Citations: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 1 To 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 1331. Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance 1994] Owner Entitled To Seek Custody Of Property Subjected To Interim Attachment On Furnishing Security: MP High CourtTitle: Smt. Girja Devi Tiwari v. State of Madhya PradeshCitation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 1The Madhya Pradesh High Court has clarified that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944...
Citations: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 1 To 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 133
Title: Smt. Girja Devi Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 1
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has clarified that the Criminal Law (Amendment) Ordinance, 1944 ('1994 Ordinance') confers right upon person whose property is subjected to ad interim attachment to file an application under Section 8 for release of property, subject to furnishing security to the satisfaction of District Judge.
The Bench comprising Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Devnarayan Mishra on perusing the provisions of the 1994 Ordinance, observed
Section 8 of the 1994 Ordinance states, “when an order of interim attachment is made awaiting the same to become absolute, the person who is adversely affected by the ad interim attachment can make an application u/S.8 furnishing security to the District Judge concerned, who, in turn, is empowered to assess the sufficiency of the said security and thereafter pass appropriate order regarding ad-interim custody subject to the final attachment.”
The appellant in this case held lease hold rights on behalf of Indian Oil Company qua a retail outlet at Satna. Consequent to the appellant and her husband being charged with offences punishable Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120(B) of IPC, the appellant's retail outlet was temporarily attached by an ad interim attachment order. The appellant thus moved an application under Section 8 of the 1994 Ordinance seeking permission of Trial Court to operate the said retail outlet, which was rejected by the Special Judge.
Title: U.S. (Upjeet Singh) Arora v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 2
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has laid down that substituting a provision with an amended provision cannot lead to a vacuum in law, even if the amendment is to take effect at a later point.
The Bench of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Hirdesh, while dealing with an offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('criminal misconduct by public servant'), said that the substitution of the said provision with the amended version of the same with effect from July 2018 would mean that the offences which had taken place on or after the said date would be governed by the amended provision, while those prior to the same would be dealt with by the unamended version of the provision.
“If (the contention of learned senior counsel) is accepted that substitution leads to obliteration of the unamended Section even for offences which occurred prior to substitution is accepted then vacuum in law would be created thereby letting all those offenders go scott free who committed crime punishable under the unamended Section 13(1)(d) of the PC (Prevention of Corruption) Act. This can never be the intention of law,”
The case involved allegations of misconduct on the part of the petitioner, who is a public servant, in the tender regarding purchase of Lanterns. The petitioner was alleged to have submitted a false inspection report, thereby causing loss to the government and corresponding financial benefit to the tenderer.
Title: Vinay Kumar Athiya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 3
The Madhya Pradesh High Court (Jabalpur Bench) had observed that once an individual accepts a compassionate appointment, he/she is precluded from seeking or claiming a higher position. Referring to the Supreme Court's Judgment in the case of Rajasthan vs. Umrao Singh (1994), a bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal observed that once a compassionate appointment was given and accepted, the right to such appointment stood exhausted and a second consideration for a higher post was not warranted.
The bench opined thus while dealing with a writ petition filed by one Vinay Kumar Athiya challenging his appointment as a constable with the state police, after his father's death, following a prior appointment as Bal Arakshak.
Title: Madhav Prasad Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 4
The Madhya Pradesh High Court, Jabalpur Bench, has emphatically laid down that once the application for resignation of an employee has been accepted, there cannot be any withdrawal of the same.
"...once the resignation was accepted, there cannot be any withdrawal as the bilateral relationship of Master and Servant has seized to exist," Justice Vivek Agarwal declared, while considering the plea of a Police Constable who sought reinstatement in service, sixteen years after his resignation had been accepted.
The petitioner averred that he had submitted his application for resignation in 1994 due to the 'torture' that had been meted out to him while in service. He submitted that his subsequent application for reinstatement which had been moved in 2010, had been disallowed by the Director General of Police, Police Headquarters.
Title: A Minor Girl v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 5
The Madhya Pradesh High Court last week permitted a minor girl to undergo medical termination of pregnancy, with the condition that herself and her father ought to submit an affidavit to the Investigating Officer stating that they shall not resile from their allegation that the pregnancy had occurred as a result of rape.
Justice G.S. Ahluwalia also directed the Trial Court to submit its report before the Registrar General of the High Court, along with a deposition sheet of the victim in case she turned hostile and claimed that no rape had been committed, or claimed herself to be a major.
The minor girl in this case alleged that the accused had raped her under the pretext of marriage, which resulted in her pregnancy. Court had stated that "...the child will also have social stigma throughout her life and the girl, who is 17 years of age, has to deliver a child which will certainly result in life threat to the pregnant minor girl".
6. Wife's Refusal To Consummate Marriage Amounts To Mental Cruelty, Ground For Divorce: MP High Court
Title: Sudeepto Saha v. Moumita Saha
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 6
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that wife's refusal to consummate the marriage would amount to cruelty, and would constitute a ground for divorce under Section 13 (1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act.
The Bench of Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Vinay Saraf observed
“..The appellant solemnized the marriage. It was already decided that he will leave India in a short period. During this period, the appellant was hopeful to consummate the marriage but the same was denied by the respondent and certainly the said act of the respondent amounts to mental cruelty. The ground of divorce enumerated in Clause (i-a) under Section 13 (1) is made out. The appellant is entitled for the decree of divorce”
The appellant husband in this case filed an application under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act for grant of decree of divorce alleging that despite the solemnization of marriage with the respondent in 2006, the latter refused consummation of their marriage, and denied cohabitation with the appellant.
Title: Adnan Mansuri Vs. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Station House Officer
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 7
The Indore bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court released on bail an 18-year-old Muslim teenager who had been in custody for 151 days for allegedly spitting on a Hindu 'Mahakal' procession after the complainant and the eye witness turned hostile.
The above ruling came in a bail application filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The applicant, Adnan Mansuri was in jail since 17.07.2023 in connection with a criminal case for commission of offences punishable under Sections 295-A, 153-A, 296, 505 and 34 of IPC.
Justice Anil Verma observed, “Considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, arguments advanced by counsel for the parties, nature and gravity of allegation as also taking note of the fact that complainant Sawan has been examined before the trial Court but he has turned hostile and did not support the case of prosecution and even he has also denied his relevant portion of his FIR (Ex. P-1), eye- witness Ajay Khatri also turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution.”
Title: Aniruddh Singh v. Authorized Officer, ICICI
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 8
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act stipulating condonation of delay would apply in respect of applications under Section 17 of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ('SARFAESI Act') before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) filed beyond the period of 45 days.
Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act provides the remedy of appeal for the borrowers against the actions taken by the bank, and prescribes the time period for the same as 45 days.
Taking note of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act which inter alia stipulates that if the special law did not expressly exclude the application of Sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act would apply qua all causes raised under the Special Law, the Bench comprising Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Vivek Jain observed:
"The special law i.e. SARFAESI Act does not expressly exclude the application of the provisions from Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act (including Section 5) and therefore the benefit u/S.5 of Limitation Act shall be available to the cause of action raised in an application u/S 17 of SARFAESI Act".
Title: Veer Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 9
The Madhya Pradesh High Court Gwalior Bench allowed an application filed by an accused under Section 311 CrPC seeking appearance of the Investigating Officer as a witness in the cross-case registered by him.
Section 311 of CrPC stipulates the power to summon material witnesses, and examine persons present. Justice Anand Pathak noted that Section 243 of Cr.P.C. ('evidence for defence') does not bar an IO of cross-case to appear on behalf of the accused in the case in which he is the complainant, so as to advance truth and help the cause of justice. The Court at the outset ascertained that the matter was at the stage of evidence for defence, and that Section 243 Cr.P.C. provides such a mechanism.
"Scheme of Section 243 of Cr.P.C. indicates that defence/accused can produce his evidence and it nowhere bars the Investigating Officer of cross-case to appear on behalf of accused in the case in which he is complainant so that truth can come to the fore as it would help the cause of justice to the extent where his act vicarious or individual or the extent of role would be determined," it observed.
Title: Kapoori Bai & Ors. v. Neelesh & Ors
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 10
The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior has laid down that if one of several plaintiffs having independent right to relief which is severable from the right claimed by the other plaintiffs, seeks to abandon his/her claim in the suit, the Court may grant such prayer in its discretion. Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke added that this is so if such abandonment of claim by the plaintiff does not affect the right to relief of the co-plaintiffs, and that in such a scenario, the consent of the co-plaintiffs would not be a sine qua non.
“"...if one of several plaintiffs having independent right to relief and which is severable from the right claimed by the other plaintiff(s) seeks to abandon his claim in the suit once and for all without reservation and such abandonment does not affect the right to relief of the co-plaintiff(s), his/her consent would not be a sine qua non..”
The factual matrix reveals that the predecessor-in-title of the petitioner and other plaintiffs filed a civil suit for declaration of title and permanent injunction in respect of a property. During the pendency of the suit, it is noted that the 7th plaintiff expired and the Trial Court allowed the application under Order 22 Rule 3 ('procedure in case of death of one of several plaintiffs or of solo plaintiff'), since a legal representative of the deceased 7th plaintiff was already on record.
Title: Monu Upadhyay v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 11
The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Gwalior had laid down that merely casting a doubt upon the conduct of free and fair Legislative Assembly elections via a social media post cannot attract the offence under Section 505(2) of IPC ('statements conducing to public mischief').
The petitioner in this case, a correspondent, had made a social media post raising doubt in relation to conduct of free and fair election in Lahar Legislative Assembly Constituency. Treating the said post as derogatory and amounting to public mischief, an FIR was registered against the petitioner by Naib Tahsildar alleging the commission of offence under Sections 505(2) and 188 ('Disobedience to Order duly promulgated by public servant') of IPC
Finding the social media post of the petitioner to clearly fall within the ambit of 'Freedom of Speech and Expression' under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, Justice Anand Pathak observed,
"Article 19 of the Constitution provides Freedom of Speech and Expression and if the post allegedly made by the petitioner is taken into consideration, then from the said post no derogatory comment or public mischief is reflected. Conducting free and fair elections in the Legislative Assembly particularly in Bhind/ Chambal area is always a paramount consideration and if doubt is raised by anybody in relation to conduct of free and fair election, then by no stretch of imagination it constitutes offence under Section 505(2) of IPC as the social media post of petitioner is not creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill -will between different classes of the society and further no public mischief as provided in Section 188 of IPC is caused by the petitioner".
12. Contract Wages Cannot Be Reduced Arbitrarily On Delegation Of Work: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Title: Darvari Singh Sareyam & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. and connected matters
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 12
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had laid down that contract wages cannot be reduced in an arbitrary and illegal manner upon delegation of work in favour of a delegatee. Justice Vivek Agarwal passed the order while considering a batch of petitions by employees who had been initially engaged by the respondent-National Health Mission as part of their scheme on various subsidiary jobs.
The Court was informed that the respondent authorities thereafter decided to delegate the services of the petitioners to Rogi Kalyan Samiti and that subsequently, the Rogi Kalyan Samiti decided to outsource the services through a contractor.
“...there cannot be any reduction of wages on delegation of work to Rogi Kalyan Samiti or sub delegation of work to a contractor and, therefore, respondents have failed to make out a case for reduction of wages for doing the same nature of work for the same duration in the hands of a delegatee or a sub delegatee and, thus, the submission put forth by the respondents that they are entitled to negotiate the wages again, is not made out…”
13. No Hindu Marriage Deemed Valid Until 'Saptapadi' Is Performed: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Title: Ajay Kumar Jain and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and others
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 13
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that in Hindu law, marriage is not a contract and unless and until Saptapadi is performed, there cannot be said to be a valid marriage.
With this, a bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia dismissed a plea filed by 4 petitioners seeking to quash an FIR lodged against them for offences under Sections 366 (abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage), 498- A (cruelty), 34 (common intention) of IPC
The petitioners were alleged to have abducted the prosecutrix/victim, forcibly bringing her to Jabalpur. Subsequently, they took her to the High Court premises and coerced her into signing specific documents pertaining to the marriage of the victim and petitioner no. 1.
Seeking to quash the FIR, the counsel for the petitioners argued that a marriage (between victim and petitioner no. 1) had been performed by following the ritual of exchange of garland (Varmala) and filling up of Maang with vermilion (Sindoor). A marriage certificate was also produced to fortify their claim of marriage. However, in its order, the Court noted that counsel for petitioners could not point out any provision of law which acknowledges the performance of marriage by exchange of garland (Varmala). The court also emphasized on the importance of performance of Saptapadi for a valid Hindu marriage.
Title: Manohar Lal Soni (Dead) & Ors. v. Fakir Chand Agrawal & Ors. and connected matter
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 14
The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur had laid down that mere assertion in an agreement that an amount had been obtained as consideration and that possession had been handed over would not be sufficient to prove the possession over a property, particularly in circumstances where the property is a joint family property.
"The law with respect to transfer of joint family property was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in large number of cases and it was categorically held that a sole person is not having any right to dispose off a joint family property...Merely proving the readiness and willingness is not sufficient for a decree of specific performance especially in the circumstances when the executor of the agreement to sell was not competent to execute the same," the Bench comprising Chief Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Vishal Mishra observed.
Title: Virendra Singh Rana & Ors. v. State Of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 15
Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that a teacher reprimanding the student as a means of course correction cannot be brought under the ambit of abetment to commit suicide under Section 306 IPC. The court also noted that some informal social controls applied to guide the students in the right path will not constitute abetment or instigation as given in Section 107 of IPC.
“Although all Informal Social Controls…coming out from different Sociological Theories, cannot be befitting in our social milieu but it is also to be seen that for betterment of children, some Informal Social Controls are necessary. Here, calling parents for counselling was a mechanism which could have given a lesson to the erring students and calling parents cannot be inferred as abetment”, the single judge bench of Justice Anand Pathak observed.
The instigation on the part of the accused should be 'active and proximate to the incident', which is lacking in the undisputed factual scenario of this case, the court added.
The bench sitting at Gwalior also opined that the Principal and other teachers must 'maintain discipline and peaceful atmosphere in the premises' to ensure that none of the children are drawn to the vices that may impede their holistic growth. The court strongly felt that the teachers have taken the exact measures intended to achieve the same in the current case.
Title: Hariom Shrivastava v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 16
Madhya Pradesh High Court reversed a rape conviction on the ground that there was no cogent proof that the consent for sexual relations was obtained by giving a false promise of marriage. The court also observed that no plausible conclusion can be drawn that the sexual liaison occurred under the misconception of fact such as the promise of marriage.
The single-judge bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh also went on to note that there has never been a specific denial by the accused to marry the prosecutrix, as evident from the WhatsApp chats between them. Moreover, it is undisputed that the prosecutrix has already married whereas the accused remains unmarried.
“….it is crystal clear that the physical relations between the prosecutrix and appellant were made with consent. Certainly, marriage was not consummated between them due to some unforeseen circumstances. However, since the appellant himself has not specifically declined regarding marriage with prosecutrix, the allegation of false promise cannot be established…”, the bench sitting at Indore added.
The court also made a detailed analysis of other factors such as the age of the prosecutrix, the voluntary nature of the conversation that transpired between the prosecutrix and the accused after both of them met through a matrimonial website, and the lack of any evidence or deposition by prosecution witnesses about forcible relations in the hotel room concerned.
Title: Suncity Dhoot Colonizers v. Ram Chandra
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 17
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that an order of the arbitral tribunal rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction under Section 16 of the A&C Act is not challengeable in a writ petition.
The bench of Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari held that a party aggrieved by the rejection of its application under Section 16 of the AC& Act has to wait till the passing of the final award and then challenge the award under Section 34 of the Act including the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.
The parties executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) dated 01.12.2017. In terms of the agreement, the petitioner was to construct a model house on 11 plots in a residential colony. The MoU also contained an arbitration clause for the resolution of dispute.
Disputes arose between the parties in relation to the performance of the terms of the MoU, accordingly, arbitration clause was invoked by the respondent and the arbitrator was appointed by the Court. Before the arbitral tribunal, the petitioner raised a challenge under Section 16 of the Act on the ground of non-registration and non-stamping of the MoU.
The arbitrator rejected the application by observing that the MoU was in nature of an agreement to sale requiring a stamp duty of Rs. 1,000/- which was already paid by the respondent. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner filed a writ petition challenging the order of the tribunal.
The Court held that in view of Section 5 of the A&C Act, the scope of judicial interference with the arbitral proceedings is very limited. It held that the Courts would not interfere except as provided under the Act. The Court held that an order of the arbitral tribunal rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction under Section 16 of the A&C Act is not challengeable in a writ petition.
Title: Bhagwanlal Sharma v. Government Kamla Nehru Kanya Uchchatar Mahavidyalaya, Through Principal & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 18
Madhya Pradesh High Court directed a plaintiff to pay the ad-valorem court fees in a suit for declaration and mandatory injunction since the court found that the injunction sought for was not consequential to the prayer of declaration made. Hence, in the appeal preferred by the plaintiff against the stand taken by the trial court in an Order VII Rule 11 application preferred by the respondents, the High Court concurred with the decision rendered by the lower court.
The single-judge bench of Justice Sanjay Dwivedi held that the declaration and the relief claimed as consequential in the plaint are 'very much distinct to each other'. The court further elucidated in the order that the relief of mandatory injunction and its nature in the plaint is such that it stands out as an independent claim for the plaintiff himself.
“….the Court has rightly observed that although a declaration was claimed, but by a mandatory injunction claiming whatever amount was to be paid towards the retiral dues of late employee in favour of respondent Nos. 3 and 4 be paid in favour of plaintiff/petitioner is not a relief consequential to the said declaration. By the said relief, the plaintiff is not only depriving the defendants to get the relief, which is already granted in their favour, but the plaintiff is also claiming that the said amount be paid to him…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur observed in the order
Title: Umesh Kumar Gupta v. The Collector, Rewa District & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 19
The Madhya Pradesh High Court at Jabalpur recently laid down that the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('AC Act, 1996') can be invoked by a financial institution in addition to the remedies available under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 ('SARFAESI Act') for settlement of disputes in relation to non-payment of amount.
The court said that Section 37 of SARFAESI Act prescribes that the provisions of the Act are mandated to take effect in addition to and not in derogation of Companies Act, 1956, Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956 Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992, and Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 and any other law for the time being in force.
