Mere Direction To Decide Representation By HC Does Not Revive Stale Claim Of Salary Dues: Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court has held that even though Article 226 of the Constitution does not contemplate laches, merely obtaining a direction to decide representation after significant delay in making the claim (and in submitting representation) would not give rise to a new cause of action or revive a stale claim of salary dues by the petitioner.Justice Subhash Vidyarthi relied on State...
The Allahabad High Court has held that even though Article 226 of the Constitution does not contemplate laches, merely obtaining a direction to decide representation after significant delay in making the claim (and in submitting representation) would not give rise to a new cause of action or revive a stale claim of salary dues by the petitioner.
Justice Subhash Vidyarthi relied on State of Uttaranchal and another vs. Sri Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and others where the Supreme Court held that “it is clear as crystal that even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.”
Factual Background
Petitioner challenged validity of order dated 20.01.2024, by which his representation for payment of difference in salary from June 2006 to June 2009 was rejected.
Petitioner had previously filed a writ petition praying for payment of gratuity with 9% interest, or to decide aforementioned representation. An order was passed directing the respondent authorities to decide petitioner's representation within time. Subsequently, his claim was rejected by order dated 20.01.2024 by the Deputy Director (Secondary Education) on the ground of there being no statutory basis for payment to a teacher working as principal only on an officiating basis.
High Court Verdict
The Court noted that as per the law laid down by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Jai Prakash Narayan Singh vs. State of U.P., there is no justification to deny salary to a person appointed even on an officiating basis under the statute of a university. However, the petitioner approached the court for the first time in 2024 for a cause of action purportedly originating in 2009.
It was observed that in Union of India vs. Tarsem Singh, while stating that continuing wrong is an exception to the law on delay and laches, the Supreme Court also stated that relief relating to arrears will normally be restricted to a period of three years prior to filing of the petition. The aforesaid principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in State of M.P. vs. Yogendra Shrivastava, and Syed Mohammad Suleman vs. State of U.P.
In Jwala Devi vs. State of U.P. and 5 others, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court had held that iHigh C
“It is settled law that payment of gratuity is the right of the employee, provided gratuity is actually payable in accordance with law. Non-payment of gratuity, in the event it is legally payable, is the statutory responsibility of the employer. Therefore, the writ petition of the widow of the deceased employee asking for payment of gratuity cannot be dismissed merely on the ground of laches, unless it is found that the gratuity is not legally payable.”
The Court distinguished the case of Jwala Devi, holding that the effect of laches on a writ petition filed for arrears of salary was not contemplated therein (payment of gratuity as a statutory responsibility being the subject matter), making it non-relevant to the case of the petitioner.
Expounding upon the principle of delay and laches, the Court referred to Bichitrananda Behera vs. State of Orissa, where the Supreme Court held that laches occur when a party neglects pursuance of a claim involving relief which causes prejudice to the other party. Delay in approaching the court amounts to waiver of such a right, and puts the other party in a particular position due to such waiver. The Court then cannot grant relief to the party approaching as its actions have indicated otherwise, it was held.
The Apex Court further observed how acquiescence when combined with delay becomes laches, and that a reasonable time for approaching the court depends on the facts of a case and cannot be reduced to a formula. It was held that unlike limitation, laches is flexible.
Justice Vidyarthi also relied on Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley, wherein the Supreme Court held that a person slumbering over his rights beyond a reasonable time period should not be granted relief in the extraordinary jurisdiction of a writ court. It was held that the discretion of a writ court has to be exercised with care and caution.
“Therefore, the law is well settled that a claim for arrears of salary for a period earlier than three years, cannot be entertained by the High Court and the Writ Petition filed in the year 2024 for claiming payment of arrears of salary for the period June, 2006 to 30.06.2009 cannot be entertained.”
The Court observed that as per the law laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal vs. Shiv Charan Bhandari, relied upon in State of Bengal vs. Debabrata Tiwari, a direction by a court or tribunal directing consideration of representation for a stale claim shall not give rise to a new cause of action.
Since laches of more than 15 years were attributable to the petitioner, the Court dismissed the writ petition.
Case Title: Bhagirath Prasad Sharma v. State Of Up And 4 Others 2024 LiveLaw (AB) 461 [WRIT - A No. - 9709 of 2024]
Case citation: 2024 LiveLaw (AB) 461