Limitation Act | Party Not Entitled To Delay Condonation As A Matter Of Right Despite Showing 'Sufficient Cause': Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court recently refused to condone a delay of 288 days in filing a review petition on the ground that the power of attorney holder could not file the same within the stipulated time, being a chronic asthma patient undergoing treatment for the illness. Perusing Section 5 of the Limitation Act which provides for the extension of the prescribed period in certain circumstances,...
The Kerala High Court recently refused to condone a delay of 288 days in filing a review petition on the ground that the power of attorney holder could not file the same within the stipulated time, being a chronic asthma patient undergoing treatment for the illness.
Perusing Section 5 of the Limitation Act which provides for the extension of the prescribed period in certain circumstances, the Single Judge Bench of Justice K. Babu observed:
"The expression “sufficient cause” contained in Section 5 of the Limitation Act is elastic enough to yield different results depending upon the circumstances of the case. The criteria to be applied in condoning the delay in different claims may be different...The concept of reasonableness demands that the courts, while taking a liberal approach, must also consider the rights and obligations of both the parties. When a right has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligence of the other, the Court shall refrain from exercising the discretionary relief. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the Statute mandates so. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds".
The review petitioners approached the Court seeking condonation of delay of 288 days on the ground that the power of attorney holder was afflicted with severe asthmatic problems and related diseases since 2014, and was under the treatment of his daughter at his residence. They further averred that the rectified judgment had been issued to them in October 2014, and the review petitions could be filed only in May 2015 due to his illness.
The Court was posed with the twin questions as to whether the petitioners had established sufficient cause for not preferring the review petitions within the statutory period, and whether the petitioners had established grounds for exercising discretion in condoning the delay in case sufficient cause is established.
The Court perused Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as well as several precedents to conclude that the expression 'sufficient cause' ought to be given a liberal interpretation, so as to ensure that substantial justice is done. It however added that this is so, only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, and that whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case. The Court further found that no straitjacket formula would be possible in this regard.
Relying upon the observation in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. (1962), the Court said:
"It is important to note that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party may not be entitled to the condonation of delay as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. When sufficient cause is established the application for condonation of delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. However, if sufficient cause is shown, then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. In such circumstances, the Court considers all relevant facts especially diligence of the parties or its bona fides. However, the scope of enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. The Court is not expected to enquire into why the party was sitting idle by all the time available to it".
Based on the above precedents, the Court in this case discerned that no material had been placed before the Court by the review petitioners to indicate that they had any inconvenience or difficulty in prosecuting the matter, nor had any materials been produced to explain the delay of 288 days.
"The claim of the review petitioners lacks bona fides. Adequate and enough reasons have not been placed before the Court to condone the delay. The present litigation had commenced in the year 2004. It is not in dispute that the review petitioners were well aware or conversant with the issues involved and the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter if they bona fide wanted," the Court observed while dismissing the pleas.
Counsel for the Review Petitioners: Advocates C.K. Jayakumar, and E. Sheena
Counsel for the Respondents: Advocates R. Muraleekrishnan, Sanil Kunjachan, T.M. Reshmi, Arthur B. George, P.M. Mujeeb Rehiman, Dinesh R. Shenoy, Harikrishnan G., Unnikrishnan V.V., Mahesh Menon, M.M. Jasmin, K.S. Sumitha, and Aparna V.S.
Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (Ker) 652
Case Title: Sathy M.P. & Anr. v. Sarasa & Ors. and connected matter
Case Numbers: R.P. No. 497 OF 2015 and R.P. No. 498 OF 2015