"Meaning thereby that the overriding effect of the SARFAESI Act mandated in Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act is diluted to a consideration extent by Section 37 of the SARFAESI Act by providing that the provisions of SARFAESI Act would be in addition to and not in derogation of various enactments referred to in Section 37 of the SARFAESI Act and also any other law for the time being in force, including AC Act, which has been invoked by respondent financial institution herein".
Title: Sanjay Singhania v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 20
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had declined to accept a compromise filed by the prosecutrix for compounding the case against a rape accused.
Though the prosecutrix had filed the compromise with the intent not to prosecute the FIR against the accused, the bench sitting at Indore made strong observations that no one can ravish a woman and then get acquitted based on a compromise.
The single judge bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh added that the offence of rape is against the 'dignity of women' as well as the 'public interest'. In such a scenario, one cannot allow the quashing of the offence based on a compromise between the accused and the prosecutrix under specific circumstances.
“….the concept of compromise with regard to the offences of rape, cannot be accepted, because on this holy land where the belief has been prevailing since ancient golden days that "यत्र नार्यस्तु पूज्यन्ते रमन्ते तत्र देवताः" (where women is worshiped or honoured, divinity blossoms there). A women survives as a mother, wife, sister and daughter etc. of every person. Her body is known as her own temple as she is specifically known for her sacrifices…”, the single judge bench noted in the order.
Title: Smt. Nagina Bano & Ors v. Mohd. Naeem Ali
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 21
Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that when the husband has taken a step back from the promises made in the agreement to live separately, then it can't be said that the wife is living separately by mutual consent.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vishal Dhagat also clarified that the wife will be entitled to maintenance in such instances.
“... Petitioner No.1 agreed to live separately on the basis of promises made in the agreement. Since respondent resiled from promises made in the agreement therefore, it cannot be said that petitioner is living separately by mutual consent”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur observed.
The court also added that the trial court has erred in dismissing the application filed by the wife for the grant of maintenance to her and her two children under Section 125(5) of Cr.P.C. The court accordingly directed the respondent-husband to pay the maintenance of Rs 5,000/- per month to the wife and Rs 2,500 each to the children aged 18 and 11 years.
Title: Smt. Tulsa Bai Gond v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 22
Madhya Pradesh High Court had recently held that when government employees who have direct/indirect influence in the selection process or members of local bodies are related within the prohibited degrees to an Anganwadi Karyakarta candidate, then that candidate will be held ineligible. The prohibited degrees of relationship are given in the Office Memorandum No./F3-2/06/50-2 dated 27.05.2006 connected to such appointments.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal clarified the right interpretation of Clause 4 in the memorandum and stated that direct involvement in the selection process/scrutiny process of a Karyakarta is no longer relevant for determining eligibility when the Panchayati Raj/ local body members already have a close relation with the candidate as specified in the memorandum.
“…intention of the policy makers is that any person who is related to the Government Employee having direct or indirect relationship with the selection process or elected or nominated members of the Panchayat Raj Institutions/Local Bodies, then that will be a disqualification…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur observed while noting that the husband of respondent appointee is a Panch at the time of applying and comes with the ambit of a close relative as per the memorandum.
Title: Pappu Alias Jalikh v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 23
In a rape case involving a father-daughter duo, Madhya Pradesh High Court has set aside the conviction of father by holding that the prosecution was unable to establish even the 'foundational facts' against him.
The court also felt that it could place sufficient credence in the version of the appellant/accused that he was roped in for 'raising eye-brows about the conduct of the daughter' who was allegedly in a romantic relationship with another boy. The father had remained in prison for almost twelve years since 21/03/2012 due to the rape allegations put forth by his daughter.
“The prosecutrix could not withstand cross-examination. The story so narrated by her does not seem to be natural and it appears that the appellant was roped in because he raised eye-brows about the conduct of his daughter…”, the Division Bench of Justices Sujoy Paul and Vivek Jain observed in the order.
Title: National Federation of The Blind M P Branch v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 24
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had proposed constituting a three-tier scrutiny system for issuing disability certificates to candidates seeking public employment. A single-judge bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal was hearing a plea filed by the National Federation Of The Blind (MP) against the dismissive attitude of the state government in appointing visually impaired persons as per statutory requirements.
Court stated that “…It is also expected from the State that they will not permit any fraudester to take advantage of the provisions for reservation of differently-abled persons by misrepresenting themselves to be either visually impaired, hearing impaired or orthopedically handicapped or with other disabilities and they will ensure a three-tier system for scrutiny of such differently-abled persons so that one Doctor may not be sufficient to issue a certificate”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur held.
According to Section 33 of the Persons With Disabilities (Equal Opportunities Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, and the subsequent notification issued by the state government in 2001, visually impaired persons were entitled to 2% reservation out of the 6% earmarked for differently-abled persons. A plea was filed before the High Court for implementation of the policy, and thereafter, when the state refused to adhere to the directions issued, the High Court also issued a slew of directions in a contempt petition from 2013.
In 2013, the Government of India issued an office memorandum after incorporating the gist of the landmark judgment in Union of India & Another v. National Federation of Blind & Ors.(2013). The office memorandum required the "appropriate Government" to compute the number of vacancies available in all the "establishments" and further identify the posts for disabled persons within three months. With the promulgation of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, new categories were added to the types of disabled persons due to which the quota of visually impaired persons was altered to 1.5% out of 6 % allotted for PwD, as per the office memorandum dated 03.07.2018.
Title: Smt. Geetababi Khambra V. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 25
Citing the lack of 'specific' allegations in the F.I.R. as well as the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C, Madhya Pradesh High Court quashed a case registered against the close relatives of the complainant's husband for the offence under Section 498-A IPC.
The single judge bench of Justice Maninder S. Bhatti pointed out that the petitioners, i.e., mother-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law of the complainant, were not residing with the complainant at the relevant time. The complainant submitted that the petitioners used to visit her at the house where she lived along with her husband. During such visits, the petitioners allegedly demanded dowry from her to secure their financial interests.
…There are no particulars like specific date and time when the complaint was subjected to the demand of dowry. As per complainant own showing the present petitioners were not residing with the present complainant but the complainant made an effort to demonstrate that the present petitioners used to visit her at place. The said particulars have not been disclosed by the complainant…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur explained.
Title: Muskan Ivnati v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Principal Secretary Department of School Education & Ors
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 26
While allowing a student to appear for examinations in the Biology stream of Class XII instead of Mathematics, Madhya Pradesh has held that MP Board of Secondary Education's Circular mandating the opting of the same stream as Class XI in Class XII has no retrospective application.
The court clarified that the new guidelines for the examination were issued on 28.06.2023 whereas the petitioner student had already passed her Class XI examinations by then.
“…If the facts of the case are tested on the anvil of the aforesaid dictum of the Supreme Court, it makes it more than clear that the respondents have tried to apply the Regulations issued on 28/06/2023, In such circumstances, when the aforesaid Regulation 14 itself cannot be applied in the case of the petitioner, the respondents cannot compel her to opt for Mathematics subject only with which was her subject in Class 11th”, the single judge bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar observed.
The court added that the circular will only have prospective application when the student has already passed the Class XI exam in 2022-23. The court, accordingly answered the two questions raised before it: i) Whether Regulations issued by the Board of Secondary Education on 28.06.2023 can be applied retrospectively, and ii) Whether the student originally opted for biology at the time of admission in the school.
“…the Guidelines issued by the respondent on 28/06/2023 shall be applicable prospectively and would not be applicable in the case of the petitioner, and secondly, the petitioner is also held to have taken admission in the respondent No.6 School in Biology stream and is entitled to appear in the examination for Class 12th for the said stream”, the court clarified while allowing the petition.
Title: Vijay Kumar Tevraiya & Ors v. The Registrar Public Trust And Sub Divisional Officer Tikamgarh & Ors
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 27
In discussing Section 26 of the Madhya Pradesh Public Trusts Act, 1951, the MP High Court has held that framing of issues is not a mandatory procedure before passing final orders in cases of management of trusts.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vivek Jain said that the scheme of Sections 26-31 in the 1951 Act did not contemplate framing of issues, either expressly or by necessary implication.
“…the District Court has already held that points of determination will be framed while finally deciding the matter. The Court is not barred from framing issues and/or from taking evidence. However, the discretion exercised by the Court in refusing to frame issues cannot be interfered with by holding it to be a violation of mandatory provision”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur opined.
The court pointed out that the objective of Section 27 is to provide a 'speedy efficacious remedy' in matters of the management of a trust. As per Section 26 of the Act, if a trust is not being properly managed, the registrar of public trusts has the option to apply to the District Judge to take corrective measures in that matter.
The powers of the District Judge under Section 26 include removing trustees, appointing new trustees, allocation of a specific portion of trust property for a particular purpose, formulating a scheme of management of trust property, and giving directions as to how the funds of a trust whose original object has failed must be spent.
Title: Pradeep Bafna & Anr. v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Station House Officer & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 28
Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently expressed its discontent regarding the general tendency wherein a victim of a crime tries to implicate all family members of the main accused to settle personal scores.
The single-judge bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar opined that the court must look into the matter from the perspective of a reasonable man, though it is well aware of the fact that
It is pertinent to note here that the names of the parents were not mentioned in the F.I.R. dated 29.07.2021 on the basis of survivor's written complaint. Additionally, Section 161 CrPC statement recorded on the same and the supplementary statement recorded on 24.08.2021 also did not disclose the names of the petitioner parents.
“….seen from the said perspective, it is difficult for this court to assume that when the crime is said to have been committed during the period of around two and a half years, while lodging the written complaint, the prosecutrix would miss the names of the petitioners who are none other than the parents of the main accused, and from whom no recovery has also been made”, the bench sitting at Indore noted.
Title: SB v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 29
After a senior student expressed his regret for his alleged act of ragging a junior at Jiwaji University (Gwalior), Madhya Pradesh High Court allowed compounding the offence between the accused and the victim, pursuant to both parties expressing their intent to settle.
The single-judge bench of Justice Anand Pathak also instructed the delinquent student to perform 7 days of community service in the University Library and further directed the University Registrar to file a report on the student's brief stint there
“…he will help the Librarian for arrangements of books properly from 10:30 am to 2:30 pm or in his free time for at least 4 hours daily for seven days. Meanwhile, he may read some self-help books also for his course correction, so that he may introspect about his deviant behaviour and would ensure that he gets some insight for his future course of action, so that he may become a good citizen in future rather than a liability. Such melting of 'Ego' may make petitioner a better person for posterity”, the bench sitting at Gwalior observed further in the order.
The complainant/victim was a 4th Semester student in the University's BBA course. In June, 2023, senior students of 6th Semester including the petitioner/accused allegedly abused him and demanded that he dance after becoming naked. When the junior student refused, he was allegedly beaten up by the petitioner and other seniors.
As per the complaint made to the H.O.D of the BBA Department, a Disciplinary Committee was constituted. Later, the anti-ragging committee of the University absolved the petitioner from the accusations levelled against him. However, FIR was registered at Police Station University (JI) for offences covered by Sections 294, 323, 506 and 34 of the IPC.
30. Madhya Pradesh High Court Permits Liver Transplant Despite Objection By Donor's Wife
Title: Vikas Agrawal & Anr v. State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Principal Secretary & Ors
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 30
In a pertinent decision, Madhya Pradesh High Court had upheld a man's right to donate a part of his liver tissue to his ailing brother, despite the strong objections recorded by the donor's wife prior to authorisation.
The single-judge bench of Justice Raj Mohan Singh held that the donor is a 'master of his own choice' and he cannot be subjected to any intrusive action, even by his wife. Though the wife may have merely intended to preserve her marital status due to her apprehension about the consequences of the transplant and as per the laid down societal norms, it is not certain that her husband will die thereafter, the court observed.
“…The caveat put by his wife cannot be taken to be a rider on the right of the petitioner No.1…. the perception of the respondent No.4 cannot be over weighed over and above the desire of the petitioner No.1, who intends to save the life of his brother by donating his part of the liver…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur noted in the concluding part of the order.
While allowing the petition filed by the donor brother and the wife of the recipient, to buttress the proposition that societal norms cannot invariably compel individual behaviour to align with societal expectations, the court placed extensive reliance on landmark case laws such as and Prasanna Laxmikant Joshi & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, 2023 LiveLaw (Bom) 2019. Bombay High Court held that a spouse's consent is not a mandatory requirement for organ donation under the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994, especially if the consent is being withheld unreasonably or for extraneous reasons. Back then, the court had stated that the essence of the 1994 Act is the voluntary donation of an organ by a living donor.
Title: Smt. Radha Langri & Anr. Vs. The Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Ujjain, District Ujjain & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 31
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had awarded a compensation of Rs 1 lakh to a petitioner whose houses were illegally demolished by the Ujjain Municipal Corporation without following due procedure.
While granting the compensation, the Court also directed the Commissioner of Ujjain Municipal Corporation (UMC) to take disciplinary action against officials involved in fabricating a panchnama. Additionally, the petitioners were given the option to seek further compensation for their losses through a civil court.
Justice Vivek Rusia observed in the order, "As observed repeatedly by this court, it has become fashionable now for local administration and local bodies to demolish any house by drawing up proceedings without complying with the Principal of Natural Justice and publish it in the newspaper. It appears that in this case also the criminal case was registered against one of the family members of the petitioners and demolition activities were carried out."
The court “Demolition should be the last recourse, that too after giving opportunity to owner to seek regularisation”
The above ruling was delivered by the Indore bench of the High Court in a petition filed by Radha Langri seeking compensation for the demolition of her houses (house numbers 466 and 467) illegally by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation Ujjain, District Ujjain And Building Officer, Municipal Corporation Ujjain, District.
Title: Life Insurance Corporation of India, Through Its Chairman & Ors. v. Yeshwant Singh Garewal
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 32
Madhya Pradesh High Court had clarified that the expression 'lower' grade/post in Clause 39(1)(d) of LIC (Staff Regulations, 1960) also encompasses punishment to the 'lowest'/'minimum' grade or post.
The division bench comprising Justices Sujoy Paul and Vivek Jain also held that the regulation makers did not intend to give a restrictive meaning to this enabling provision.
“…had it been the intention of regulation makers to restrict the punishment only to lower grade/post and not to the minimum/lowest grade, they would have clearly provided so by employing necessary words in the regulation. We are unable to give such restrictive meaning to the language employed in Regulation 39(1)(d). The punishment imposed, in our considered judgment falls within the four corners of enabling Regulation 39(1)(d)”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur noted.
The penalty envisaged under Regulation 39(1)(d) of LIC Staff Regulations is as follows:-"Regulation 39 (1)(d) - reduction to a lower service, or post, or to a lower time scale, or to a lower stage in a time-scale."
Title: Butto Bai & Anr v. Dumri & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 33
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that when there is no dispute about the identity of the land, correction of the Khasra Number (unique identification number assigned to parcels of land) can be effected in the plaint, judgment, and decrees accordingly.
A single-judge bench of Justice Hirdesh allowed the S.152 CPC application preferred by the plaintiffs/applicants before the trial court based on the finding that Khasra Numbers were mistakenly mentioned on account of an accidental slip.
The bench sitting at Jabalpur also took note of the fact that the alleged mistake was not even taken note of by the defendants/ respondents while contesting the suit before the trial court or the lower appellate court.
“…in present case due to mistake occurred on account of accidental slip it has been mentioned in plaint as Khasra No.265 in place of Khasra No.165 and the same was not even taken note of by the defendants while contesting the suit…It has been established in various decisions referred to above that if there is no dispute of identity of land, then correction of Khasra number can be effected”, the court observed in the order.
Section 152 of CPC provides the scope for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, orders and decrees arising out of an accidental slip or omission.
While setting aside the lower appellate court's decision not to allow the S.152 application, the High Court instructed that those necessary amendments be carried out in the plaint, judgments and decrees of both courts below.
Justice Hirdesh, while adjudicating this civil revision petition, also pointed out that Khasra No. 165 is rightly mentioned, instead of Khasra No. 265 measuring merely 0.3 Hectares, in various exhibits placed before the lower courts as evidence.
Title: Shyam Malpani v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Station House Officer Through Police Station Lasudiya & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 34
Madhya Pradesh High Court has quashed proceedings arising from the charge of criminal trespass against a father-in-law who served the contempt notice issued by a Canadian Court directly at the house of his daughter-in-law.
At the time of serving the said notice issued in pursuance of the custody battle for the child, which is being fought between the petitioner's son and daughter-in-law, the petitioner was accompanied by his lawyer.
The single-judge bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar held that serving the notice directly at the house of the daughter-in-law cannot be said to have been tainted with any mala fide intention, especially when the petitioner-father-in-law was accompanied by his lawyer. The e-mail sent to the petitioner's son mentioned the alternatives of serving it either to the complainant or her counsel.
“If this entire episode of the petitioner going to the house of the complainant along with his lawyer to serve the notice issued by a Canadian court is viewed objectively, this court finds that the petitioner and his lawyer cannot be saddled with the intention of criminal trespass. It may be that as the notice was not to the liking of the complainant, there might be some heated arguments but that cannot be held to be an intention to commit the offence of criminal trespass”, the bench sitting at Indore clarified.
Title: Sadkik Akaram v. Kuldeep
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 35
Madhya Pradesh High Court iterated that a judgment debtor cannot be sent to civil prison merely based on the money decree against him if he is devoid of any property/source of pay.
The single-judge bench of Justice Dwarka Dhish Bansal also held that the inability to pay decretal amount due to poverty is not an offence.
“In view of the aforesaid decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court it is clear that merely because there is a money decree in favour of respondent/D.H., the petitioner/J.D. who has no property or source to pay the decretal amount, cannot be sent to civil prison because poverty is not an offence…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur.
The single-judge bench also pointed out that the executing Court has failed to comply with the provisions contained in Section 51 and Order 21 Rules 37 and 40 of CPC. The court added that when the executing court issues a show cause notice against detention in civil prison to the judgment debtor, the procedure laid down in Rule 40(1) of Order 21 must be followed.
The said rule stipulates that after issuance of Order 21 Rule 37 notice, the executing court is expected to hear the decree-holder and all the evidence adduced in support of his execution application. Thereafter, the executing court is further required to grant an opportunity of hearing to the Judgment Debtor, allowing him to convince the court as to why he shouldn't be sent to civil prison.
