Criminal Complaint Cannot Be Quashed Solely On Grounds Of Being Initiated Due To Political Vendetta: Himachal Pradesh High Court
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has recently held that a criminal complaint cannot be quashed solely because it was initiated due to political rivalry. The court was hearing a petition for the quashing of an FIR filed against the petitioners under Section 39(1)(a) of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act and Section 171E read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The FIR stemmed from...
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has recently held that a criminal complaint cannot be quashed solely because it was initiated due to political rivalry. The court was hearing a petition for the quashing of an FIR filed against the petitioners under Section 39(1)(a) of the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act and Section 171E read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The FIR stemmed from allegations that the petitioners had distributed liquor during Panchayat elections to influence voters.
The complaint was lodged by a political rival, who alleged that the petitioners were attempting to sway the election by distributing alcohol. The petitioners denied the accusations, asserting that the complaint was rooted in political vendetta. They also argued that the amount of liquor found in their vehicle did not violate the permissible limits under the Excise Act and sought to have the FIR quashed on these grounds.
Justice Rakesh Kainthla, presiding over the matter, rejected the argument that the political motivations behind the complaint were reasonable grounds for quashing the FIR. The court emphasized that “the fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings.”
This reasoning drew upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., which established that criminal prosecution, even if prompted by malice or political motives, remains valid as long as it is backed by sufficient evidence.
One of the key arguments raised by the petitioners was that the recovery of six bottles of liquor did not constitute an offence under the Himachal Pradesh Excise Act, as each individual in the vehicle was permitted to possess up to two bottles of alcohol.
However, Justice Kainthla rejected this line of reasoning by referencing the court's own decision in Veena Devi & Ors. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, where the court held that it is impermissible to divide the recovered contraband among multiple accused to avoid legal liability. The court clarified that possession in such cases is considered collective, not individual.
The petitioners also contended that no concrete evidence had been presented to support the claim that they were distributing liquor to voters. In response, the court cited the Supreme Court's decision in State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan, which held that “the sufficiency of evidence is a matter for trial and cannot be decided at the stage of quashing proceedings under Section 482 of CrPC.”
The High Court reiterated that at this stage, it is not the role of the court to assess the adequacy of the evidence collected by the prosecution; such matters must be addressed during the trial.
In examining the allegations under Section 171E of the IPC, which pertains to bribery during elections, the court found that the facts presented in the FIR, even if politically motivated, prima facie satisfied the legal requirements for an offence under this provision. The court emphasized that the political context in which the complaint was made does not negate the possibility that an offence was committed.
The petitioners further argued that the allegations were improbable, pointing out that it was unlikely they would have left their vehicle unlocked with liquor inside. The court dismissed this argument, noting that the assessment of the credibility of such allegations must be determined through a full trial. Justice Kainthla, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in Priyanka Jaiswal v. State of Jharkhand, underscored that “the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations cannot be determined at this stage; it is a matter of trial.”
The court underscored that the trial court is the appropriate forum to examine the sufficiency of evidence once a charge sheet has been filed. Although the petitioners argued for the quashing of the FIR, the court highlighted that the charge sheet had already been submitted, making it the trial court's responsibility to assess the evidence collected.
Citing the Supreme Court's judgment in Iqbal v. State of U.P., the High Court emphasized that the trial court must be allowed to consider the materials gathered during the investigation without interference from the High Court at this stage.
In conclusion, Justice Kainthla refused to quash the FIR and reiterated that the High Court cannot conduct a mini-trial under the guise of exercising its powers under Section 482 of the CrPC. The petition to quash the FIR was dismissed, with the court clarifying that its observations were confined to the present petition and would not impact the outcome of the trial.
Case Title: Virender Singh and others. Versus State of H.P. and another
Citation: 2024 LIveLaw (HP) 58