Order 39 CPC | Suppression Of Material Facts Detrimental To Grant Of Temporary Injunction: Karnataka High Court

The Karnataka High Court recently held that relief of temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is a discretionary remedy which requires a careful balance between the need for interim relief and the ongoing legal proceedings.

Justice H.P Sandesh added that this discretion should not be exercised when material facts are suppressed before the Trial Court and that any false or misleading information in obtaining such interim relief can be detrimental to the integrity of the judicial process.

"The present respondents/plaintiffs have not approached the Court with clean hands and the discretionary relief for granting injunction invoking Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC is a discretionary relief and discretion should not be exercised when the material facts are suppressed before the Trial Court." 

The plea was filed against the issuance of an injunction by the Trial Court while an appeal was already pending. The trial court by its order restrained the appellants from interfering or attempting to interfere with the respondents' right, title and interest and ownership of the property and from interfering with the commencement and completion of the project on the scheduled property.

The core question before the Court was whether the cause of action in the current suit was truly distinct from a previous suit, thereby justifying the injunction.

The appellants asserted that the respondents had obtained the injunction by misleadingly claiming that the High Court had refused the injunction's grant. However, the matter had not been examined on its merits but was merely pending alongside the main appeal. The appellants argued that this showcased a clear suppression of facts in securing the injunction. They stressed that the trial court should not have exercised its discretion to grant an injunction under these circumstances, particularly considering the pending appeal.

The defendants argued that the earlier suit filed by the appellants has been dismissed by the trial court on the grounds that there is no merit in the suit filed by him. Therefore, the initiation of an appeal would not negate the respondents' right to initiate a distinct lawsuit. They asserted that the cause of action asserted in this new lawsuit is dissimilar.

The Bench found that the appellants had previously filed a suit seeking a permanent injunction in 2014, asserting their claim over a particular property. This claim was founded on a range of events spanning several years, including incidents dating back to 2008 and subsequent interactions with the said property.

Subsequently, the appellants approached the court again in 2022, seeking an injunction against the respondents, who were allegedly interfering with their construction activities on the same property.

After a detailed analysis of the events leading to both suits, the Court ruled that the cause of action pleaded in both instances was essentially the same. It underscored that the appellants had sought similar relief in both cases - restraining the respondents from interfering with construction activities on the disputed property.

“The cause of actions for both the suits are one and the same and when such being the case, the very approach of the Trial Court in granting an order of injunction is nothing but capricious and it amounts to perversity and the same is unreasonable and ought not to have granted the relief when the appeal was admitted before this Court is brought to the notice of the Trial Court and hence, the order impugned is liable to be set aside.”

It was emphasized that the respondents had not adequately waited for the resolution of the ongoing appeal and had initiated a new suit seeking injunctive relief.  Thus, it was clear that respondents had not approached the Court with clean hands, and the Court noted that this approach effectively led to a potential conflict between the ongoing appeal and the new suit. 

"The respondents herein ought to have waited till disposal of the appeal which is pending before this Court i.e. R.F.A.No.1060/2020 and thereafter ought to have taken up the construction after the result of the appeal which is pending before this Court. It is nothing but suppressing the truth" 

Furthermore, the Bench emphasised that the mere fact that an appeal might yield a different outcome did not warrant the Trial Court's decision to grant an injunction. It observed that the Trial Court ought to have exercised its discretion more cautiously, especially in light of the pending appeal, which had the power to reevaluate both factual and legal aspects of the case.

The Bench added that it is settled that when a judgment based on merits is challenged through an appeal, the original decision made by the Trial Court loses its absolute finality and what was once res judicata at the Trial Court level becomes subject to res subjudice.

“While obtaining an order in the cause of action it is stated that High Court has refused to grant injunction and the said pleading is against the material on record and the IA has not been considered on merits and it discloses that the said IA would be considered along with the main appeal. When such being the case, the very exercise of discretion is nothing but unreasonable and capricious.”

Thus, the bench held that the trial court's approach in granting the temporary injunction was erroneous. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed. 

Case Title: Nanjamma & Others AND Rajamma & Others

Case No: M.F.A No 2172/2023

Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (Kar) 301

Date of Order: 04-08-2023

Appearance: Senior Advocate V.Lakshminarayana a/w Advocate V Rangaramu for Appellants.

Senior Advocate Udaya Holla a/w Advocate V B Shivakumar for R1 to R21.

Click Here To Read/Download Order

(Inputs by Hannah M Varghese)