Title: M/s Master Point and Anr. vs Smt. Sandhya Chouhan
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 36
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh bench comprising Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice Devnarayan Mishra refused to exercise the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226/227 of the Indian Constitution for a matter involving dismissal of an application made to an Arbitrator under Section 16(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the Petitioner. The High Court held that a writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Indian Constitution is not maintainable against every order passed by an arbitral tribunal unless exceptional circumstances or 'bad faith' on the opposite party's part has been shown in the petition. The Petitioner was set at liberty to avail remedy after the pronouncement of the final award.
M/s Master Point (“Petitioner”) and Smt. Sandhya Chouhan (“Respondent”) entered into a partnership for carrying out business. Pursuant to the agreement, they purchased an under-constructed shed in 2005 and the entire consideration for this shed was made by the Respondent, allegedly. A dispute arose between the parties when the Respondent was informed about the dissolution of the Petitioner firm. The Respondent alleged that her and her husband's signature was malafidely taken by informing her that it was for obtaining a credit facility. During the arbitration proceedings, the Petitioner filed an application under Section 16(3) read with Section 32 of the Act and contended that the matter pertained to allegations of fraud and forged dissolution deed. Therefore, it was non-arbitrable.
Title: Dr. Yadvendra Prasad Dubey v. Principal Secretary Higher Education Department Vallabh Bhawan
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 37
Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that the court cannot interfere with the findings of an expert committee in the absence of mala fides or violation of statutory provisions.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal noted that the petitioner was not appointed as an Associate Professor at Indira Gandhi National Tribal University (IGNTU) Amarkantak because the expert committee found that he was not as meritorious as the private respondent who was appointed instead of him. To reinforce the stand that even the petitioner has not taken any plea of mala fides or impleaded the expert committee members, the court resorted to the factual matrix of the case and stated as below:
“…the difference between the score secured by the private respondent No.4 and petitioner is so huge that minor or marginal errors even if taken into consideration are not sufficient to give an edge to the petitioner's case. Therefore, on both the touchstone of there being no violation of the UGC guidelines and further there being no material to show that the experts were acting in a mala fide or partial manner, this Court cannot definitely sit as an appellate authority over the judgments of the experts”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur reasoned.
Title: J.K. Sthapak vs Satish Kumar Saxena and Anr
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 38
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh bench comprising Justice Achal Kumar Paliwal dismissed a revision petition seeking to invoke Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 based on a dispute related to the transfer of cheques under a partnership deed. The arbitration clause in the deed was about disputes arising between the parties, touching the firm's business or interpretation of any subsequent provisions relating to the firm and its business. The High Court noted there was no record suggesting that the mentioned amount was provided to the Petitioner concerning the partnership's business. As a result, the High Court concluded that Clause 22 of the partnership deed, which pertained to arbitration in business-related disputes, would not be applicable in this case. Clause 22 of the partnership deed had an arbitration clause concerning disputes arising between the parties, touching the firm's business or interpretation of any subsequent provisions relating to the firm and its business.
The High Court observed that two cheques out of three were issued from the firm's account and one cheque was issued from the Respondent's account. The High Court further noted that even prima facie, there was no evidence to demonstrate that Rs. 22 Lakh was given to the Plaintiff from the firm's account. Consequently, there was no record suggesting that the mentioned amount was provided to the Petitioner concerning the partnership's business. As a result, the High Court concluded that Clause 22 of the partnership deed, which pertained to arbitration in business-related disputes, would not be applicable in this case.
Title: Shashikant Mishra v. Union of India Through CBI (ACB) Jabalpur
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 39
Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) must ensure that the sanctioning authority won't let the guilty walk away scot-free by wrongfully refusing permission for prosecution.
The Division Bench comprising Justices Sheel Nagu and Vijay Saraf, also clarified that a refusal for prosecution by sanctioning authority based on a separate inquiry conducted through field functionaries is bad in the eyes of law.
It held that the order of refusal to sanction prosecution if derived from such an inquiry, can only be regarded as one based on 'extraneous material'. Such extraneous inquiry that does not involve the investigating agency is prohibited, the court observed.
“It is a little surprising that the sanctioning authority turned a Nelson's eye towards the glaring fact of petitioner having been trapped accepting bribe leading to a prima facie case of commission of offences punishable under the P.C. Act. With this allegation supported by prima facie material, the sanctioning authority was duty-bound to grant sanction…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur opined on referring to Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
Title: Sadashiv Joshi v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Collector Indore & Ors
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 40
Noting that the 'doctrine of finality' in judgments has great sanctity, Madhya Pradesh High Court held a second review petition before it arising out of a writ matter to be non-maintainable.
The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Vinay Shukla acknowledged the dangers of allowing parties to reopen concluded judgments by filing repeated interlocutory applications. Terming the same as an abuse of the process of law with far-reaching consequences in the realm of justice administration, the division bench pointed out that the 'finality of judgment' enjoys great sanctity in a country governed by 'rule of law'.
Afterwards, turning to the factual matrix of the case, the court proceeded to make the following observations:
“…The petitioner has already exhausted remedy of writ petition, writ appeal, review and SLP. All the courts have dismissed the case of the petitioner. In the present case, counsel for petitioner could not point out any grave and palpable errors committed by the courts in its order. Under the garb of review jurisdiction, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-argue the matter again and again.”
Case title: Prahalad Gujar Vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh
Case Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 41
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that the act of taking a 6-year-old child into a closed room, placing her on one's lap, and rubbing her thigh is indicative of the sexual intention of the accused, thereby constituting an offence under the POCSO Act. Justice Prem Narayan Singh, presiding over the bench, emphasized that what constitutes 'outraging of female modesty' is nowhere defined, but the essence of a woman's modesty is her sex and the culpable intention of the appellant is the crux of the matter.
The Court further added that a woman's reaction holds significance, still, its absence may not always be decisive and this principle holds even more weight in the case of a 6-year-old child, wherein, to ascertain the accused's intention, the actions and behaviour of the accused become crucial factors to consider.
These observations were made by the single judge while affirming a judgment of Additional Sessions Judge, Bhanpura convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 363 of the IPC and Section 9(M)/10 of the POCSO Act and sentencing him to undergo 5 years RI.
As per the prosecution's case, on January 31, 2020, the mother of a 6-year-old girl (victim) lodged a police report against the accused stating that he abducted her (prosecutrix) and took her to his home where the appellant touched the prosecutrix illegally to outrage her modesty.
Title: Babulal v. Amra & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 42
Madhya Pradesh High Court had refused to grant a declaration of title based on adverse possession over the suit land on the ground that the appellant/plaintiff was unable to prove such possession was 'adequate in continuity' with the knowledge of the defendants.
The single-judge bench of Justice Hirdesh observed that a person who intends to claim that his title has been perfected by adverse possession must prove three 'necks', i.e., - nec vi, nec clam and nec precario.
“…. In other words, he must show that his possession is adequate in continuity in publicity and in extent. Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found”, the bench sitting at Indore further noted.
returning to the factual matrix of the case, the court felt that the evidence placed before the lower court by the plaintiff was insufficient to show continuous adverse possession over the suit land with knowledge of the defendants. If the documents produced before the trial court are not conclusive enough to establish adverse possession in continuity, it cannot be said that the plaintiff has perfected title over the suit land, the court opined.
Title: Prince Raj v. State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 43
Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently made an observation that being academically good cannot be treated as an excuse when it is clear that the male student has dealt with a female student in a violent and undisciplined manner. The writ petition in the current instance was filed against the disciplinary action taken by the Indian Institute Of Information Technology, Design And Manufacturing, Jabalpur.
The Division Bench comprising of Chief Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Vishal Mishra underscored that no student can be allowed to pollute the atmosphere of educational institutions. The bench sitting at Jabalpur also inferred that the Student Advisory Committee of Senate (SACS) of the IIIT-DM (Jabalpur), while suspending the petitioner-student for one semester, has reasonably stated that his act has created psychological fear in other female students.
“. The petitioner being a student has to abide by all the terms and conditions and is expected to maintain discipline in the institute…. The paramount consideration by a student for an institute is to maintain discipline on a priority basis. If the discipline is not maintained and the student is found involved in such indisciplined activities then the necessary consequences are required to follow..”, the court added.
Title: Rajendra Panwar & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 44
While quashing the ongoing criminal proceedings arising from a matrimonial dispute, Madhya Pradesh High Court has instructed the police to present the charge sheet in the appropriate court with territorial jurisdiction.
The single-judge bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar noted that though the complainant-wife lodged an FIR at Anjad Police Station in Barwani District, no cause of action has arisen at Anjad.
“….it is apparent that the marriage of petitioner No.1(husband)…was solemnized with the respondent No.2 (wife)…on 24.04.2011 at Kukshi, District Dhar, and due to matrimonial discord, and the other incident which the complainant has referred to, regarding assault on her by her husband, which took place outside the Barwani Court premises, whereas, the FIR has been lodged at Police Station Anjad, District Barwani…”, the bench sitting at Indore pointed out.
The husband, father-in-law, and mother-in-law were arraigned for offences under Sections 98A, 341, 323, 506 and 34 of the IPC read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The petitioners argued that the marriage took place at Kukshi and the alleged incident of assault on the complainant also took place elsewhere, and hence the current criminal proceedings before J.F.M.C Anjad couldn't be sustained
Title: Majid @ Bablu & Anr. v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 45
Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that when the trial court could not find any cogent reasoning about the involvement of certain parties in an offence, such persons cannot be proceeded against under Section 319 CrPC [Power To Proceed Against Other Persons Appearing To Be Guilty Of Offence] merely based on suspicion.
The single-judge bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh also remarked that an order under Section 319 CrPC can be made only before the pronouncement of an order acquitting those already arraigned where the conclusion of the trial results in i) acquittal or ii) a joint result. In a case of conviction, the proceedings under Section 319 should be initiated before the imposition of sentence, the court clarified while hearing the criminal revision petition.
“…In this case, 07 of the accused have been acquitted and remaining two have been convicted. As such, this is a case of joint result; i.e. acquittal and conviction, both. Hence, in my considered opinion, the learned trial Court should pass the order under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. before passing the order of acquittal…”, the bench sitting at Indore explained the digression endorsed by the trial court, contrary to the settled position of law in Sukhpal Singh Khaira v. State of Punjab 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 1009, by passing the order for separate trial after acquitting the originally accused
Title: Vijay Singh Yadav & Ors. v. Smt. Krishna Yadav & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 46
Madhya Pradesh High Court, while disposing of a dispute connected to Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Transfer of Name in Land Records) Rules, 2018, has held that a will without any formal proof cannot be acted upon by revenue authorities to mutate the names of beneficiaries.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia pointed out that revenue authorities cannot decide the question of title. The petitioners' contention that revenue authorities can mutate the name of a person on the basis of an unproved will does not hold much ground, the court remarked.
“…, in the light of fact that revenue authorities cannot decide the genuineness of the Will, the rule which permits the mutation of name of a beneficiary on the basis of Will has to be interpreted that the name of a beneficiary can be mutated provided the Will is duly proved and for that purposes the beneficiary has to approach the Civil Court for declaration of his title…”, the court laid down in unequivocal terms.
The counsel for the petitioners had argued that the 2018 Rules allow mutation of names in revenue records based on a Will and revenue authorities are empowered to take steps to that effect. However, the court underscored that the word 'Will' found in the 2018 Rules means 'a valid and genuine Will and not any piece of paper'. Therefore, the procedure for mutation contemplated by the 2018 Rules is not different from that of the law in force, the court further added.
Title: Anshul & Ors. v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Connected Matter
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 47
Madhya Pradesh High Court had imposed Rs 1 Lakh cost on a litigant wife for misusing the process of court by continuing prosecution against the husband and his family even after reaching a settlement and obtaining a decree of divorce by mutual consent.
The single judge bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar opined that the cost imposed would serve as a warning for 'unscrupulous litigants' wasting the valuable time of the courts instead of serious litigation. The court also took note of the fact that the respondent-wife had already received Rs 50 lakhs as a part of the settlement before obtaining a divorce. Therefore, she should deposit the cost to the bank account of the petitioner-husband within four weeks, the court instructed.
The petitioners had filed two separate petitions: one to quash the FIR registered at Vijayanagar Police station, and a criminal revision petition since the charges had already been framed by the trial court in pursuance of the criminal proceedings initiated. While allowing both petitions, the court also referred to judgments where unscrupulous litigations and the continuation of criminal proceedings against the husband even after reaching a compromise were frowned upon by the apex court as a misuse of the court's time. Some of these case laws were Mohd. Shamim & Ors v. Nahid Begum & Anr., AIR 2005 SC 757 and Abhishek v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 731.
Title: Karandeep Singh Chawla v. Gurshish Karandeep Chawla
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 48
Madhya Pradesh High Court recently iterated in a matrimonial dispute that just like a child has the right to the love and affection of both parents, parents too have a right to receive the love and affection of their child.
When the parent who has custody of the child does any act intending to deny such affection to the other parent, such alienation amounts to mental cruelty, the court clarified by relying on previous judgments.
The Division Bench of Justices Sheel Nagu and Vinay Saraf observed,
“…it can be safely observed that in present case also wife has tried to keep away husband from minor daughter and tutored her to speak against her own father. This is serious matter and definitely caused mental cruelty to husband”.
The court also held that the husband is entitled to the decree of dissolution of marriage on account of baseless allegations levelled by the wife against him and his family members, which also amounts to mental cruelty. The court then went on to note that the other ground of desertion by the wife also stood proved since the wife refused to reply to the restitution notice issued by the husband. Instead, she chose to file numerous cases against him without valid grounds, the court added.
Title: I.D. Makrani v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 49
Noting that messages sent in a private group of employees have nothing to do with the office work of the government, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has quashed a suspension order and chargesheet against an employee who allegedly forwarded an objectionable political message to the group.
The single judge bench of Justice Vivek Rusia held that forwarding a message in the WhatsApp group does not come within the purview of Rule 3(1)(i) and (iii) of Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1965 applicable to the petitioner.
“…If any member forwards a message in the Whatsapp group which does not mean that it is his personal opinion. Any message in the form of text, photo or video sent in Whatsapp group is confined to the members of the said group. It cannot be said that message had been made public. The Whatsapp group is always formed by the friends and like-minded people amongst the contact list...”, the court observed that no third person can be added to such groups without prior permission.
Court further noted that the government has not passed any circular or a statutory provision for the formation of any WhatsApp Group for government employees. Moreover, it stated that a person is free to exit the group if he/she is no longer willing to continue. In such circumstances, it can be said that the activity of government employees in such groups cannot be linked with serious disciplinary rules, the bench sitting at Indore emphasised.
Title: Gopal & Ors. v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Station House Officer Thru. P.S. Pansemal
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 50
While setting aside the conviction in a rioting case from 2016 where police authorities themselves were the complainants, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has iterated that when a prosecution case rests solely upon police witnesses, their testimonies will be subjected to strict scrutiny.
The single-judge bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh noted that omissions and contradictions that crop up in the statement of police witnesses during the chief examination and cross-examination will create a cloud of suspicion in cases where the police personnel themselves are the injured complainants.
It was argued that seventeen appellants were convicted by the trial court at Sendhwa for offenses falling under Sections 148, 332/149 & 332 of IPC.
They were sentenced to undergo varying sentences of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine. It was stated that the accused had allegedly assembled before the police station in protest against not permitting to play DJ during the Ganesh Festival procession and threatened that they would not allow any goats to be cut on Eid Festival as revenge.
It was further stated that a crowd gathered and began pelting stones at the police which resulted in injuries for the Head Constable and another constable who was there in the police station. As per the prosecution version, the windows of the police station were also damaged by the sudden onslaught.
Title: Dr. Ashok Verma v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 51
Madhya Pradesh High Court had imposed Rs 2 lakhs cost on SDO (Revenue), Sendhwa and an RTI activist (complainant) to be paid jointly for harassing an elderly couple through proceedings beyond the scope of the law.
According to the court, such harassment was done on the pretext that the petitioner, a retired college principal, issued a false domicile certificate in his wife's favour for B.Ed. admission back in 2013.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vivek Rusia noted that the petitioner, in-charge principal of Sendhwa Govt. Post Graduate College at that time, merely certified that the B.Ed candidate was his wife and she had been residing with him. Merely stating that the candidate -wife was a domicile of the state of Madhya Pradesh since 1980 cannot be equated with the issuance of a domicile certificate, hence the court opined that there was no attempt by the petitioner to usurp the authority of SDO.
“…this petition is allowed with a cost of Rs.2,00,000/- (rupees two lakhs) payable to the petitioner for the harassment meted out to him by respondent No.3 (in person, posted at relevant time) and respondent No.5 jointly and severally. Let cost amount be recovered from the respondents No.3 and 5 and paid to the petitioner”, the bench sitting at Indore accordingly quashed the 2023 order passed by SDO directing the current principal of govt. college to lodge an F.I.R. against the petitioner.
Title: Sumitra Devi Kasdekar v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Police Station Khaknar & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 52
While holding that the Judicial Magistrate First-Class at Burhanpur had no authority to entertain a criminal complaint filed against former Nepanagar MLA Sumitra Devi, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has directed the trial court to forward the complaint under S.156(3) CrPC to the designated special judge of Indore District Court.
The single-judge bench of Justice Sanjay Dwivedi noted that since the offense was allegedly committed when she was the elected representative of Nepanagar, the said offense can be tried only by the competent court in Burhanpur District, and not the JMFC there.
“…The Notification dated 14.12.2021 very specifically portrays and speaks about the direction issued by the Supreme Court. It sets up the Special Courts to deal with the cases relating to Members of Parliament and Members of Legislative Assembly… the Court of Burhanpur, which entertained the complaint, is having no jurisdiction as the said court was not designated to deal with the criminal cases involving MPs and MLAs…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur further observed.
The petitioner, Sumitra Devi Kasdekar, was a Congress MLA for Nepanagar who assumed office in 2018. In August 2020, she left the Indian National Congress and joined BJP. She also emerged victorious in the by-elections afterward and held the post till 2023.
Title: Prakash Kodwani v. Smt. Vimla Devi Lakhwani & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 53
Madhya Pradesh High Court has underscored that the merits of the proposed amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC must not be taken into consideration by the trial court. The amendment application should be allowed by examining the proposed pleadings alone, the court clarified.
The single judge bench of Justice Pranay Verma also added that the amendment sought in the written statement by the petitioner, who is the defendant in the eviction suit, is based on subsequent events. However, the trial court rejected the amendment application by citing that the pleadings were not adequately substantiated by the photographs produced along with it.
