Person Convicted Of Moral Turpitude Not Suitable To Head Any Department, Much Less Education Institution: Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court has held that a candidate convicted in a criminal case involving moral turpitude cannot be said to be suitable to head any department, much less an educational institution.“…A candidate who is convicted in a criminal case involving moral turpitude, such a candidate cannot be taken to be suitable candidate to hold the position of head of any institution or...
The Allahabad High Court has held that a candidate convicted in a criminal case involving moral turpitude cannot be said to be suitable to head any department, much less an educational institution.
“…A candidate who is convicted in a criminal case involving moral turpitude, such a candidate cannot be taken to be suitable candidate to hold the position of head of any institution or department much less an educational institution as he has not only to run the administration but to ensure discipline with high moral values and character to demonstrate,” held Justice Ajit Kumar.
The Court held that apart from act of committing a murder, 'moral turpitude' also includes any “act of committing such public offence which has the shocking effect as to conscious of seniority.”
The Court held that acts of preparing fake IDs, pan cards and admit cards and also preparing another answer sheets to be replaced as original amounts to an act suffering from moral depraving.
The Court held that the rule of the senior most teacher being made the officiating principal is subject to the candidate being fit for the most. It was held that merely relying on seniority without considering suitability of a candidate will lead to absurdity.
“In service jurisprudence the endeavour of an employer is always to ensure that the candidate who is being offered employment is suitable from all angles besides merit and if a candidate convicted in a criminal case involving moral turpitude, cannot be offered appointment, then such a person definitely does not deserve promotion even in officiating capacity.”
Factual Background
Upon the post of principal becoming substantively vacant in 2019, charge was to be given in terms of Section 18 of the then U.P. Secondary Education Service Selection Board Act, 1982. Even though petitioner was the senior-most Lecturer, he declined to take charge due to his mother's deteriorating health. Consequently, the 6th respondent was given charge as principal of the institution.
After passing of petitioner's mother, being the senior-most lecturer, he moved representation requesting the charge of principal which was dismissed. Writ petition against the rejection order was also dismissed on grounds that claim once relinquished cannot be revived due to causing administrative uncertainty. Special appeal against the order of the single judge was also dismissed.
Meanwhile, 6th respondent was convicted in a criminal case under Sections 419, 420, 467, 468, 473 I.P.C. Eventually he was granted bail and the conviction was kept in abeyance, but he did not attend to his duties to the institution. Since there was uncertainty regarding officiating principal, Committee of Management condoned the earlier waiver by the petitioner, and forwarded his name for appointment as officiating principal. The DIOS attested the signature of the petitioner.
After conviction of the 6th respondent, he was suspended by the authorized Controller, with the DIOS approving said order on 10.02.2023. However, the Committee of Management revoked the suspension order on 29.05.2023. DIOS approval of the revocation was challenged by the petitioner before the Joint Director of Education, who allowed his representation/ appeal holding that appointment of the petitioner as officiating principal valid. However, in appeal by the 6th respondent, the Additional Director of Education reversed the order of Joint Director of Education and upheld the order of the DIOS.
High Court Verdict
The issue before the Court was whether after change of circumstances, petitioner could have revived his claim for post of officiating principle.
The Court observed that when the petitioner had previously approached the High Court, the Court had held that ad hoc positions cannot be allowed to fluctuate between two persons as it will lead to administrative uncertainties. However, the Court observed that the situation which arose later could not have been imagined by the Court back then.
The Court held that upheld the waiver accorded to the petitioner by the Committee of Management as no other senior teacher had staked claim for the post and the 6th respondent who was appointed on the set post had been convicted and was absconding without informing the administration.
The second issue before the Court was whether a lecturer, who is not the senior-most, can be permitted to hold charge of officiating principal after his suspension for conviction in criminal case involving moral turpitude is revoked.
The Court held once the petitioner's waiver had been condoned by the Committee of Management, petitioner being the senior-most teacher ought to have been appointed as the officiating principal.
The Court held that the petitioner's ad hoc appointment was in accordance with Section 18 of the U.P. Secondary Service Selection Board Act, 1982 which provides that senior most teacher shall be given charge, be entitled for salary, and the DIOS can intervene to ensure the aforesaid is done in case the Committee fails to do so.
The Court held that the acts of forgery of fake IDs, replacing answer sheets, etc., committed by the 6th respondent along with other suffered from moral deprivation. The Court held that by tampering with the recruitment examination for public employment the respondent also committed fraud and forgery to those who had succeeded on merits.
“This is really a vileness,” observed the Court. The Court held that in such case the Committee of Management ought to have strict action against the 6th respondent, however, they revoked his suspension.
Observing that a person who has been convicted of moral turpitude is not entitled to be public employment, the Court held that the 6th respondent did not deserve to be the officiating principal of a recognized and aided institution under Intermediate Education Act, 1921.
The Court set aside orders passed by the DIOS and Additional Director of Education revoking suspension of principal convicted of offences involving moral turpitude and allowed the claim of the petitioner.
Case Title: Ashok Kumar Pandey vs. State Of U.P. And 5 Others 2024 LiveLaw (AB) 258 [WRIT - A No. - 18173 of 2023]
Case citation: 2024 LiveLaw (AB) 258