Passing Reinstatement Order Pursuant To Quashing Of Earlier Suspension Not Necessary For Suspending An Employee Again: Allahabad High Court

The Court held that suspension does not remove the employer-employee relationship between the parties. Consequently, the act of passing a formal order of reinstatement would amount to an empty formality. The court noted that the petitioner's counsel had neither in the arguments nor in the plea had indicated anywhere as to the prejudice that may have been caused to the petitioner on account of non issuance of the formal order of reinstatement after the earlier suspension order was quashed. 

“…once the earlier suspension order of the petitioner had been quashed consequently even if the respondents failed to pass a formal order of reinstatement, the same will not and cannot take away the power of the respondents to again place the petitioner under suspension as has clearly been done in the instant case. Thus, the aforesaid ground does not appeal to the Court and is accordingly rejected,” said Justice Abdul Moin in his order. 

Background

Petitioner had been previously suspended by order on October 4 this year, which was quashed in a consequent writ petition. By said order, it was left open to the authority to pass a fresh order, if required, in accordance with law.

Thereafter, the petitioner was again placed under suspension by order on November 5. Being aggrieved, the petitioner again approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Counsel for petitioner contended that the employer-employee relationship stood suspended due to the first suspension order. It was argued that the petitioner was suspended under Section 16G(5)(b) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. As the provision was applicable only in case her continuation in office was likely to hamper enquiry, and no enquiry was pending at the time of said order, it was argued that there was non-application of mind.

Counsel for the respondent argued that reinstatement automatically followed after quashing of the first suspension order. It was contended that the second suspension order was passed under Sections 16G(5)(a) and 16G(5)(b). Even if the argument of the petitioner qua Section 16G(5)(b) was upheld, charges were serious enough to merit dismissal.

High Court

Regarding the first submission of the petitioner, the Court held that suspension does not put a stop to the employer-employee relationship during its duration. It was held that once the employer-employee relationship continues, the petitioner, being principal or head of the institution, can be suspended by management on grounds under Section 16G(5) of the 1921 Act.

The Court observed that the earlier suspension order had been quashed, which meant that the petitioner was not a suspended employee on the date of passing of the second suspension order.

It was further observed that the fact of non-issuance of a formal order of reinstatement would have to be examined in the context of whether any actual prejudice was caused to the petitioner.

The Court relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Canara Bank and Ors. vs. Debasis Das and Ors., where it was held that

“If after hearing the parties, the court/tribunal comes to the conclusion that the non- supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the court/tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The court/tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was not furnished as is regrettably being done at present.”

Justice Moin observed that neither in the petition nor during arguments was it indicated that prejudice had in fact been caused to the petitioner.

“In the absence thereto, merely because no formal order was issued prior to placing the petitioner under suspension, the same, in the opinion of the Court, will not vitiate the impugned suspension order as no prejudice has been caused to him.”

The Court referred to the 'Useless Formality Theory' as enunciated by the Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India and Ors., holding that the fact of non-issuance was covered by the aforementioned principle of law.

Thereafter, the Court cited Gadde Venkateswara Rao vs Government Of Andhra Pradesh And Others, stating that exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction may be refused unless there is a failure of justice.

Subsequently, the Court rejected the petitioner's submission pertaining to non-issuance of formal order of reinstatement.

Dealing with cases relied on by the petitioner, the Court distinguished the decision of the Apex Court in Anand Narain Shukla vs State of Madhya Pradesh as the matter concerned reinstatement, whereas the petitioner's case was one of suspension. In Lal Bahadur Singh vs U.P. State Roadways Transport Corporation & Ors, the Apex Court was concerned with quashing of a dismissal order (as opposed to a suspension order), with enquiry only possible after a reinstatement order was passed.

The decision of the Bombay High Court in Salma Bi vs Collector, Buldana & Ors, being an election dispute was not applicable to a service matter. The decision of Apex Court in Managing Director of ECIL vs B. Karunakar was distinguished by the Court on grounds that it pertained to reinstatement of an employee, which was not applicable to the facts of the present case.

Regarding the second submission of the petitioner, the Court held that as the second suspension order was passed not only under Section 16G(5)(b) but also Section 16G(5)(a), the same would be sustainable even if the petitioner's arguments pertaining to the former section were accepted.

Lastly, the Court observed that no opinion was expressed with regard to the question of whether a suspension order can be passed without issuance of a chargesheet under Section 16G(5)(b), leaving it open to be considered in an appropriate case.

Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.

Case Title: Dr. Gyanvati Dixit v. State Of U.P. Thru. Prin. Secy. Deptt. Of Sec. Edu. Lko. And Others [WRIT - A No. - 11061 of 2024]