The bench sitting at Indore strongly disagreed with the manner in which the trial court carried out the above exercise of adjudicating the amendment application.
“…In the present case, defendant has pleaded acquisition and occupation of alternate accommodation by plaintiffs during pendency of the suit…. The proposed pleading in my opinion was not required to be proved by evidence at the present stage which would be a matter of evidence…”, the court observed.
Title: X v/s Y
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 54
Madhya Pradesh High Court has refused to interfere with a family court order that denied maintenance to a woman on account of the subsistence of her first marriage with another man. The court took the view that a wife should be a 'legally wedded wife' for claiming maintenance under section 125 CrPC.
The single-judge bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh added that the petitioner-woman will be at liberty to avail other remedies such as seeking compensation under Section 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
A woman, having solemnized second marriage to another person, is only entitled to get maintenance from that person, when the first marriage has been declared either null and void or she has obtained a divorce decree from her first husband… the petitioner No. 1 could not get divorce from her earlier husband/Bhagwansingh and could not file any proof of getting divorce…”, the court clarified why maintenance cannot be granted in the case
Though another relief sought in the revision petition pertained to an increase in the quantum of maintenance awarded to the daughter born out of their relationship from Rs 4000 to Rs 5000/, the High Court refused to interfere with the maintenance amount citing the current income of her father. However, the daughter could apply before the Family Court under Section 127 CrPC [Alteration In Allowance Upon Change In Circumstances], the court added.
Title: Arvind Kumar v. Trilok Kumar
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 55
Madhya Pradesh High Court had recently clarified that co-defendants in a suit cannot file cross-suits against each other, and for a separate dispute about the suit property, a separate suit can be filed to which Section 10 of CPC won't be applicable.
While adjudicating the issue, the single-judge bench of Justice Vivek Rusia observed that the inter se dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant in the suit which was stayed by the trial court under Section 10 CPC is not a subject matter of the earlier suit.
“…the dispute between plaintiff and defendant is altogether different dispute in which plaintiff is seeking decree for possession and protection of his suit land. Plaintiff and defendant both are co-defendants in the previous suit and it is a settled law that the co-defendants cannot fight against each other as they cannot file a counter claim against each other…”, the bench sitting at Indore noted.
The court added that the dispute between the plaintiff and defendant who are co-defendants in the earlier suit can only be dealt with in a separate suit.
Title: Rajesh Vijayvargiya v. Chairman Cum Managing Director M.P. Trafac And Investment Felicitation Corporation Limited & ORS.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 56
In a case pertaining to inter se seniority among sub-engineers of Industrial Development Corporation, Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that the merit list can't be overlooked by giving preference to age in matters of promotion.
The single judge bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal observed that when the daily wagers have been placed in a particular order in reference to their merit, then that list cannot be subverted later by giving the age of the respective candidates preference over their merit.
“….when tested from this aspect also then the decision of the authorities to give preference to age over merit without discounting for the merit cannot be given a seal of approval….Petitioner's interse seniority over private respondent Suresh Kumar Soni is restored…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur noted in the order.
It is only in situations where two persons have the same merit that the factor of age is taken into consideration for recruitment, the court made the settled proposition clearer. It is pertinent to note here that both the petitioner and the private respondent were appointed on the same date.
Title: Dr. Rajesh Batra v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 57
Madhya Pradesh High Court had iterated that no prosecution can be launched against a doctor accused of medical negligence without the report of an expert committee as contemplated in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab & Anr. (2005).
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia noted that the complainant did not approach a committee of experts to prove the medical negligence of the doctor concerned.
“…Accordingly, prosecution of the applicant on account of medical negligence cannot be allowed to continue…Resultantly, charge sheet as well as further proceedings in RCT No. 86/2020 pending in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Katni against the applicant are hereby set-aside…”, the court observed.
However, the bench sitting at Jabalpur granted the complainant liberty to approach an expert committee to establish medical negligence. If medical negligence is found to be committed by the doctor in the report, the complainant would be able to move forward with legal action, the court clarified.
The allegation against the doctor posted at Dharmlok Hospital, Katni, was that he wrongly injected the patient's right leg when the latter was under his care for stomach ache. When the right leg turned numb after injection, the patient was referred to various hospitals for further treatment on account of the alleged negligence of the applicant-doctor. Later, the patient's leg was amputated; an FIR was registered in Kotwali police station (Katni District) pursuant to the patient's complaint.
Title: Dilip Sharma & Anr v. State of MP & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 58
Madhya Pradesh High Court had deprecated the practice of availing police protection indefinitely on flimsy grounds without making payments, with the sole intention of "basking in the glory of position and power".
The single judge bench of Justice Anand Pathak underlined that providing police security uninterruptedly when there is no source of threat against the applicants is contrary to the constitutional spirit and undermines 'the well-being quotient of society at large'.
“…Director General of Police, Bhopal and Superintendent of Police, Gwalior are directed to immediately remove the police security given to the petitioners and take appropriate steps for recovery of due amount from petitioners for services rendered in accordance with law including treating dues as arrears of land revenue”, Justice Pathak noted in the order with regards to over 2.5 crores of arrears till 2018 due from the petitioner businessmen, who are siblings, hailing from Gwalior.
After these businessmen were threatened with extortion in 2005, the son of Sanjay Sharma (petitioner no.2), Managing Director, Heeralal Estate and Constructions Private Limited Company, was killed by miscreants. Afterwards, the petitioners continuously sought police protection with the promise of payment despite having licensed weapons of their own. All of the accused were convicted back in 2007 and 2018 vide two separate judgments. Later, when the granted police protection was removed, the petitioners approached the High Court and secured a favourable interim order in 2012.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 59
Madhya Pradesh High Court had underscored that compelling a married woman to live in her parental home for less dowry would amount to mental cruelty.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia added that the same would constitute a continuous offence which gives the aggrieved woman a fresh cause of action every day from there on.
“It is true that there may not be any physical cruelty after the separation but under section 498-A of IPC, cruelty may be of mental or physical. If a lady has been ousted from her matrimonial house, then certainly it will have impact on her mind amounting to mental cruelty….then it would become a continuous offence and every day would give a fresh cause of action”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur noted in the order.
The F.I.R. was filed by the wife allegedly three years after the separation; the complaint filed in 2021 stated that her husband, mother-in-law and relatives subjected her to torture, including physical and mental cruelty, for bringing less dowry. Her husband and mother-in-law allegedly used to beat her up by demanding an additional Rs 10 lakhs.
The allegations of physical cruelty meted out by the mother-in-law is sufficient for the prosecution of offences mentioned in the F.I.R., the court opined. The court opined that there is sufficient material available against the husband as well for warranting prosecution.
Title: Smt. Sampat Devi & Ors v. Branch Manager Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 60
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had criticised a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Tikamgarh for not disbursing the claim amount citing the non-furnishing of security by the owner of the offending vehicle.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal held that the law, as it stands, prevents the tribunal from withholding the award amount deposited by the insurance company even if there are infractions of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy by the driver or owner of the offending vehicle. In such scenarios, the insurance company can always recover the said amount from the latter without making the claimant suffer, the court clarified.
“…since the owner insured has already appeared and he has failed to satisfy the requirement of the orders of the Coordinate Bench of this Court and the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court and has not furnished the security, then the course open to the Tribunal is as prescribed in the judgment of three Judges in Pappu and others (supra) and by no stretch of imagination, that amount can be withheld by the Tribunal…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur noted in the order.
Additionally, the court reprimanded the tribunal for not paying attention to the three-judge bench judgment that was delivered in 2018. The court reminded that all district court judges have been given access to software of SCC by the High Court.
Title: Gauri Shankar Bisen v. Sanjay Nagayach & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 61
Observing that specific allegations have been made out, Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed a petition to quash the proceedings in a criminal defamation case pending against former BJP Minister Gauri Shankar Bisen.
The single-judge bench of Justice Sanjay Dwivedi observed that the statements of witnesses mention the former Co-operative Minister addressing Sanjay Nagayach, former Chairman of Panna Central Co-operative Bank, as 'Chor' in a public gathering. The court inferred that the above premise prima facie indicates that the comment allegedly made by the Minister lowered the Chairman's image in the public eye.
“…I am of the opinion that in the complaint, specific allegations have been made by complainant against the present petitioner and in the statement, the witnesses have also stated that the present petitioner has alleged against the complainant in a pubic meeting addressing him as 'Chor' which otherwise lowered his image in public”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur reasoned why the dismissal of the petition under Section 482 CrPC is necessitated.
Bisen, a veteran BJP leader, was a Member of the Legislative Assembly from Balaghat Assembly Constituency from 2008 till 2023.
In 2014, a complaint was filed by Mr. Nagayach as per Section 200 Cr. P.C. for the offence under Section 500 IPC against Mr. Bisen and five others. According to the allegations, Bisen visited Panna along with another minisiter Brijendra Pratap Singh and lowered the reputation of Nagayach by calling him 'Chor' while addressing the public gathering. According to the complainant, he was the leader of the petitioner's rival political organisation when the alleged incident happened. The defamatory comment was inspired by political agenda, the counsel for Nagayach argued before the High Court.
Title: Javed Naseem v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 62
Madhya Pradesh High Court recently refused to quash criminal proceedings pending against a husband and the witnesses who signed talaknama for granting Talaq-e-ahsan to a woman in contravention of Section 2(c) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019.
The applicant-husband primarily submitted that Talaq-e-ahsan has no instantaneous effect and it becomes effective only after the completion of the wife's three menstrual cycles.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia held that it does not become lawful merely by virtue of the husband's discretion to withdraw the same before the Talaq comes into force. It was further noted thad that before the period of iddah was over, the appellant had illegally pronounced talaq ul biddat or triple talaq to his wife.
The court, after perusing the Talaq-e-ahsan sent by the applicant-husband by registered post on 30.01.2023, noted that the husband is effectively putting pressure on the complainant wife to come back during the period of iddah by threatening that Talaq would take effect otherwise. Therefore, the court felt that Talaq-e-ahsan sent by the husband is akin to 'instantaneous talaq'.
“….Merely because the applicant has sent Talaq-e-ahsan with aforesaid condition would not take his case out of the purview of section 2(c) of the 2019 Act, because the applicant has already expressed his intention to grant irrevocable talaq to respondent No.2. Such a Talaq-e ahsan sent by the applicant is contrary to the reasons and objects of the 2019 Act”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur laid down in unequivocal terms.
Title: Suresh Dhakad v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 63
Stating that police have nothing to do with the type of allegations involved, Madhya Pradesh High Court has refused to interfere with the lower court orders that disallowed police investigation in a criminal complaint filed against comedian Kapil Sharma.
In 2021, a lawyer named Suresh Dhakad preferred a complaint under Section 190-200 of Cr.P.C. against Kapil Sharma, the anchor of 'The Kapil Sharma Show', and N.P Singh, C.E.O of Sony Television Channel over which the contentious programme was aired.
While considering the application filed by Dhakad against Shivpuri J.M.F.C's order dated 19.04.2023 and Shivpuri 5th Additional Session Judge's dismissal of criminal revision dated 06.12.2023, the single judge bench of Justice Anand Pathak noted as below:
“….. It appears that petitioner is aggrieved by the way court has been depicted in the television show. Therefore, prime source is recording of programme. Police has little role to play and if learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Shivpuri has declined to entertain the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. then it has not caused any illegality, perversity or impropriety…”
The bench sitting at Gwalior felt that the complainant will have to 'stand on his own legs' and collect necessary evidence, and depose satisfactorily before the trial court to justify his complaint.
“… Shoulder of police cannot be used to gain mileage if the aim is of that nature.”, the court added about the application filed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
Allegedly, in 'The Kapil Sharma Show', the comedian attempted to undermine the majesty of courts by picturising it offensively via a courtroom set. As per the version of the complainant-lawyer, on 21st April 2021, Sharma depicted the court proceedings while taking a liquor bottle in his hands and exhibiting its consumption. The lawyer has also accused Sharma of meting out verbal and abusive comments in the set of the courtroom, which could potentially tarnish the image of the courts.
Title: Rishabh Khare v. The State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 64
Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently iterated that grave suspicion about a person committing certain offences is sufficient for the trial court to frame charges. The High Court was considering a challenge against the trial court's order of framing charges under Sections 5 and 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia noted the moot point involved was whether a customer, who had paid money for 'procuring' a girl could be punished under Sections 5 & 6 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 or not.
“….in view of the fact that there is specific allegation that the girl was procured by the applicant for the purpose of prostitution coupled with the fact that there was no such material in the case of Naman Laddha (supra), this Court is of considered opinion that this case is distinguishable from the facts of the case of Naman Laddha (supra)”, the court held in the order since the petitioner had relied on the ratio in Naman Laddha v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2022).
About Section 6 of the Act and its inclusion in the chargesheet, Justice Ahluwalia said that the aspects of whether the girl's detention in the premises where prostitution is carried out was with her consent or not, and whether the act of procuring a person would amount to abetment to commit an offence under section 6 of the 1956 Act or not can be determined at trial after recording evidence.
Title: M/S Banco Construction Pvt Ltd Vs Narmada Extrusions Ltd
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 65
The Madhya Pradesh High Court single bench of Justice Anand Phatak held that proceedings under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act regarding dishonoring of cheques and arbitration are two proceedings moving in different jurisdictional realm and they are parallel in nature rather than overlapping. It held that “both may continue because scope of Section 138 of the N.I. Act is confined to the dishonoured cheques, whereas dispute between the parties appears to be such deep and exact depth can only be fathomed by the arbitrator where parties would have all opportunities to canvas their cause.”
The Applicant approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court (“High Court”) under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (“Arbitration Act”) seeking several reliefs. These included the filing of certified copies, the appointment of an independent arbitrator(s) as per arbitration agreement clause 14.7, asserting territorial jurisdiction for appointing an independent sole arbitrator, and any further orders deemed fit by the High Court.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 66
The Madhya Pradesh High Court, while granting protection to a young live-in couple - both the boy and the girl aged 19 years- sounded a word of caution about youngsters getting into relationships and leaving their families at an early stage of life.
Since the petitioners had attained the age of majority and affirmed that they were acting out of free choice, the Court (Indore Bench) granted them protection. At the same time, the bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar observed, “Having held so, this Court must record its concern on the choices, the youngsters are making these days. Although there is much to ponder over this subject but it must be remembered that even though certain rights have been conferred by the Constitution, it is not necessary to enjoy, and enforce them as well.”
The petition filed by the petitioners, both of whom are aged 19 years sought that the respondents no.2 and 3 i.e., the Sanawad Dist. Khargone (Madhya Pradesh) and the Station House Officer P.S. Sanawad Dist. Khargone (Madhya Pradesh) be directed to give proper protection and help against the respondent no.4 to 6 and their associates.
Both the petitioners also sought that they be given full protection and security and a false case should not be registered against the petitioner no.2
In view of the aforesaid, the Madhya Pradesh Court allowed the petition as despite the fact that, “both the petitioners are 19 years old only, and the petitioner no.2 has not even completed 21 years, since he is a major, he is entitled to reside as per his own will, and if he so decides, his choice needs to be protected from external forces.”
Title: The State Of Madhya Pradesh Thr. Principal Secretary, School Education Department & Ors v. Jagdish Prasad Dubey & Connected Matters
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 67
A full bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that recovery can be ordered to be effected from the pensionary benefits or the salary in view of the undertaking or indemnity bond given by the employee at the stage when the grant of benefit of pay refixation is made. However, while answering the questions posed in the reference, the High Court has clarified that this would mean dues can be realised from a 'retiring' employee, and not a 'retired' employee, as per Rule 65 of MP Civil Service Pension Rules, 1976.
The bench of Chief Justice Ravi Malimath, Justice Vishal Mishra and Justice Pramod Kumar Agarwal further made it clear that if an employee was forced to give an undertaking at the time of refixation of pay, it won't be enforceable for the purpose of recovery of money at a later stage.
“….in case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited (supra)…It was held that the employer should not be allowed to take advantage of its position. Therefore, the condition of furnishing an undertaking cannot be forced upon a Government servant... Therefore in all those cases where the Government servants have furnished an undertaking willingly at the time when the benefits of revision of pay have been extended to them, in such an event, they are bound by the undertaking and not otherwise”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur clarified.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 68
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that a wife can be debarred from getting maintenance on the ground of “adultery” only when she is actually “living in adultery” at or around the time of application for maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC.
A bench of Justice Prakash Chandra Gupta added that the acts of adultery by the wife have to be continuous and the liability to prove the same is upon the husband to debar wife from getting maintenance as per Section 125 (4) CrPC.
The Court observed thus while dismissing a plea moved by a husband challenging a family court's order directing him to pay Rs.10,000/- per month maintenance to his wife (respondent) on a plea moved by her under Section 125 CrPC.
In the family court, the wife asserted that her husband began pressuring her for dowry shortly after their marriage. She claimed that when she didn't meet his demands, he resorted to physical violence against her. She further alleged that a year before filing for maintenance, her husband forced her out of the matrimonial house, leaving her to reside in a rented room without any support from him.
The Court noted that as per Sectio 125 (4) CrPC, a wife is not entitled to any maintenance allowance from her husband if she is living in adultery or if she has refused to live with her husband without any sufficient reason or if they are living separately by mutual consent
The Court, however, noted that the law mandates that to extract the provision under Section 125(4) of the CrPC, the husband has to establish with definite evidence that the wife has been living in adultery, and one or occasion acts of adultery committed in isolation would not amount to “living in adultery”.
Title: Gajendra Sharma v. State Of Madhya Pradesh & Arun Kumar Soni v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 69
In a case where the Branch Managers (Sales) of Bajaj Appliances Private Limited had been implicated as accused, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has listed planting the saplings of ten 'fruit-bearing trees' or 'neem/pipal trees' as one of the conditions for grant of anticipatory bail.
The single-judge bench of Justice Anand Pathak also asked the applicants to furnish a personal bond to the tune of Rs 50,000/- with two sureties for the grant of bail.
“Considering the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the rival parties and the fact the applicant is agent only and Company has tried to cheat the complainant, but without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, this Court intends to allow this application under Section 438 of Cr.P.C…”, the bench sitting at Gwalior said in the order.
Justice Pathak also directed the accused to take good care of the trees they would be planting in Sirol Hills. He said:
Firstly, the accused should adequately protect the saplings from nearby flora through measures such as fencing. To ensure the same, the court has also demanded photographs of the growing saplings from the accused in due course of time, i.e., within 30 days. These accused will also be required to submit status reports pertaining to the planted saplings every three months until the completion of the trial.
