"Attempt To Wreak Vengeance, Divert From Core Issues": J&K High Court Quashes Defamation Complaint
Quashing a defamation complaint, citing the improper use of judicial processes for personal vendetta the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has highlighted that judicial mechanisms cannot be exploited to satisfy personal egos or to pursue vengeance.A bench of Justice Javed Iqbal Wani added that the filing of the impugned complaint amounted to a misuse of the judicial process, undermining...
Quashing a defamation complaint, citing the improper use of judicial processes for personal vendetta the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court has highlighted that judicial mechanisms cannot be exploited to satisfy personal egos or to pursue vengeance.
A bench of Justice Javed Iqbal Wani added that the filing of the impugned complaint amounted to a misuse of the judicial process, undermining the sanctity of the legal system. It further noted that such conduct not only burdens the judiciary with unnecessary litigation but also distracts from core issues that genuinely require adjudication.
Background:
The dispute between the petitioner, Kuldeep Raj Dubey, and the respondent, Puneet Sharma, traced its origin back to 2018 when Kuldeep Raj had filed a complaint under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, seeking police action against Sharma for offenses under Sections 447, 427, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code.
Pursuant to the complaint, the police registered an FIR against Puneet Sharma on April 11, 2018. Sharma challenged the FIR, which the High Court quashed in February 2023, holding that the allegations were baseless.
Subsequently, Puneet lodged a defamation complaint against Kuldeep Raj, alleging that the FIR caused irreparable harm to his reputation as the police action took place in broad daylight, with neighbors and acquaintances witnessing the police presence at his home. Puneet contended that the FIR was defamatory in nature since it was ultimately quashed.
Kuldeep filed the present petition under Section 482 of the CrPC, seeking to quash the defamation complaint and the cognizance order dated April 20, 2023. He argued that the complaint was barred by limitation under Section 468 of the CrPC, as the three-year period for filing the complaint had expired. He further asserted that the police were merely performing their duties, and their actions did not amount to defamation.
Respondent Puneet opposed the petition, justifying the delay in filing the defamation complaint by invoking Sections 470 and 473 of the CrPC. He claimed that the period spent challenging the FIR should be excluded from the limitation period and that the interests of justice necessitated the prosecution of the complaint.
Court's Observations:
Adjudicating upon the matter Justice Wani delved into the provisions governing defamation under Section 499 of the IPC and the procedural rules regarding limitation under Sections 468, 469, and 470 of the CrPC. The court reiterated that a complaint for defamation under Section 500 IPC must be filed within three years from the date of the alleged offense.
The court emphasized that merely because the police conducted their duty in public view does not constitute defamation. It stated,
“.. the police were merely acting in the line of duty upon registration of said FIR, a process i.e. standard procedure in any investigation. The fact that locals became aware about the registration of said FIR during the search is a natural consequence of law enforcement agency and its presence in a residential area cannot per-se be construed to be as a defamatory conduct as is alleged by the respondent herein”
The court also discussed the respondent's reliance on the 2016 Supreme Court judgment in Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India and clarified that police cannot register an FIR for defamation. Thus, Puneet Sharma's claim of initially approaching the police to file a defamation case was unfounded.
“.. From the plain reading of Section 199 Cr.PC supra coupled with the law laid down by the Apex court in Subramanian judgement supra it is clear that police cannot register an FIR for commission of offence under Section 500 IPC. Therefore, the explanation for the delay offered by the respondent herein to have approached the police station to act against the petitioner herein falls to the ground”, the bench remarked.
On the issue of limitation, the court cited the Supreme Court's ruling in Surinder Mohan Vikal v. Ascharaj Lal Chopra (1978), which clarified that the limitation period begins on the date of the alleged offense. Since Puneet Sharma's complaint was filed five years after the registration of the FIR, it was deemed time-barred. The court observed, “Recourse to Section 473 of the CrPC at this stage is impermissible since the respondent failed to seek an extension of the limitation period while filing the complaint.”
Additionally, the court criticized the Magistrate for issuing process without examining the limitation issue. Citing Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998), the court reminded that issuing summons in criminal cases is a serious matter and requires the application of judicial mind.
Terming the defamation complaint as an ill-conceived attempt by Puneet Sharma to retaliate against Kuldeep Raj the court stated, “Such misuse of the judicial process burdens the courts with unnecessary litigation and diverts attention from substantive issues.”
The court concluded by quashing the defamation complaint along with the cognizance order, stating that there must be an end to litigation and If the respondent failed to appreciate the limitation period, the courts cannot entertain the matter now.
Case Title: Kuldeep Raj Dubey Vs Puneet Sharma
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (JKL) 293