Wife's Refusal To Consummate Marriage Amounts To Mental Cruelty, Ground For Divorce: MP High Court
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that wife's refusal to consummate the marriage would amount to cruelty, and would constitute a ground for divorce under Section 13 (1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.The Bench of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Vinay Saraf observed, "There can never be any straight jacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters....
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that wife's refusal to consummate the marriage would amount to cruelty, and would constitute a ground for divorce under Section 13 (1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
The Bench of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Vinay Saraf observed,
"There can never be any straight jacket formula or fixed parameters for determining mental cruelty in matrimonial matters. The prudent and appropriate way to adjudicate the case would be to evaluate it on its peculiar facts and circumstances while taking the relevant factors in consideration. The appellant solemnized the marriage. It was already decided that he will leave India in a short period. During this period, the appellant was hopeful to consummate the marriage but the same was denied by the respondent and certainly the said act of the respondent amounts to mental cruelty. The ground of divorce enumerated in Clause (i-a) under Section 13 (1) is made out. The appellant is entitled for the decree of divorce".
The appellant husband in this case filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for grant of decree of divorce alleging that despite the solemnization of marriage with the respondent in 2006, the latter refused consummation of their marriage, and denied cohabitation with the appellant. The appellant averred that the respondent had revealed that she had a love affair, and requested her custody to be handed over to her boyfriend. It is further alleged that the respondent also t threatened him through e-mail that she would commit suicide, and that she left the matrimonial home in 2006 to never return.
The appellant submitted that the respondent had also filed a false complaint against himself and his parents alleging cruelty, dowry demand allegations, and an attempt to murder the former, following which the appellant's parents had to remain in custody for almost 23 days.
The trial court dismissed the appellant's application for divorce on the ground that he failed to prove any of the grounds available in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for grant of decree of divorce.
On the submission of the appellant that the trial court ought to have granted divorce on the ground of cruelty since he had produced the documentary evidence on record to establish the allegation of lodging the false report against the appellant and his parents by the respondent, the Court said,
"When the criminal case is pending and has not culminated in acquittal of the appellant and his parents, it cannot be accepted that appellant and his parents arrested on the basis of the false report. Learned trial court has not committed any error in holding that as the criminal case is still pending, no decree of divorce can be granted on the ground that by lodging false report, the respondent has committed cruelty with appellant and his parents".
It further found that the allegation raised by the appellant that the respondent wife deserted him would also not stand since the appellant himself left home for the US five days after reaching his home, nor had he made any arrangement for taking the respondent alongwith him.
The Court added that the mere allegation raised by the appellant that the respondent wife was having a boyfriend and that she was forced to marry the appellant by her parents and relatives would also not constitute any ground for grant of divorce decree.
Addressing the appellant's allegation that both parties had entered into a compromise and that as per the settlement, all the articles of dowry had been handed over to the respondent and that a settlement for payment of permanent alimony of Rs.10,00,000/ in lieu of the dissolution of marriage was also entered into, the Court found that no evidence had been produced to establish the payment of cheques.
"On the basis of the settlement, the decree of divorce can be passed only in a situation when both the parties are present before the Court and they confirm the settlement and jointly pray for grant of decree of divorce by mutual consent. In the present case, though the appellant has submitted that he entered into a settlement with the respondent and paid the settlement amount in full but neither any petition under Section 13 (B) of the Act 1955 was filed nor the respondent was present before the Court to confirm the factum of settlement, therefore, learned trial court has not committed any error in refusing to grant decree of divorce on the ground of settlement," it observed.
However, the Court found a positive case for divorce had been established on the ground of the wife's refusal to consummate marriage.
"We understand that unilateral refusal to have sexual intercourse for considerable period without any physical incapacity or valid reason can amount to mental cruelty. In the present matter, it is specifically alleged by the appellant in the petition and stated in the affidavit that the respondent denied consummation of marriage from the date of marriage till he left India and the marriage was never consummated, due to unilateral decision of the respondent to refuse sexual intercourse for considerable period without having any valid reason. In the absence of any contrary version or any rebuttal on the part of the respondent, the statement of the appellant cannot be discarded and has to be accepted as it is," it said.
It thereby found that the trial court had wrongly held that failure on the part of the wife to consummate the marriage could not be a ground for divorce.
The Court thus allowed the appeal, and granted the decree of divorce to the appellant.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 6
Case Title: Sudeepto Saha v. Moumita Saha
Case Number: FIRST APPEAL No. 896 of 2014