Title: Vijay Kumar Punj v. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 70
Madhya Pradesh High Court had granted relief to a police officer whose case of promotion was held in a sealed cover citing the pendency of an allegedly fabricated criminal case, registered against him 28 years before in Uttar Pradesh.
The single judge bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal opined that the government's action which is detrimental to the petitioner officer, Vijay Kumar Punj (DSP, CID-Bhopal), is not justified. The court has instructed that the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) kept in a sealed cover until now must be opened and acted upon, subject to the outcome of the criminal case.
“With the aforesaid stipulation, it is directed that sealed cover be opened and if petitioner is found fit for promotion as per the recommendations of the D.P.C., the said recommendations be acted upon with a condition that the promotion if so granted will be subject to outcome of that criminal case”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur noted that the said exercise should be completed by the department within 60 days.
title - Nisha Saket vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 71
The Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the wife's act of not preparing the food in time, compelling the husband to do household chores and going to the market along with other persons for shopping purposes does not attract the offence of abetment of suicide.
While setting aside an order of the Sessions Judge, Umaria framing charge under Section 306 IPC against the wife for allegedly abetting her husband's suicide, a bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia observed thus:
“In cases of abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect acts or incitement of commission of suicide. Acts involve multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviour and reactions or in the cases of abetment, Court must look for cogent and convincing proof of acts of incitement of commission of suicide”
The Court was dealing with a plea filed by one Nisha Saket (applicant), against whom, a charge had been framed for abetting her husband's suicide.
The primary allegations against the applicant-wife revolved around her alleged rude behaviour towards her in-laws and her deceased husband. It was alleged that she did not maintain a good relationship with her in-laws and failed to adequately care for her husband. There were instances where she did not prepare meals for her husband on time, leading to him sometimes going on duty without eating.
title - Alka Sharma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 72
In a ruling, the Madhya Pradesh High Court had said that the mere act of a mother-in-law objecting to the household work of her daughter-in-law does not constitute cruelty under Section 498-A IPC.
"If the daughter-in-law gets mental harassment on account of certain objections raised by her mother-in-law in the household works, then it can be said that the daughter-in-law may be hypersensitive. But, certain disputes with regard to household works would certainly not amount to cruelty," a bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia observed.
The single judge added that if a mother-in-law tries to stay away from the personal disputes in the life of the husband and wife, then also it cannot be said that such an act of mother-in-law would amount to cruelty as per the requirement of Section 498A IPC.
The court made these observations while allowing a plea filed by one Alka Sharma (mother-in-law) seeking quashing of FIR and subsequent proceedings in a case lodged against her (filed by her daughter-in-law) for the offences under Sections 498-A, 506 r/w Section 34 of IPC and Section 3, 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.
The facts, in brief, are as follows: At the time of marriage, the applicant (mother-in-law) was employed and stationed in Chakhrata, Uttarakhand. However, four months into the marriage between respondent no. 2 (daughter-in-law) and her son/husband, the applicant opted for voluntary retirement and relocated to Pune, where they all began residing together.
As per the allegations levelled by the daughter-in-law, her mother-in-law (applicant) started interfering in household matters upon moving in and her husband began siding with the applicant. It was alleged that the applicant frequently mentioned astrological predictions indicating two marriages for respondent no. 2, causing mental distress to her.
Title: Girish Mehta v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 73
Imposing an exemplary cost of Rs 1.5 lakh on all parties in a Section 482 Cr. P.C Petition, the Madhya Pradesh High Court highlighted that advocates appearing for the parties owed a duty to the court to 'argue responsibly'.
The single-judge bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar reprimanded the counsel for the petitioner and objectors for arguing the entire disputed facts in a plea for quashing the FIR, as if in a writ petition, by placing on record scores of documents that do not form a part of the charge sheet. The court felt that the counsels are 'treating the courts as their playground' in the backdrop of a fierce legal battle over the ancestral property that's ongoing between the petitioner and the objectors.
“…Although, the petitioner was entitled to file the petition for quashing the FIR, however, from the scores of documents which have been relied upon by the petitioner, which do not form the part of the charge-sheet, and the leisurely manner in which the entire matter has been argued by the counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered opinion that the counsel also owe a duty to the court to argue responsibly and not for the gallery”, the bench sitting at Indore accordingly noted.
Title: Anil Kumar v. Balwantsingh Sethi
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 74
Madhya Pradesh High Court has iterated that the defect of mentioning incorrect dates of cheque in the complaint cannot be cured since there is no provision in the CrPC to amend the criminal complaint.
The single-judge bench of Justice Pranay Verma observed that the defect in the dates of the cheque is a 'substantial infirmity', especially when summons have already been issued to the accused and he has appeared before the trial court.
“…. The amendment if permitted would change the entire nature of the complaint as the date of the cheques itself would be altered. The facts proposed to be inserted by way of the amendment are not at all based upon subsequent events. If the amendment is permitted it would certainly cause prejudice to the accused….”, the bench sitting at Indore opined that the trial court has erred by allowing the amendments sought by the respondent.
Before dismissing the Section 482 Cr.P.C. application preferred by the accused, the court emphasised that the amendment to a limited extent was allowed in S.R. Sukumar since it did not change the original nature of the complaint. The facts proposed by the amendment in that particular case were based on subsequent events. Justice Verma, therefore, opined that the trial court had committed an error by allowing the application for making amendments to the original complaint filed under Section 138 of NI Act. Similarly, the accused had also challenged the trial court's order that rejected his Section 142 application (expiry of limitation period) before the High Court.
Title: Fulkunwar v. Saksham Pradikari, Writ Petition NO. 6939 of 2024
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 75
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh had held that a writ petition filed to challenge an arbitral award is not maintainable in view of the efficacious alternative statutory remedy available under Section 34 of the A&C Act.
The bench of Justices Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Gajendra Singh held that a writ petition should be dismissed in limine when there is a statutory appeal available. It held that statutory remedies available under Sections 34 and 37 of the A&C Act cannot be bypassed by the parties.
The petitioner challenged an arbitral award dated 03.08.2023 passed by the arbitrator under Section 3(G)(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. The respondent objected to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that there is an alternative efficacious remedy available under Section 34 of the A&C Act and the award must be challenged under the statutory provisions only.
The Court observed that the award is passed pursuant to a reference under Section 3(G)(5) of the National Highways Act and that the arbitration under the NHAI Act is governed by the provisions of the A&C Act.
The Court held that a writ petition should be dismissed in limine when there is a statutory appeal available. It held that statutory remedies available under Sections 34 and 37 of the A&C Act cannot be bypassed by the parties. Accordingly, the Court upheld the objection and dismissed the petition as non-maintainable.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 76
Madhya Pradesh High Court had clarified that a woman will be entitled to maintenance when the parties are living as husband and wife for a long time, given that there is no specific finding that she is not the legally wedded wife.
In the instant case, the single judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia concluded that the trial court was right in awarding maintenance to the aggrieved woman.
“….this Court is of considered opinion that since the applicant and respondent were residing as husband and wife for a considerable long time and in absence of any specific finding by the Trial Court that respondent is not a legally wedded wife of the applicant, this Court is of considered opinion that the Trial Court did not commit any mistake by awarding maintenance to the respondent under Section 125 of Cr.P.C”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur noted in the order after considering the totality of facts and circumstances in the case.
Case title - Nitish Umariya and others vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and another
Case citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 77
The Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that not providing food to the married woman on account of non-fulfilment of the demand of dowry would amount to physical and mental harassment.
A bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia added that compelling a married woman to live in her parental home on account of non fulfillment of demand of dowry would certainly amount to mental harassment, punishable under section 498-A of IPC.
The Court made these observations while dismissing a petition moved by a husband (applicant no. 1) and his family members seeking to quash an FIR lodged at the instance of the wife (respondent no. 2) for the offence under sections 498-A, 506, 34 of I.P.C. read with section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
The impugned FIR had been lodged by respondent No.2 (wife) on the allegations that upon her marriage to applicant No.1 (husband) in April 2018, adequate dowry was provided by her father. However, the applicants (husband and in-laws) allegedly refused to provide her with food, keeping it hidden and leaving her hungry and thirsty. The FIR claimed that she had been subjected to mental harassment due to her failure to bring an air-conditioned car as part of her dowry.
Title: Ramesh Kumar Khandelwal v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, WP No. 11123 of 2019
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 78
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur bench had held that a writ would not be entertained when the petitioners fail to avail the efficacious contractual remedy before the Arbitrator.
The bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia held that merely because the nominated arbitrator is the managing director of the respondent corporation, it cannot be assumed that it would not be able to fairly discharge its functions as an arbitrator.
The petitioners (Rice Millers) entered into several agreements with Respondent (MP State Corporative Marketing Federation) for milling of paddy. In terms of the agreement, the entire paddy was to be milled within a period of 45 days. Upon failure, the respondent could impose penalty or refuse to accept the converted rice.
A dispute arose between the parties when the respondent refused to accepted the stocks available with the petitioners due to their failure to follow the timeline within which the entire supply was to be made. Thereafter, the impugned order was issued by respondent no.2 (Managing Director) wherein it was decided that the stock would be taken subject to imposition of penalty.
The Court observed the petitioners have no right to claim extension under the contract. It observed that the issue of extension is for the Union of India to decide and the respondent did pursue the matter with Union of Indian which declined to extend it.
The Court observed that the grievance of the respondent can be addressed through arbitration. It held that a writ would not be entertained when the petitioners fail to avail the efficacious contractual remedy before the Arbitrator.
title - Pawan Kumar vs. Dr. Babita Jain
Case citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 79
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that if the husband objects to his wife's act of financially supporting her parents, the same would amount to cruelty.
A bench of Justice Rohit Arya and Justice Sanjeev S Kalgaonkar also added that making complaints to the employers of the wife as to how they had kept her at a job without his (husband's) permission, constitutes treating the wife as a “slave”, stripping her of her own identity, thus constituting cruelty.
These observations were made by the division bench while DISMISSING an appeal filed by the husband under section 19 of the Family Courts Act challenging a judgment of the Family Court whereby the court had allowed the wife's petition under section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and a decree of divorce had been granted.
The marriage of the appellant (husband) and respondent (wife) was solemnized in April 2002 as per Hindu rites and rituals, however, they are presently living separately without cohabitation for the last 15 years since February 2009.
8 years after the marriage, the wife, a doctor by profession, made a petition under section 13 of the HM Act before the Family Court alleging that her husband had no source of earnings and his sole intention of marriage was to lead a luxurious life on her income. She also alleged that after their marriage, her husband took her to his house in Sagar and demanded that she cut ties with her parents. He controlled her finances and forbade her from seeking employment outside the home.
Considering overall circumstances reflected by evidence on record, the trial Court committed no error in granting the decree for divorce under section 13(1)(ia) of the Act, the HC held as it dismissed husband's appeal.
Title: Sukhendra Chatuvedi v. Neha & Anr .
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 80
Madhya Pradesh High Court underscored that the wife leading a modern life that's immoral in her husband's eyes cannot be a ground for denying maintenance when it's not shown that she has been living separately from her husband without sufficient cause.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia opined that as long as the wife is not committing any offense or indulging in any criminal activity while leading her modern life, mere differences between the spouses do not affect the matter of maintenance.
Thus, this court cannot hold that if the wife is leading a modern life and if such an act of the wife is immoral in the eyes of her husband, then wife is wrong…If there are differences between the applicant and his wife on this issue, then this Court can only say that so long as respondent No.1 is not indulged in criminal activity, she is free to live her life as per own wishes whether orthodox or modern”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur observed
The respondent-wife and son were awarded Rs 5000/- and Rs 3000/- respectively as monthly maintenance by JMFC, Amarpatan, District Satna, which was later affirmed by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Satna in 2023. In the application under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court, the applicant-husband, who is also a lawyer, alleged that he belonged to a very orthodox family. However, his wife has been living a very modern life, as evidenced by her Facebook and social media posts, it was averred. The husband also submitted that he was willing to pay the maintenance amount ordered for his 1-year-old son. Be that as it may, in view of the lifestyle choices made by his wife, no maintenance may be granted to her, the applicant added.
Title: Bharat Singh Chouhan & Ors v. The Madhya State Of Pradesh Through Collector Katni District & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 81
The Madhya Pradesh High Court, while dealing with proceedings arising out of a matrimonial dispute, held that concealing the true educational qualification and lying about it for the purpose of marriage does not constitute the offence of deceiving or cheating as contemplated in Sections 415 and 420 of IPC. The court also highlighted that none of the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act would cover the said instance either as a condition for the marriage or for granting a divorce.
“The counsel for petitioner as well as petitioner No.3 could not justify as to how the performance of marriage by giving false information about educational qualification would amount to deceiving a person to deliver the property. The petitioner No.3 is admittedly cannot be said to be property. The word “deceive” clearly indicates otherwise a person was not bound to deliver the property”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur emphasized.
Justice G.S. Ahluwalia underscored that petitioner no.3/husband failed to prove how the act of his wife, who allegedly gave false information that she has passed Class-12th when she has only passed Class-10th would amount to deceiving or cheating.
Any marriage conducted on the basis of wrong information about educational qualification will not make it a void or voidable marriage within the definitions of Sections 11 and 12 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the court remarked.
Title: Ramesh Kumar v. Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority, Arbitration Revision No. 47 of 2022
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 82
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh, at Jabalpur, has held that the Arbitration under Section 7 of the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983 cannot be invoked without first invoking the pre-arbitral in-house remedy provided under the agreement within the period of 30 days given under the Agreement.
The bench of Justices Sheel Nagu and Vinay Saraf held that the pre-arbitral in-house remedy must be invoked within the 30 days from the termination of the works order as provided under the agreement. It held the 3 year limitation period as provided under Section 7 of the Act of 1983 would not be available for reference before the in-house authority.
A works contract was issued in favour of the petitioner by the respondent. Clause 29 of the works contract provided that the party aggrieved by termination has to make a reference to the Chief Executive Officer of the respondent within 30 days of such termination and only upon the failure of proceedings before the authority, the party can invoke arbitration under Section 7-B(2-A) of the Act. The respondent terminated the works contract issued in favour of the petitioner on 25.06.2004, leading to a dispute between the parties. However, the petitioner failed to make a reference before the in-house authority within the 30 days period before the in-house authority.
The Court observed that Clause 29 of the works contract required the petitioner to challenge termination of the contract within 30 days before the Chief Executive Officer and only upon failure of proceedings before the in-house authority, the petitioner was entitled to invoke arbitration under Section 7 of the Act. The Court held that the pre-arbitral in-house remedy must be invoked within the 30 days from the termination of the works order as provided under the agreement. It held the 3 year limitation period as provided under Section 7 of the Act of 1983 would not be available for reference before the in-house authority.
Title: Ilwonhibrand Co. Ltd. vs Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd. and Others
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 83
The Madhya Pradesh High Court division bench of Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice Devnarayan Mishra dismissed a petition seeking interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, stating it should have been filed as a 'Miscellaneous Civil Case' rather than an 'Arbitration Case' based on Chapter 2 of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings) Rules, 2008.
Ilwonhibrand Co. Ltd. (“Petitioner”) entered into a sale contract with Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd. (“Respondent”) for the supply of 2014 MT of 'Full-Fat Soya Grits'. However, the Respondent breached the contract by delivering inadequate goods, bypassing the quantity and quality requirements of the contract. When the governmental authorities conducted a raid, they sealed the Petitioner's premises due to the substandard materials supplied by the Respondent. The Petitioner promptly notified the Respondents of the breach, to which the Respondent admitted its fault. The Respondent also promised to pay compensation for the breach. However, it was never initiated.
Subsequently, another sale contract was entered between the Petitioner and the Respondent, wherein the Respondent demanded an increased rate, issued a proforma invoice, and received payment from the Petitioner. Nevertheless, the Respondent breached this contract as well.
In the High Court's opinion, it was evident that the nature of the case and the relief sought by the Petitioner did not align with the characteristics of an arbitration case. Instead, the High Court asserted that the petition should have been filed as a 'Miscellaneous Civil Case', falling under the broader category of civil applications not specified elsewhere, as stipulated by sub-rule 8 of Rule 10 of Chapter 2 of the 2008 Rules.
Consequently, the High Court dismissed the petition, while simultaneously granting the Petitioner the liberty to file a miscellaneous civil case under sub-rule 8 of the 2008 Rules.
Title: V v. R & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 84
Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that an isolated instance of adultery can't disentitle a wife to receive maintenance from her husband. To attract the rigors of Section 125(4) Cr.P.C, the wife should be 'living in adultery' through 'continuous and repeated acts of adultery,' the court made it clear.
“… 'living in adultery' means only continuous and repeated acts of adultery…. The learned trial Court has considered the whole evidence…after considering the whole evidence found that on substratum of the single instance in living adultery, the wife could not be eschewed from getting the maintenance under Section 125(4) of Cr. P.C”, the bench sitting at Indore concluded.
The single-judge bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh mentioned that 'relevance' and 'admissibility' may seem synonymous with each other, and the finding of adultery in the divorce decree is 'relevant' in deciding the issue of maintenance as per Section 41 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, 'relevance' and 'admissibility' have varying legal implications, the court added.
“…For example, an evidence of a witness who dies prior to his cross-examination is relevant though the evidentiary value will depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. Certainly, relevant evidence is prima facie admissible unless it is secluded for some other reasons”, the court clarified further.
Title: Govind Khandelwal v. Suresh Khandelwal & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 85
Stating that there is no error apparent on the face of the record warranting interference, Madhya Pradesh High Court had refused to exercise review jurisdiction in a matter where 'Aare' was used instead of 'Hectare' while drafting the sale deed.
The Division Bench of Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice Gajendra Singh held that none of the grounds available for review as set out in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC were made out in the case.
“…it is seen that in para 11 and 13 of the order impugned detailed factual discussions have been made wherein, it has also been considered that while drafting the sale deed instead of using word "Hectare" the word "Aare" has been used which cannot be said to be an apparent error on the face of the record,” the bench sitting at Indore observed before dismissing the review petition.
The petitioner had challenged a single judge order which upheld mutation of land as per the sale deed which mentioned the word 'Aare' instead of 'Hectare'. The question under consideration in the previous proceedings was whether the revision petitioner had earlier sold 0.314 Hectares of land to others via a sale deed and whether the mutation as per the contentious sale deed was allowed by the Board of Revenue justly or not.
