Burden On Accused To Prove Exceptions Under IPC Doesn't Neutralise Prosecution's Burden To Prove His Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Kerala HC
The Kerala High Court recently observed that the burden on the accused to prove that his case comes under the general exceptions given in the Indian Penal Code does not counteract the initial burden on the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A Division Bench of Justice P.B Suresh Kumar and Justice C.S Sudha added that the burden on the accused to prove exceptions is not...
The Kerala High Court recently observed that the burden on the accused to prove that his case comes under the general exceptions given in the Indian Penal Code does not counteract the initial burden on the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
A Division Bench of Justice P.B Suresh Kumar and Justice C.S Sudha added that the burden on the accused to prove exceptions is not as stringent as the prosecution's burden and that the accused merely has to show that the preponderance of probability supports their plea.
"The burden which rests on the accused to prove the exceptions is not the same rigour as the burden of the prosecution to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough for the accused to show, as in a civil case, that the preponderance of probability is in favour of his plea. It is not necessary for the accused to lead any evidence to prove his defence, because such proof can be offered by relying on the evidence led by the prosecution, the materials elicited by cross examining the prosecution witnesses and the totality of the facts and circumstances emerging out of the evidence in the case."
The appellant had approached the Court challenging his conviction under Section 302 IPC by the Sessions Court for allegedly murdering his son.
The prosecution case was that a quarrel between the accused and his wife escalated, leading to their son's intervention. The accused fatally stabbed his son with a tapping knife on his neck. Despite defence arguments about the compatibility of injuries with the weapon and discrepancies in witnesses' testimonies, the trial court upheld the conviction, citing potential rough handling of the knife and variations in attack angles.
The defence argued that even if the prosecution's case is believed, the accused's actions would not amount to murder under Section 300 of IPC. Instead, it would constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the first part of Section 304 IPC.
Thus, the principal question was whether the offence disclosed established by the prosecution against the accused is murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder as per the distinction explained in State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya (AIR 1977 SC 45).
The Court emphasised that while all 'murder' is 'culpable homicide,' the reverse is not true. Culpable homicide can take three degrees: 'culpable homicide of the first degree' equating to 'murder,' 'culpable homicide of the second degree' punishable under S.304(1) IPC, and 'culpable homicide of the third degree' punishable under S.304(2) IPC.
The Division Bench also highlighted the difference between the intentions and knowledge required under Sections 299 and 300 IPC, specifying that 'likely to cause death' in Section 299(b) corresponds to 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' in Section 300(3). The key distinction is the degree of probability of death resulting from intentional bodily injury. It's explained that even if the offender's intent was limited to inflicting an injury likely to cause death, and not necessarily to cause death itself, the act could still fall under 'murder.'
Further, in State of U.P. v. Ram Swarup [AIR 1974 SC 1570], the Apex Court had established that even if the accused does not explicitly claim self-defence, the Court has the authority to determine, based on the evidence and circumstances presented by the prosecution, whether the accused's actions fall within the boundaries of lawful private defence or whether the offence has been mitigated due to exceeding the right of private defence.
Notably, this does not shift or neutralise the prosecution's initial burden to prove the accused's involvement in the crime beyond reasonable doubt.
"Even in such cases the burden which rests on the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt is neither neutralized nor shifted. The prosecution must discharge its initial traditional burden to establish the complicity of the accused and not until it does so can the question arise whether the accused has acted in self defence."
Similarly, Section 105 of the Evidence Act highlights that when an individual is accused of an offence, the burden of proof to establish circumstances that fall under the general exceptions in IPC is on the accused, and the Court presumes the absence of these circumstances until proven otherwise. However, this requirement for the accused to prove exceptions does not relieve the prosecution from establishing its initial burden.
It was thus observed that the primary burden remains with the prosecution until they demonstrate the accused's involvement, only after which the question of whether the accused acted in self-defence arises. Even if the accused does not definitively establish the presence of circumstances falling under the exceptions, their evidence can cast doubt on the prosecution case. This doubt can arise if the facts and circumstances presented by the accused's evidence are sufficient to negate specific elements of the offence.
The Bench added that it is not mandatory for the accused to provide separate evidence to prove their defence; they can rely on the evidence presented by the prosecution, cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, and the overall context of the case.
The Court also evaluated the claims of sudden provocation and the application of Exceptions 1 and 4 to Section 300 IPC and concluded that the evidence does not establish the necessary conditions for these exceptions.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the Court determined that the accused's act of stabbing his son fell under 'culpable homicide of the first degree' as there was no clear intention to kill.
The defence had also challenged the credibility of the testimonies given by some of the prosecution witnesses and had contended that these discrepancies and embellishments in the witness accounts cast doubt on the prosecution case and questioned the accused's involvement in the crime.
However, the Court highlighted that these discrepancies and tampering allegations do not substantially impact the core prosecution narrative. The court emphasizes that the rural and rustic nature of the witnesses must be considered, as their behaviour and perceptions might differ from more urban settings. Moreover, the court asserts that while imperfections and inconsistencies might exist in witness testimonies, they should not overshadow the overall credibility of the prosecution's case. In this instance, the key aspects of the testimonies, supported by physical evidence like bloodstains, corroborate the essential fact that the accused stabbed his son, resulting in his death.
As such, the appeal was dismissed and the Session court's decision was affirmed, upholding that the accused's act qualifies as a case of 'culpable homicide amounting to murder.'
Advocates P Mohandas, K. Sudhinkumar, S.K Adhithyan, Sabu Pullan and Gokul D Sudhakaran appeared for the appellant, while Public Prosecutor E.C Bineesh appeared for the State in the matter.
Case Title: Shaju v. State of Kerala
Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (Ker) 396
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