judgment passed by Principal Judge, Family Court, Faridabad whereby the applicant was directed to pay Rs.4,000 per month to the wife and Rs.2,000 per month to the son of the petitioner, from the date of filing of the petition before the Family Court.
The counsel for the petitioner contended that petition could not be filed in time as the order was passed ex-parte by the Family Court and there was no timely intimation from his trial Court counsel.
The Court considered the question, "whether, the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 filed by the applicant-petitioner seeking condonation of 398 days delay in filing the accompanying revision petition, deserves to be allowed."
"A Statute of Limitation does not confer any right of action but is enacted to restrict the period within which such right may be asserted. Any person undoubtedly has a great interest in having a well known limit, fixed by law of limitation, so that stale claim(s) do not haunt him," the Court observed.
The basic underlying objective behind a Statute of limitation is to prevent the unexpected enforcement of stale demands concerning which persons interested have been thrown off their guard by want of prosecution, it added.
Justice Goel further opined that the Court, while dealing with an application for condonation of delay in filing appeal/revision etc., is required to undertake an onerous task of balancing, in an egalitarian manner, the rival rights of the parties to a lis i.e. on one hand is the applicant (seeking condonation of delay) urging to show cause for adjudication of the lis on merits by having such delay condoned whereas on the other hand is the non-applicant pleading that inter- se rights of the parties have already been crystallized and the litigation has attained finality.
In the present case, the Court noted that "No cause muchless sufficient cause as required in terms of The Limitation Act, 1963 has been shown to condone the delay of 398 days in filing the accompanying revision petition."
Stating that the "the delay is not only inordinate but inscrutable apart from being inexplicable," the Court opined that the application seeking condonation of delay of 398 days in filing the instant revision petition merits rejection.
Consequently, the plea was dismissed.
Manoj Kaushik, Advocate for the petitioner.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (PH) 66
Title: XXX v.XXX