Title: Rakesh Pandey v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Principal Secretary School Education Department & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 86
In reference to the Samvida Shala Shikshak Grade-III Recruitment Scam in Rampur Naikin, the Madhya Pradesh High Court stated that it is clear from the records that the state authorities have carried out the appointment process by defying due procedure. The court also reprimanded the state government for not following the applicable provisions in Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Shiksha Karmi (Recruitment and Condition of Service) Rules, 1997.
The Division Bench of Chief Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Vishal Mishra clarified that once the role of concerned officers in unlawfully granting appointments is reflected from the record before the Revenue Commissioner, the further direction for registration of FIR against them doesn't warrant the court's interference.
“…It is the settled law that once the cognizable offence is being pointed to the police authorities then they are duty bound to register an FIR. Even otherwise, prior to registration of an FIR, no opportunity of hearing to be granted to the concerning in terms of the settled principles of law. ..” the bench sitting at Jabalpur observed by relying on the Division Bench judgment in Arvind Kumar Gautam v. State of Madhya Pradesh.
Hence, the court noted that the petitioner appointees and concerned authorities will have the opportunity to defend themselves when and if a criminal case is registered against them. By stating the above reasons, the court refused to interfere with the order in the writ.
Title: Sushil v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 87
Reasoning that the test identification parade was sufficient to establish the involvement of the convict, Madhya Pradesh High Court had refused to suspend the sentence of Sushil Mishra for planting explosives in a hostel room at Ujjain back in 2016.
According to the court, since the room in the hostel was taken by the appellant using the fake identity card of a non-existent Muslim individual, there was a clear motive to create communal disturbance by showing the involvement of a Muslim organization during the Sinhasta Mela at Ujjain.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla observed that the commission of the offense by the appellant was established through the identification done by the caretaker as well as the manager of the hostel where the explosives were found. While dismissing the I. A for suspension of sentence in the criminal appeal, the bench sitting at Indore noted as below:
“…considering the serious nature of offence to create communal disturbance the occasion of Sinhast at Ujjain in order to show the involvement of Muslim organization by creating fake identity of a muslim person and urdu papers, this Court does not find any case for grant of suspension of jail sentence”.
Title: Dainik Bhaskar Through Its Authorised Representative Rajkumar Sahu v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Principal Secretary Labour Department & Ors. and Connected Matters
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 88
In a petition filed by Dainik Bhaskar challenging the order passed by the Labour Court (Hoshangabad), the Madhya Pradesh High Court has clarified that a declaration given by the employee stating that he is satisfied with the wages under Section 20(j) of Majithia Wage Board Recommendations cannot be deemed to be absolute. The employee receiving lesser wages won't be estopped from claiming higher wages as per the standards enshrined in Majithia Board Recommendations, the court added.
Upon a recommendation from Dy. Labour Commissioner, a reference was made by the state government pursuant to a statement of claim made by the newspaper employee under Section 17(2) of The Working Journalists And Other Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 for pay scale enhancement. Adjudicating the said reference, the Labour Court had directed Dainik Bhaskar to pay an additional amount of Rs. 9,82,751/- along with Rs. 22,031/- towards interim relief for his stint as the Sub-Editor and Dy. News Editor at DB for the period of 2009-2016.E PERIOD OF 2009
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia held that Clause 20(j) of the Board Recommendations should be interpreted in such a manner that a declaration under the same could only allow an employee to draw wages higher than what has been prescribed by the Board, and the same can be retained by such employee.
The employer will not be in a position to reduce the pay scale later by strictly adhering to the pay recommendations made by the Board, the court underscored.
89. Unnatural Sex By A Man With Wife Not Rape, Absence Of Woman's Consent Immaterial: MP High Court
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 89
Noting that 'Marital rape' has not been recognised as an offence in India, the Madhya Pradesh High Court has observed that any sexual intercourse, including unnatural sex by a man with a wife, won't amount to rape as the consent of the wife becomes immaterial in such cases.
A bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia held that if a wife is residing with her husband during the subsistence of a valid marriage, then any sexual intercourse or sexual act by a man with his own wife not below the age of fifteen years will not be rape.
"...insertion of penis in the anus of a woman has also been included in the definition of 'rape' and any sexual intercourse or sexual act by the husband with her wife not below the age of fifteen years is not a rape, then under these circumstances, absence of consent of wife for unnatural act loses its importance", remarked single judge.
The Court, however, added that the only exception to this position of law is Section 376-B of IPC, where the sexual act with his own wife during the separate living on account of judicial separation or otherwise would be rape.
Referring to Exception 2 of Section 375, the Court noted that sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen years of age, will not amount to rape.
The Court made these observations while quashing an FIR lodged against one Manish Sahu by his wife alleging, inter alia, a commission of unnatural offence as per Section 377 of IPC.
Title: Maharishi Panini Sanskrit Evam Vedic University Vs Kumari Rajani Verma
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 90
The Madhya Pradesh High Court single bench of Justice Anil Verma held that the termination of the Worklady's services was justified due to unsatisfactory performance and loss of confidence in the Management, nullifying the Labour Court's award of reinstatement and back-wages.
The bench noted that the Worklady was not a permanent employee, therefore, formal disciplinary proceedings were not required before her termination. Further, the Management was an educational institute which is distinct from an Industrial Establishment. Therefore, the work conditions of the Worklady were subject to the Madhya Pradesh University Act and other circulars.
The High Court noted that the Management itself conceded in the petition that the Worklady was engaged as a daily wager from March 4, 2013, and continued her service until August 10, 2016. This admission, it held, unequivocally established that the Worklady was employed since 2013 and satisfactorily completed work for more than 240 days in a year.
The High Court noted that the Management operated as an educational institution, which categorically distinguished it from an industrial establishment. Consequently, the service conditions of the Worklady were governed by pertinent statutes such as the MP University Act, Rules, and other relevant circulars.
The High Court held that the Labour Court did not duly consider all relevant aspects of the case. The bench reiterated that the Worklady's work was found unsatisfactory, resulting in a loss of confidence in the employer. Consequently, the termination of the Worklady's services, following due notice under Circular No. 12(9), on August 9, 2016, was held just and proper.
As a result, the High Court held the impugned award passed by the Labour Court as legally flawed and set it aside. Accordingly, the petition was allowed, and the impugned award dated February 17, 2020, was hereby nullified.
Title: Managing Director M.P. State Forest Development Corporation Vs M.P. State Forest Development Corporation Employees Union
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 91
The Madhya Pradesh High Court single bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal held that disputes related to promotion and seniority fall within the scope of industrial disputes as defined under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Therefore, being a forum established by the ID Act, the Labour Court has the rightful jurisdiction to adjudicate on such matters.
The matter pertained to an award passed by the Labour Court, Bhopal. The Labour Court framed two issues. Firstly, whether the issue of promotion falls within the definition of a dispute permissible under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Secondly, whether the issue of promotion is covered under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The Labour Court answered the questions in positive. Feeling aggrieved, M.P. State Forest Development Corporation approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court.
The High Court noted the Labour Court in Paragraph No. 8 held that Item No. 6 of Schedule-II of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 encompasses questions of seniority. Additionally, the High Court held that a plain reading of Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 illuminates that it covers disputes or differences between workmen and workmen, with broader implications extending to employers and workmen.
Referring to the definition given in Section 2(k), the High Court held that there is no iota of doubt that the matter of promotion and seniority could be adjudicated between the two employees by the Labour Court as it is an industrial dispute under Section 2(k). Consequently, the High Court dismissed the writ petition.
Case Title: Maushad Ali vs Telecom District Manager Sagar Sagar
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 92
The Madhya Pradesh High Court single bench of Justice Vivek Agarwal dismissed a writ petition and held that since the Workman didn't work continuously for one year under an employer, provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 such as Section 25F and Section 25N had no application to the facts and circumstances of the case.
The High Court held that Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 unequivocally stipulates that no workman employed in any industry, having served continuously for not less than one year under an employer, shall be retrenched without due process. This entails providing one month's written notice specifying the reasons for retrenchment, or remuneration in lieu of such notice.
Title: Rajbhan Dwivedi and Others vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through its Principal Secretary School Education Department and Others
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 93
The Madhya Pradesh High Court division bench of Chief Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Vishal Mishra held that while Guest Faculty members may continue their services, they cannot demand regularization as an inherent right, emphasizing the contractual nature of their employment and the absence of specific rules or regulations governing their regularization.
The High Court observed that the Petitioners were serving as Guest Faculty members and were currently in active service. The High Court emphasized the contractual nature of their employment, which typically lasts for an academic session. The High Court acknowledged that the faculty members cannot be replaced by another set of Guest Faculty. However, the High Court made a clear distinction between the rights and entitlements of regular employees and those of contractual employees like Guest Faculty members.
The High Court held that while Guest Faculty members are permitted to continue their services, they cannot claim benefits equivalent to those of regularly appointed teachers. It pointed out that the nature of the two cadres, i.e., Guest Faculty and regular teachers, cannot be equated, and regularization cannot be demanded as an inherent right. Instead, it held that the Petitioners were working on a contract basis for each academic session, subject to the continuation of their services based on their performance
Title: Namrata Golhani Sahu Vs Labour Commissioner And Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 94
The Madhya Pradesh High Court single bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar held that even if the application for maternity benefits was erroneously submitted by an employee before the Labour Commissioner, it is the duty of the Commissioner to refer the same to the Inspector as provided under Section 17 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961
The Petitioner, employed as an Assistant Manager (HR) with Yutika Natural Pvt. Ltd., applied for maternity benefits as per the provisions of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. However, in the absence of any decision on her application, she approached the Labour Commissioner under Section 14 of the Act of 1961. Contrary to the expected referral to the Inspector as outlined in Section 14, the Labour Commissioner instead referred the matter under Section 10 of the Act of 1947, treating the Petitioner's complaint as an industrial dispute. Feeling aggrieved, she approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court (“High Court”) and filed a writ petition.
The High Court referred to Section 17 of the Act of 1961. The provision explicitly states that any woman claiming maternity benefit or any other entitled amount under the Act, or any person alleging wrongful withholding of payment, may lodge a complaint with the Inspector appointed as per Section 14 of the Act by the State Government.
Title: Smt. Priyanshi Garg Vs Union Of India And Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 95
The Madhya Pradesh High Court single bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar held that dismissal of a woman during her absence from employment or pregnancy has to be dealt by the prescribed authority only, before whom, an efficacious alternative remedy, by way of an appeal, as provided under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 lies.
Smt. Priyanshi Garg, a contractual employee, has filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging an order dated 12/02/2024, issued by respondent No.4, the Principal of Army Public School, Mhow, District Indore (M.P.), terminating her services as a Primary Teacher under Clause 4 of the contract.
She claimed that she diligently performed her duties but faced issues when seeking maternity leave benefits under the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. Despite her requests, she was verbally informed of the option to go on leave without pay due to insufficient funds. The Petitioner, unwilling to accept leave without pay, formally requested the maternity benefits. Instead of granting the benefits, she received the termination notice on 12/02/2024. Feeling aggrieved, the Petitioner approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court (“High Court”) and filed a writ petition.
High Court stated that in considering the legality of dismissing a woman during her absence from employment or pregnancy, the High Court referred to Section 12 of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961. This section explicitly prohibited the discharge or dismissal of a woman during her pregnancy if she would have been entitled to maternity benefits. It also provided for an appeal process within sixty days of such dismissal, emphasizing the finality of the decision made by the prescribed authority.
Title: The Factory Manager Rccpl And Anr vs. the State Of Madhya Pradesh And Others.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 96
The Madhya Pradesh High Court (“High Court”) single bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia held that the Assistant Labour Commissioner is not a competent authority to decide the claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages under the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. It held that the Assistant Labour Commissioner is not competent to decide the complaint filed by the Inspector under the Minimum Wages Act.
The High Court noted that Section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act gives the relevant government the authority to designate any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, any officer of the State Government functioning as a Labour Commissioner for a specific region, any officer of the State Government not ranking lower than Labour Commissioner, or any officer possessing experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate, through notification in the official gazette, to adjudicate claims pertaining to payment below the minimum wage rates within a designated area. Thus, it held that any Commissioner, officer not lower than Commissioner rank, or officer with judicial experience can be appointed to handle such claims.
Title: Shailendra Porwal v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Principal Secretary Department Of Urban Administration And Development & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 97
Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently underscored that notice of proceedings should have been issued to the petitioner and not his counsel in the matter. The single-judge bench of Justice Pranay Verma observed that when a direction was issued by the court to grant the opportunity of hearing to all interested parties, including the petitioner, the respondent-Joint Director, Directorate of Town and Country Planning was obligated to issue notice to the petitioner himself.
Pursuant to a High Court order, the Joint Director had decided on an earlier application of the petitioner dated 1/11/2022 and the fresh application filed by him on 28/3/2023.
“…In the order it has been stated that notice of the proceedings was issued to the complainant Shri Vibhor Khandelwal, Advocate but he did not appear before respondent No.2. From a perusal of the entire order it is evident that respondent No.2 has considered Shri Vibhor Khandelwal to be the complainant in the case…”, the bench sitting at Indore noted.
Title: Moti Singh v. Election Commission of India Through Chief Election Commissioner & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 98
A division bench of Madhya Pradesh High has refused to interfere with a single judge bench order holding that a 'substitute candidate' fielded by the Congress Party cannot be considered as an 'approved candidate' due to the withdrawal of the initially approved candidate from the Lok Sabha Elections 2024.
The single bench had held that if the substitute candidate's form is signed by only one proposer, on acceptance of the form of the 'approved candidate', the form of the substitute candidate would become liable to be rejected.
The Division Bench of the High Court affirmed the findings of the single-judge bench that a substitute candidate is required to submit part II of the nomination form with the signatures of 10 proposers or file another nomination form as an independent candidate in order to become eligible for consideration as an 'approved candidate' at a later point if the originally 'approved' candidate withdraws.
Justices Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Gajendra Singh concluded that since the nomination of 'substitute candidate' fielded by Indian National Congress, Moti Singh, had already been rejected on 25.04.2024, and since such rejection of nomination was never challenged by him, there does not arise a question of such a candidate contesting the elections at Indore as an 'approved candidate' of the party later.
Title: M/S Kamla Construction Company And Anr. Vs M/S Kamla Construction Company And Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 99
The Madhya Pradesh High Court single bench of Justice Gajendra Singh held that when the government constitutes a proper dispute redressal system for resolution of any dispute between the parties, the party cannot directly approach the High Court and file a writ petition. It held that when the statute provides for statutory appeal, the said remedy is to be availed by the litigating parties (referred to Hindustan Coca Cola Beverage Private Ltd vs. Union of India and others reported in (2014) 15 SCC 44).
The High Court referred to the Clause 24 and 25 of the 'General Conditions of Contract' outlined in the tender document. Clause 24 delineates a comprehensive dispute redressal mechanism, empowering a competent authority to settle any disputes arising from or in connection with the contract. It mandates that such disputes be referred to the competent authority within 45 days and necessitates the authority to convey its decision within 60 days of the contractor's written request. The decision rendered by the competent authority is deemed final and binding upon the contractor, allowing the execution of works to proceed pending the authority's decision. Clause 25 provides the provision for arbitration, allowing either party to appeal against the decision of the competent authority to the Madhya Pradesh Arbitration Tribunal if the claim amount exceeds Rs. 50,000.
The High Court held that a structured dispute redressal system was established by the State for resolving conflicts between the contracting parties. Notably, it held that the Petitioners had bypassed this system and directly approached the High Court by filing the writ petition without resorting to the competent authority stipulated in the contract.
100. Throwing 13 Months Old Child On Floor Itself 'Attempt To Murder': Madhya Pradesh High Court
Title: Bharti Patel v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 100
Surprised by the act of a woman who threw her 13-month-old infant on the court floor during proceedings before Shahdol Magistrare, Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the same amounts to an 'attempt to murder' her own child. The court also termed the conduct of the mother, who later threw a paperweight towards the child's head, is sufficient to aggravate the situation.
“… Throwing a 13 months old child on the floor by itself would amount to an attempt to murder and throwing a paperweight towards his head would further aggravate the situation…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur opined.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia was considering a 482 Cr.P.C application preferred by the woman to quash an F.I.R where she has been arraigned for attacking her practicing lawyer-husband by trespassing into his chamber in 2022.
In the petition to quash the F.I.R., the woman has termed the one filed against her as nothing but a false one by way of counterblast, since she had already filed one against her husband for assaulting her a few days before.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 101
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has held the editor of a Hindi newspaper in Gwalior, Suman Singh Sikarwar, guilty of Contempt of Court for publishing a scandalising news report against one of its sitting judges in 2011.
The Court imposed a fine of ₹2,000 on Sikarwar, along with a cost of ₹1 lakh to be paid to the M.P. High Court Bar Association within one month.
The division bench comprising Chief Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Milind Ramesh Phadke said the Editor deliberately made comments about a particular judge and the same was not in the nature of mere "dispassionate criticism"
The contempt petition (criminal) was initiated over a news item titled “Sarvoch Nayalaya Aaj Ki Tarah Nishpakch ho jai to Judge Shri Mody Ji Ko Jail Mein Hona Tha” in Dainik Chambal Vani, casting aspersions on the judge. The news levelled allegations of corruption and abuse of power within the judiciary, particularly a sitting judge
Court noted the Editor in his replies and affidavit had even tried to justify the said news items. It said,
From the very appearance of the respondent-contemnor before this court, it appears from his attitude that there is no repentance of any kind on his face and just for the sake of apology he had made a regretful acknowledgment of the offence, which appears to this court not bona fide. The aforesaid act of seeking apology appears to be just for the sake of it, as he had glued himself with the allegations leveled against the then sitting judge/judges of the High Court and had tried to justify his stand, the regret which respondent-contemnor had shown are just in words and not imbibed in his deeds.”
Title: High Court Advocates Bar Association vs Bar Council of India and Others
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 102
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had dismissed a petition filed by the High Court Advocates Bar Association against the refusal of the State Bar Council to recognize it as a separate bar association.
The Court ruled that the purpose of the Adhivakta Kalyan Nidhi Adhiniyam Act of 1982, which administers welfare schemes for advocates, is being fulfilled through existing recognized bar associations.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Vivek Agarwal and Justice Avanindra Kumar Singh observed, “it is evident that purpose of the (Adhivakta Kalyan Nidhi Adhiniyam) Act of 1982, being to administer welfare schemes for the social security and welfare of advocates whichcan be administered only through a Bar Association recognized by the Bar Council, then it is evident that by virtue of the fact that all the 330 odd members of the petitioner-Association being also members of the High Court Bar Association or the District Court Bar Association, which are duly recognized by the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh under Section 16, are being administered the welfare schemes which is the aim and object of Act of 1982.”
The writ petition was filed by the High Court Advocates Bar Association, through its Secretary, contesting an order from the Bar Council of Madhya Pradesh (Recognition Committee). This order pertained to a Recognition Case involving the High Court Advocates Bar Association, Jabalpur (the applicant), the Madhya Pradesh High Court Bar Association, Jabalpur (respondent No.2, objector), and the Democratic Lawyers Forum, Jabalpur (intervener), all represented by their respective counsels. The order in question denied separate recognition to the High Court Advocates Bar Association, Jabalpur.
title - Tamish Saluja and others vs. State Of Madhya Pradesh and another
citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 103
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that an FIR cannot be quashed only because the Police Station where it was lodged had no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
A bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia further said that if any cognizable offence has been committed, a complainant can lodge the FIR in any Police Station. If the Police Station concludes that it has no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter, it has to transfer the FIR to the Police Station having territorial jurisdiction to investigate the same. However, on this ground alone, an FIR can't be quashed.
The single judge made these observations while dealing with a plea filed by a husband and his parents seeking quashing of an FIR lodged by his wife under Section 498-A read with Section 34 of IPC and Sections 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The Court said that merely because a complainant's relative is a practising lawyer would not make the FIR vulnerable. The Court has to consider the allegations made in the FIR and not the status of the complainant or his/her relatives.
Further, the Court also noted that an FIR cannot be quashed on the ground that police have no jurisdiction to register it and that it cannot be quashed only on the ground that the Police Station where the FIR has been lodged has no territorial jurisdiction to investigate the matter.
Title: Brajesh Kumar Pannalal vs Indusind Bank Limited
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 104
The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Duppala Venkata Ramana held that the executing court cannot dismiss the objections regarding the adequacy of the arbitral award without determining whether the award meets the stamping requirements outlined in the Indian Stamp Act.
The matter pertained to a dispute initiated by the Respondent-Bank against the Petitioner for the recovery of a loan amount that the Petitioner borrowed and subsequently defaulted on. The Respondent-Bank pursued arbitration proceedings, resulting in an award in its favor.
Subsequently, the Respondent-Bank filed an execution petition seeking to enforce the arbitration award before the Court of Principal District Judge. The Petitioner objected to this petition under various sections of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and the Indian Stamp Act. It contended that the arbitration award was not validly obtained and that the execution proceedings were therefore not maintainable.
The High Court noted that the Arbitration Act doesn't explicitly mandate parties to an arbitration agreement to pay stamp duties on an arbitral award. The High Court referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. Anasuya Devi v. M. Manik Reddy and held that objections regarding the non-stamping of the arbitral award should be addressed during the enforcement stage, not during objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.
Examining the applicability of Section 17 of the Indian Stamp Act 1989, which governs the time for stamping instruments, the High Court observed that instruments, including awards, must be stamped before or at the time of execution. This provision grants parties the flexibility to pay the requisite stamp duty either before or at the moment of execution.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 105
The Madhya Pradesh High Court recently refused to grant protection to an inter-faith couple observing that a marriage between a Muslim man and a Hindu woman was invalid as per the Muslim Personal Law.
The petitioners, stating that they were in love with each other, approached the Marriage Officer under the Special Marriage Act, however on account of objections raised by the family, they could not appear before the Marriage Officer. As a result, their marriage is not being registered.
In this backdrop, they sought, among other reliefs, protection to appear before the Marriage Officer on the date fixed for the registration of their marriage under the Special Marriage Act.
The Court refused protection stating that the marriage between Hindu woman and Muslim man would be irregular as per the Muslim personal law.
“As per Mahomedan law, the marriage of a Muslim boy with a girl who is an idolatress or a fire-worshiper, is not a valid marriage. Even if the marriage is registered under the Special Marriage Act, the marriage would be no more a valid marriage and it would be an irregular (fasid) marriage.” Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia stated in the order passed on May 27.
Title: Virendra Rathore vs. Tehsildar
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 106
The Madhya Pradesh High Court (Indore Bench) held that the Housing Finance Companies (HFC) can resort to the draconian powers under SARFAESI Act of taking over of physical and symbolic possession of the mortgaged property, towards recovery of their loans and borrowings, irrespective of the loan borrowings in favour of the petitioner falling below the threshold limit of twenty lacs.
The Division Bench of Justice Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Justice Gajendra Singh observed that “the provisions contained under Chapter III-B of the RBI Act, specifically Section 45 (1)(f) cannot be treated to be applicable in the context of HFI's/HFC's established under Section 29A of the NHB, for the purposes of interpretation of notifications issued under 2 (1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act”.
The HFIs/HFCs will be categorised as FI's not by virtue of their being NBFC's, but because of their falling under the phrase 'any other institution' as mentioned u/s 2(1)(m)(iv) of the SARFAESI Act, added the Bench.
The Bench observed so, while referring to the principal of 'generalia specialibus non derogant', expounded in the decision of Apex Court in case of Managing Director, Chhattisgarh State Co-operative Bank Maryadit v. Zila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit & Ors [(2020) 6 SCC 411].
107. Does Agreement Of Separation Between Married Couple Amount To Divorce? Madhya Pradesh HC Answers
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 107
A single bench led by Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia of the Madhya Pradesh High Court recently observed that a separate divorce agreement signed by a husband and wife has no legal validity and does not amount to divorce.
This case concerns quashing a case registered by a wife in 2023 against her husband and in-laws. Husband and Wife got married on 21/04/2022 and later the wife alleged that she was subjected to taunts for dowry from her husband and in-laws. As a result, she is compelled to live with her parents due to cruelty, and harassment by the husband and in-laws, and therefore, an FIR was lodged against the husband and in-laws under Sections 498-A, 506, and 34 of IPC and under Sections 3, and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia of the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that the contentions of the applicants that parties have separately divorced agreement cannot be relied upon. The Court said that “the agreement of separation has no sanctity in the eye of law, therefore it cannot be said that any divorce has taken place between the parties.”
Adding to that the Court also mentioned that “Even otherwise, if any divorce has taken place, still the FIR under Section 498-A of IPC can be lodged in respect of cruelty meted out to the complainant prior to the divorce but that situation has not arisen in the present case because no divorce has taken place between the parties.”
The Court mentioned that parties are not Muslim by religion, therefore cannot be any divorce by mutual consent without approaching the Court.
The Court also addressed the contention raised by the counsel for applicants, which argued that wife had agreed not to take any judicial action against them. The Court conclusively rejected this argument, identifying it as misconceived and contrary to the provisions of Section 28 of the Contract Act.
Title: M/R Ruchi Global Limited (Presently Agrotrade Enterprises Limited) Through Mr. S.N. Sadawarti & Ors. v. Central Bureau Of Investigation Through Its Investigation Officer P.S.AC-IV & Anr. and Connected Matters
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 108
Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently clarified that when the proceedings initiated against the principal borrower/ offender on account of the commission of fraud get terminated, other accomplices involved in the offence cannot be prosecuted thereafter.
The Division Bench of Justices Sushrut Arvind Dharmadhikari and Gajendra Singh was adjudicating a batch of miscellaneous cases arising from the FIR registered by CBI against Ruchi Global Limited and others for committing fraud upon the lender bank by diverting funds.
“The proceedings against the M/s Ruchi Global Limited has been closed by the Trial Court on the basis of order dated 21.11.2023….and order dated 25.07.2023….passed by this Court. When the proceedings have been terminated against M/s Ruchi Global Ltd to whom credit facility was sanctioned, then the proceedings against rest of the petitioners to whom it is stated that they conspired with Ruchi Global Ltd. cannot be continued”, the bench sitting at Indore held.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 109
Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently held that consent becomes immaterial when the husband indulges in an unnatural act of sex with his wife during the subsistence of marriage, and the same cannot come within the purview of rape as mentioned in Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code. Since it won't be rape under Section 375 IPC, the offence under Section 377 IPC will not be attracted either, the court further held.
The single-judge bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh observed that the alleged unnatural act, i.e., the insertion of a penis in the mouth of a woman, comes within the ambit of rape as defined in Section 375. However, any sexual act between the husband and wife when they are residing together during the subsistence of marriage, even in the absence of consent, cannot be brought under the scope of Section 375 IPC, the bench sitting at Indore clarified.
“…in the case at hand since the respondent no.2/wife was residing with her husband during the subsistence of their marriage and as per amended definition of "rape" under Section 375 of IPC by which insertion of penis in the mouth of a woman has also been included in the definition of "rape" and any sexual intercourse or act, by the husband with his wife not below the age of fifteen years is not a rape, therefore, consent is immaterial…”, the court concluded that the allegations mentioned in the FIR would not constitute an offence under Section 377 IPC for the same reason.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP)110
Stating that the act of the wife who filed a criminal case against the husband and in-laws for cruelty cannot be termed as an act that amounts to abetting the husband to commit suicide, the Madhya Pradesh High Court observed that the complainant-wife shouldn't be punished for taking the recourse of a legal remedy.
The single judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia also added that a person committing suicide, since he is hypersensitive, cannot be termed as an outcome of abetment. If a person takes recourse to the legal remedy available to them after an offence has been committed, it cannot be considered an illegal act synonymous with abetting the deceased to commit suicide, the court laid down in clear terms.
“…By lodging the FIR, the applicants had not committed any illegal act and since a victim has a solitary option of approaching the Police and thereafter to the Court for redressal of her grievances and if the suicide committed by the deceased on the pretext that he has been falsely framed in offence under Section 498-A, 406, 294, 506, 34 of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, then it cannot be said that the widow of the deceased or her parents had abetted the deceased to commit suicide”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur clarified.
Case Name: Chhaya & Anr. v. Public at Large & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 111
Disapproving the 'somewhat rude' behaviour of the Indian Army towards the missing soldiers and their families, Madhya Pradesh High Court has highlighted the importance of abolishing the 'worn-out rules' regarding the pension and retirement benefits of soldiers.
The single-judge bench of Justice Anil Verma was adjudicating a second appeal filed by the family members (parents) of the missing soldier to modify the date of his death in order to avail the GPF, Gratuity, Family pension and other retiral benefits.
…The brave soldiers of the Indian Army live for the country and die for the country. But unfortunately when a soldier suddenly goes missing, the Indian Army's behavior towards him becomes somewhat rude. Instead of helping the family of the missing soldier, the Indian Army expects them to get the date of his civil death declared through civil Court, and they are denied to release the pension and other retirement allowances of the missing soldier…” the bench sitting at Indore underscored how the grieving families are put through certain hardships based on old rules.
High Court analysed Sections 107 and 108 of Indian Evidence Act to show that it does not provide any indications on how the date on which a person is presumed to be dead can be determnined.
“…The moment it is established that a person has not been heard of for 7 years, the presumption of death arises. Although the presumption under the Evidence Act is confined only to the factum of death, but is silent in respect of the actual date of death or presumed death”, the court pointed out.
Case Name: Bhaskardutt Dwivedi v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Panchayat Development Secretary, And Rural Department & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 112
Madhya Pradesh High Court had come down heavily on the government officials for citing the lack of legal knowledge as an excuse to trample on the constitutional rights of its citizens.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia imposed Rs 25,000/- cost on the Executive Engineer, PWD, Rewa Division, for flouting the court's erstwhile instruction to stop the use of private land as a government road. The court also expressed its disbelief about the executive engineer not even paying heed to the office of the Advocate General, though the latter duly informed the official about the court's interim order not to encroach upon the private land for road construction.
“If the State is of the view that their officers have no legal knowledge, then it is a high time for the State to consider as to whether such officers are to be retained in the service or not? How the State can promote the violation of the constitutional rights of the citizens of the country only on the ground that their officers have no legal knowledge?”, the court had raised these questions after the State tried to justify the stance of the executive engineer who dodged the court's query as to whether the interim order to stop the usage of private land had been complied with or not.
Case Name: Nitin Mewate v. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 113
Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that a close relative would be likely to present the actual story of the incident instead of hiding the actual culprit and foisting the crime on an innocent person.
The single judge bench of Justice Prem Narayan Singh was explaining why the testimonies of close relatives shouldn't be disregarded automatically by compartmentalising them as 'interested witnesses'.
“…Virtually, in many of the criminal cases, it is often seen that the offence is witnessed by close relatives of the victim, whose presence on the spot of incident would be natural and the evidence of such witness cannot automatically be discarded by levelling them as interested witness...”, the bench sitting at Indore added.
The criminal appeal was filed by the accused against the judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Indore, convicting him for the offence under Section 326 IPC and sentencing him to 5 years rigorous imprisonment along with Rs 1000 as fine. The complainant and the accused in this case were brothers, and the other witnesses were close relatives. The accused had apparently assaulted his daughter with a knife, and when the complainant-brother tried to stop him, he too was assaulted by the accused.
In the appeal, the accused submitted that the quantum of punishment should be reduced to the sentence already undergone (2 years) along with an enhancement of fine if the court deems it necessary. The appellant also contended that the injuries caused were not dangerous to life and the offence would not have exceeded the ambit of Section 324 IPC
Case Name: Dr. Shivani Nishad & Anr. v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh Through Police Station Bamhani District & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 114
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that a constant threat by the accused to falsely implicate the deceased/victim in a case of rape and eve-teasing can amount to abetment to suicide.
Refusing to allow the application preferred by the accused under Section 482 Cr. P.C., the single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia, opined that the threat of sending the deceased to jail by foisting false cases upon him could not be taken lightly as an empty threat. The bench sitting at Jabalpur found that the threats were not a one-off incident, and it was prima facie capable of demeaning and destroying the self-esteem of the deceased.
“….it is clear that the deceased, who was making preparation for appearing in PSC for getting a Government job, was upset because of his false implication in criminal cases he would not get any Government job apart from the continuous threat of his false implication in a case of rape and eve-teasing...”, the court also mentioned about how the continuous harassment and taunts about the ongoing legal proceedings involving the deceased could have driven him to commit suicide.
Case Name: Pradeep Singh Parihar v. Smt. Rubina & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 115
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has reiterated that an insurance company cannot be held liable when it emerges that the owner of the vehicle has not verified the skills of the offending driver before employing him.
The single-judge bench of Justice Achal Kumar Paliwal upheld the award made by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal at Rewa based on the 'Pay and Recover ' principle, after examining the deposition of the owner of the offending vehicle and other relevant documents. The tribunal had earlier found that the offending driver did not have a valid and effective license at the time of the incident, which made the insured liable under the 'Pay and Recover' Principle.
“….Pradeep, owner of offending vehicle has nowhere mentioned/deposed in his testimony and has not produced any evidence to establish that before employing Sukhnandan, as driver of offending vehicle, he verified the skills of driver Sukhnandan and thereby, he satisfied himself that Sukhnandan is competent to drive the vehicle…”, the court held that the appellant-bus operator was rightly burdened with the liability since the principles laid down in Rishi Pal Singh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors., 2022 Live Law SC 646 will be of no assistance to him.
Case Name: Victim A v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 116
Taking a firm stand against the misuse of the court's lawful authority, Madhya Pradesh High Court recently rejected a plea for medical termination of pregnancy when the victim's mother conceded that they did not intend to prosecute the accused relative.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia also observed that the real intention of the prosecutrix and her petitioner-mother was evident from the petitioner's admission that they wouldn't support the prosecution case at the trial.
“…Whether the petitioner wants to ensure the conviction of her son-in-law or not is not the concern of this Court but the only concern is whether this Court can be used as a tool for getting rid of an unwanted child and thereafter claiming that no offence had taken place… Nobody can be allowed to play the game of hide and seek for committing murder of an unborn child”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur observed in the order.
“this Court is of considered opinion that although the unwanted child may have some adverse effect on the mental status of the girl but if the prosecutrix and her mother are going to take a somersault by claiming that no offence was committed, then this Court would like to ignore the said aspect”, the single judge bench concluded while declining permission for termination of pregnancy
Title: Anurodh Mittal Vs Rehat Trading Company
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 117
The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia has held that merely because of the initiation of proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 the signatory of the cheque cannot escape from his liability under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
The Applicant approached the Madhya Pradesh High Court (“High Court”) and filed an application under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. seeking relief of the examination of records in a case pending before the II Additional Session Judge and the quashing of a condition to deposit Rs.13,73,890. This condition was imposed in an application under Section 389 CrPC seeking suspension of the execution of the sentence, including the order to pay compensation, during the pendency of the appeal. The Petitioner argued that this condition was affected by an interim moratorium as per Section 96 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, initiated by the National Company Law Tribunal, Indore Bench.
The High Court held that the mere initiation of proceedings under the IBC, couldn't serve as a ground for the signatory of the cheque to evade liability. Therefore, it upheld the conviction recorded by the Trial Court and held that it wasn't invalidated by the initiation of proceedings under the IBC. Consequently, the High Court upheld that the Appellate Court didn't err in directing the Applicant to deposit Rs. 13,73,890 as a condition precedent for the suspension of the sentence.
Case Name: Victim X v. The Superintendent Of Police Department, Bhopal & Ors.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 118
Madhya Pradesh High Court had permitted the termination of a 17-year-old rape survivor's pregnancy at 29 weeks, subject to certain conditions, considering the peculiar circumstances involved.
The Division Bench of Former Chief Justice Ravi Malimath and Justice Vishal Mishra held that the pregnancy of the physically disabled survivor in this particular case can be terminated provided that it is carried out by a team of expert doctors, after explaining to the minor and her family the risk factors of the procedure.
“…Permitting for carrying out the pregnancy of a woman who is not in a position to manage herself will be creating great problems to her in future life. Even the other family aspects are also required to be considered”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur reasoned before imposing certain conditions for termination of pregnancy.
Additionally, all medical facilities like post-operative care and the presence of a radiologist and a paediatrician should be made available to the survivor, the court instructed. The Division Bench also noted that the duty of care will rest on the shoulders of the state if the child is born alive. To aid the prosecution in the criminal trial, a DNA sample of the foetus should be preserved, the court added.
Case Name: Ganesh Balai v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh. Through P.S. Khajrana
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 119
Noting that there is no reason to reject the testimony of a child of tender age per se, Madhya Pradesh High Court has upheld the conviction and sentence passed by the trial court in a murder case, based on the evidence of an 8 yr old child who was the sole eye witness.
The Division Bench of Justice Vijay Kumar Shukla and Justice Hirdesh opined that once the quality and reliability of the testimony given by a child of tender age is ascertained by the court through close scrutiny, a conviction can be recorded based on such evidence.
…A child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he has intellectual capacity to understand questions and give rational answers thereto… The evidence of a child witness is not required to be rejected per se, but the court as a rule of prudence considers such evidence with close scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality thereof and reliability…”, the bench sitting at Indore noted in the order.
Before the High Court, the appellant/accused raised an argument that the child witness, who is the daughter born out of the wedlock between the deceased wife and the accused husband, was playing outside at the time of the alleged incident. It was submitted by the counsel further that she was not an independent witness, and she was tutored by her grandparents before making the deposition. It was alleged by the counsel that the child's testimony was tainted with numerous infirmities of description. The court declined to agree with any of these submissions.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 120
The Madhya Pradesh High Court refused to quash the FIR registered against Bhojpuri singer Neha Singh Rathore over posting a cartoon on her Twitter and Instagram handles in relation to the incident of a person urinating on a tribal man in Sidhi last year.
The Court noted that the cartoon depicted a person wearing Khaki shorts, the uniform dress of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) workers, although the person involved in the incident was not wearing such a dress.
"Why the dress of persons believing particular ideology was added by the applicant on her own, is a question which is to be decided in the trial," the bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia observed while refusing to quash the FIR registered for the offence under Section 153A of the Indian Penal Code.
"The addition of a particular dress was indicative of the fact that applicant wanted to communicate that the offence was committed by a person belonging to a particular ideology. Thus, it was a clear case of making an attempt to disrupt harmony and to provoke the feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will," the Court stated
“Since the cartoon which was uploaded by the applicant on her Twitter and Instagram account was not in accordance with the incident which had taken place and certain additional things were added by the applicant on her own, this Court is of considered opinion that it cannot be said that the applicant had uploaded the cartoon by exercising her fundamental right of free speech and expression,” the Court said.
Title: Rajlaxmi Sharma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 121
Finding that the death of the deceased was attributed to corona virus and he died while performing active duty in the drive against corona virus, the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the action of the Relief Commissioner in denying the benefit of Mukhyamantri COVID -19 Yoddha Kalyan Yojna to the legal heirs of the deceased (Arun Pateriya) are totally illegal, arbitrary & discriminatory.
Further, finding that the petitioners have been victimized by not granting their lawful claim for more than three years, the High Court held that denial of such benefit to them smacks foul play and a result of malafide action of the Respondents.
The Division Bench of Justice Raj Mohan Singh and Justice Avanindra Kumar Singh observed that “Arun Pateriya died on 22.05.2021. After his death, his son was given certificate of Covid - 19 Yodha on behalf of the deceased Arun Pateriya, endorsing that he died while performing Covid duty and was honored posthumously by way of mark of identification”. (Para 14)
The Bench observed so while emphasizing that the competent authorities have isolated the case of the deceased with no reasons except to harp upon para No.3.1 of Mukhyamantri COVID -19 Yoddha Kalyan Yojna, which is apparently not applicable to his case.
This isolation approach was followed, when there is no ground available with the Respondents to create any artificial & meaningless classification viz-a-viz the death of Arun Pateriya (deceased CMO) on one hand and deaths of Tahsildar and Deputy Collector on other hand, added the Bench.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 122
The Madhya Pradesh High Court came down heavily on the investigating officer and the treating doctor after they failed to duly inform family members of a minor rape victim about the right to terminate pregnancy within 22 weeks under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971.
The single-judge bench of Justice Subodh Abhyankar emphasised that most of the rape cases occur in remote areas where the victims or their families would probably be unaware of the safeguards granted by the Act of 1971. Indisputably, it is incumbent upon the treating doctor as well as the officer of the police station concerned to inform the victim/ victim's family about the right to terminate pregnancy before 22 weeks, the bench sitting at Indore observed.
“…This court is of the considered opinion that non-disclosure of such information to the victim infringes upon her right to live with dignity as enshrined under Art.21 of the Constitution of India, and at the same time it also defeats the very purpose for which the Act of 1971 was enacted”, Justice Abhyankar added.
The court termed the conduct of the doctor and the officer as 'apathetic' and 'deplorable' and censured them for their outight failure to inform the petitioner's father about the risks involved in continuing his minor daughter's pregnancy and the necessity of getting it terminated immediately.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 123
Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that the factum of a husband sentenced to life imprisonment in a murder case can be grounds for divorce on account of 'mental cruelty' to the wife.
The Division Bench of Justice Vivek Rusia and Justice Rajendra Kumar Vani observed that divorce can be granted in instances where the husband or wife has been convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment, even in the absence of an express provision for the same under the Hindu Marriage Act. The bench sitting at Gwalior placed its reliance on the Delhi high Court's decision in Swati v. Arvind Mudgal(2013) where divorce was granted in similar set of circumstances.
“…Therefore, the conviction of the husband under Section 302 of IPC and sentence of life imprisonment amounts to mental cruelty towards the wife which entails her getting the divorce from her husband”, the division bench held in the order.
The court, therefore, set aside the decree and judgment of the Gwalior Family Court in November 2023 by dissolving the marriage between the appellant-wife and the respondent-husband.
The court laid down in unequivocal terms that no wife can share a marriage with someone who is so 'short tempered-and impulsive turned criminal'. The court also opined that it would be prejudicial to the interests of their 12-year-old daughter if she were to live with a parent who has such a criminal background.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 124
Refusing to dismiss the FIR registered against the husband's relatives for cruelty meted out to the wife, Madhya Pradesh High Court had underscored that the complainant-wife's silence in the hopes of saving the marital ties cannot be held against her.
The single-judge bench of Justice Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia noted that the FIR lodged for cruelty cannot be discarded as a 'counterblast' to the divorce petition merely because of the lapse of time that has occurred in filing the criminal complaint. In this case, the time of filing the complaint for cruelty had coincided with the divorce petition filed by the husband.
“If the wife had maintained silence in order to save her marital life and did not lodge the report, then her silence for the noble cause should not be considered against her…Once, the wife had realized that all the chances of reconciliation have vanished on account of filing of divorce petition and if she decided to take action in accordance with law, then she cannot be blamed for the same…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur held.
Justifying the wife's hesitance to file a complaint at first, the single-judge bench observed that she couldn't be left at the losing end for her 'good gestures of maintaining silence'. She was merely trying to save her marital life, if possible, by withholding information about the cruelty meted out to her, the court explained. There is nothing wrong in filing the complaint for the in-laws' cruelty only after realising that the marriage was beyond repair, the court remarked.
Case Name: Ramlal Jhariya v. State Of M.P. And Other
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 125
Noting that authorities cannot be allowed to take advantage of the conflicting judgments with regard to the confiscation of vehicles under the Madhya Pradesh Excise Act, the High Court had referred the matter to the Chief Justice for the constitution of a larger bench.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vinay Saraf observed that there is obscurity about the scope of Section 47(A). The primary question raised by Justice Saraf is regarding the powers of the Authorised Officer/District Collector to independently confiscate the articles/vehicles involved in the commission of the offence falling under Section 34(2) of the 1915 Act when criminal proceedings are pending. The legality of parallel proceedings in confiscation and criminal cases with reference to the Excise Act is also yet to be answered authoritatively, the court opined.
Determined to resolve the said anomaly, Justice Saraf has raised a few additional questions to be answered in reference:
Whether the decision in State of M.P. and others v. Madhukar Rao (2008) is applicable to confiscation proceedings under Section 47(A) of the Excise Act?
Whether a writ petition can be entertained against an order of confiscation by resorting to the grounds of lack of authority of the District Collector to pass such an order during the pendency of the criminal trial.
“In the present matter, the confiscating proceedings were initiated under Section 47-A of the Act during the pendency of the trial. However, the present petitioner is not accused in the criminal case…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur initially noted.
Title: Child Under Conflict With Law v. The State Of Madhya Pradesh
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 126
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had held that a child in conflict with the law need not be granted bail irrespective of the offence committed. The Court was dealing with the case of a juvenile who had kidnapped a 16-year-old and later murdered him due to non-payment of ransom.
The single-judge bench of Justice Dinesh Kumar Paliwal emphasised that provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act cannot be interpreted to give undue advantage in matters of bail, especially when heinous crimes are committed by the juvenile. The Bench held:
The murder of a helpless and innocent child shows the depravity of the mind of the person committing such offence. The kidnapping of a child for ransom and in absence of receipt of ransom murder of kidnapped child cannot be treated to be an act, which can be dubbed as a child's mistake committed during youth or adolescence. It is an act motivated with passion to obtain heavy ransom from the father or family members of the deceased child...shows the cruel mentality of the juvenile in conflict with law.
While considering bail to a juvenile in conflict with law, gravity of offence cannot be considered but at the same time it cannot be overlooked that discretion of bail to such a person will obviously tantamount subverting the course of justice, the Court added.
It is necessary to strike a balance between the welfare of the child-in-conflict with-law as well as the concerns of the society; the bench sitting at Jabalpur stated that the 'cries of the family of the deceased child' cannot be ignored.
Case title: Sandeep Kumar Soni v/s State
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 127
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has recently quashed a FIR registered for rape and criminal intimidation since the prosecutrix's version that she was forcefully raped repeatedly did not instil confidence in the context of her marriage with the accused. The prosecutrix married the accused-petitioner after the latter allegedly subjected her to multiple acts of rape.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vishal Dhagat held that the prosecutrix's failure to lodge a FIR despite repeated acts of alleged rape seemed doubtful. The subsequent marriage between the accused and the victim made it difficult for any 'reasonable man' to believe the prosecutrix's story, the court opined.
“…From her statement, it is clear that there is no case that prosecutrix has surrendered to petitioner under false promise of marriage but forceful rape has been committed on her. Despite forceful rape being committed by the petitioner on her repeatedly for long time, she did not lodge FIR against petitioner on the contrary she also married the petitioner…”, the bench sitting at Jabalpur observed.
The single-judge bench highlighted how the prosecutrix's version stated that she had never consented to sexual intercourse by believing the false promises of marriage made by the accused on several occasions. After examining the statement of the victim given Section 164 CrPC, the court noted that she opposed the advances made by the accused at all times. Based on the story narrated by the victim, the court noted the reasons why her version seems to be untrustworthy in the end:
“…She did not give any consent for establishing physical relationship. After incident of rape which is said to have occurred, prosecutrix did not lodge any FIR against the petitioner. She remained quite and after incident of rape she has also done marriage with the petitioner in Arya Samaj Mandir….”
Title: M/S Liladhar Laxminarayan Agrawal Vs Managing Director M.P. Rajya Beej Evam Vikas Nigam
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 128
The Madhya Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Vishal Dhagat had held that there is no bar created by Section 31 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 that the court cannot entertain an application in respect of award until it has been filed.
Section 31 of the Arbitration Act, of 1940, specifies the court jurisdiction for arbitration matters. It states that an award may be filed in any court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. It also states that all questions regarding the validity, effect, or existence of an award or arbitration agreement must be decided by the court where the award has been or may be filed, and not by any other court.
The High Court noted that Sections 14(1)(2) and 31 of the Arbitration Act outline specific procedures for the signing and filing of the award by the arbitrators, as well as the jurisdictional matters concerning the court. Section 14 requires arbitrators to sign the award and notify the parties in writing, detailing the fees and charges payable for the arbitration and award. Upon payment of these fees, the arbitrators are to file the signed award, along with any depositions and documents, in the court. The court, in turn, must notify the parties about the filing of the award.
Section 31 determines the jurisdiction of the court regarding the arbitration award. It states that all questions about the validity, effect, or existence of the award or arbitration agreement must be decided by the court where the award has been or may be filed. It also mandates that all applications related to the arbitration proceedings must be submitted to the same court. The High Court held that the language of Section 31(3), using "may be filed," indicates that there is no restriction preventing the court from hearing objections about the award before it is formally filed.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 129
Case Title: Maruti Sondhiya v. Union Of India Through Special Secretary, Ministry Of Law And Justice & Ors
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that though the collegium system owes it's existence to "Judge-made law", it is binding on every court, executive and the legislature as per Article 141 of the Constitution.
The Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Amar Nath (Kesharwani) thus dismissed the plea moved by a lawyer to quash the appointments made to the office of High Court judges last November. The court refused to entertain the writ by reasoning that the grounds taken were insufficient and contrary to constitutional provisions.
It emphasised that the post of a High Court judge cannot be compared to that of an executive civil post. The post of High Court judge is a constitutional office and the appointments are made by solely adhering to the procedure prescribed in the constitution, the court added.
“…No statute or statutory rule or executive instruction can supplant or for that matter supplement the procedure prescribed in the Constitution for appointment of High Court Judge…”, the court reasoned why there is no requirement of issuing advertisements or conducting selection tests in such matters.
The Constitution does not prescribe any representation or proportionate representation for all categories in appointments, and hence, the argument put forth by the petitioner-advocate about the excess of forward class representation wouldn't hold ground, the court held. Similarly, the Constitution and the judge-made law are silent about SC/ST, OBC or EWS reservations in appointments.
Title: Jyotsna Dohalia & Anr. v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 130
Regarding the Civil Judge (Entry Level) Judiciary Exams, the Madhya Pradesh High Court had ordered the 'weeding out of candidates' found to be ineligible under the Amended Recruitment Rules since these Rules were upheld by the High Court and Apex Court in April 2024.
This would effectively mean that candidates would be deemed ineligible even if they cleared the stage of Preliminary Exams and appeared in the Mains on the strength of the Apex Court's interim order, permitting them to do so under the old M.P. Judicial Services (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994.
“… Once the Amended Recruitment Rules were upheld not only by this Court but also by Apex Court, the right course of action should have been to weed out all those ineligible candidates, who failed to satisfy the Amended Recruitment Rules and who were provisionally allowed to appear by way of judicial order in the Preliminary Examination”, the court held in its order that no ineligible candidate can be allowed to secure the post of Civil judge (Entry Level).
The Division Bench of Acting Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Amar Nath (Kesharwani) have recalled the order dated 07.05.2024 passed in W.P. No.12399/2024 for being erroneous since the court had then failed to grasp the pertinence of the concept behind cut-off marks. The entire recruitment process since the stage of Preliminary Exams was subject to the outcome of the writ petitions challenging vires of the Amended Rules, the court emphasised.
131. Wife's Refusal To Have Physical Relations With Husband Amounts To Cruelty: Madhya Pradesh High Court
Title: Sanchita Vishwakarma Vs. Yogendra Prasad Vishwakarma
Case Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 131
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had observed that the denial of the wife for having a physical relationship with her husband amounts to cruelty to the husband.
A bench of Acting Chief Justice Sheel Nagu and Justice Amar Nath (Kesharwani) observed thus while upholding a family court's order allowing the husband's application for divorce under Section 13-1 (i-a) & (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
The husband filed a divorce petition in January 2018 before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Satna, on the grounds of cruelty and desertion by the appellant/wife.
It was his case that his marriage was solemnised with the appellant-wife on May 26, 2013, as per Hindu customs and rites, but on the first night itself, the appellant-wife refused to establish physical relations with him and also told that she did not like him and she got married under the pressure of her parents.
Perusing the records of the case and the arguments advanced by the parties, the Court noted that the wife had admitted that after the solemnization of marriage, she stayed at her matrimonial house only for three days, and when the husband's family members asked her to come back, she did not. The Court opined that the respondent-husband's averment was proved that on the first night, the appellant/wife refused to have a physical relationship with the respondent/husband.
In this regard, the Court asserted that the denial of the appellant/wife for making a physical relationship with the respondent/husband amounted to cruelty to the respondent.
Title : Victim A vs. The State Of Madhya Pradesh
Case Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 132
The Madhya Pradesh High Court had granted permission for the termination of a 14-year-old girl's (rape survivor) pregnancy following a statement from her parents affirming that they would not turn hostile during the trial against the rape accused.
A bench of Justice GS Ahluwalia also added that the victim would undergo an abortion at the risk and cost of the parents and that the state government and the doctors performing the abortion would not have any responsibility for this.
The Court passed this order while dealing with a writ plea filed by a 13-year-old rape survivor. During the hearing of the case, the court sought an affidavit from the complainant and the parents of the prosecutrix to the effect that she would not turn hostile concerning the commission of rape by the person against whom allegations have been made.
The Court directed the respondents to terminate the prosecutrix's pregnancy immediately and directed her father to produce her before the CMHO, District Hospital, Singrauli.
Further, the Court also directed the Doctors to preserve the fetus as per the directives of the DNA Test Laboratory and not to preserve the same in a formalin solution.
"The preserved fetus shall be immediately handed over to the investigating Agency, and the Investigating Officer is directed to send the fetus to DNA Fingerprint Laboratory within a period of two days from the date of seizure of the said fetus," the Court added.
Title: Shivnarayan Batham v. Vishesh Jupitor Hospital and Others)
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (MP) 133
In a rare instance, the Madhya Pradesh High Court had allowed a 17-year-old girl to make the donation of her liver tissue in order to save her father from chronic liver disease.
The single-judge bench of Justice Vishal Mishra permitted liver transplantation under the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act & Rules. The court granted permission after the Medical Board and the State Level Authorisation Committee gave their consent to the transplantation procedure after finding the donor to be medically fit.
“…The procedure of transplantation of tissue of liver will be carried out in a specialized centre and in presence of expert team of at least 3 doctors. The expert doctors will explain to the family members as well as the petitioner the risk of getting the entire procedure done and other related factors.”, the bench sitting at Indore observed in the order. The court has also given necessary directions for post-operative care and for ensuring adequate medical facilities.
Despite the urgent nature of the representation, the state government faltered by not expeditiously considering the request even after the medical board's recommendation, the court had noted then. The report of the Medical Board dated 21.06.2024 had declared the minor daughter as medically fit for liver transplantation.
“Under these circumstances and considering the relevant provisions of the Transplantation of the Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994 read with the Transplantation of the Human Organs and Tissues Rules, 2014, the respondents are directed to permit….to donate tissue of liver (part of liver) to her father….”, the court accordingly noted while disposing off the petition.