Krishna Janmabhumi-Shahi Idgah Dispute | 'Suits Seeking Mosque's Removal Are Barred By Places Of Worship Act': Masjid Committee In Allahabad HC
The Committee of Management Trust Shahi Masjid Idgah (Mathura) today argued before the Allahabad High Court that the suits pending before the HC, inter alia seeking the removal of the Shahi Idgah mosque from the 13.37-acre complex which it shares with the Katra Keshav Dev temple in Mathura, are barred by the Places of Worship Act 1991, Limitation Act 1963 as well as the Specific Relief...
The Committee of Management Trust Shahi Masjid Idgah (Mathura) today argued before the Allahabad High Court that the suits pending before the HC, inter alia seeking the removal of the Shahi Idgah mosque from the 13.37-acre complex which it shares with the Katra Keshav Dev temple in Mathura, are barred by the Places of Worship Act 1991, Limitation Act 1963 as well as the Specific Relief Act 1963.
In its application filed under Order VII Rule 11 (d) [for rejection of plaint] r/w Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, the Shahi Masjid Idgah Committee today raised the contention that the suits pending before the High Court admit the fact that there has been a Mosque in existence after 1968.
Appearing for the Mosque committee, Advocate Tasneem Ahmadi contended that in the majority of the suits pending before the HC, the plaintiffs are seeking the right to the title of the land, which was the subject matter of a compromise arrived at in 1968 between Shree Krishna Janmasthan Seva Sangh and the management of the Shahi Masjid Idgah, dividing the disputed land and asking the 2 groups to stay away from each other's areas (within the 13.37-acre complex), however, the suits are specifically barred by law.
Challenging the maintainability of the Original Suit no. 2 (filed by Bhagwan Shri Krishna Virajman Through Manish Yadav and another), Advocate Ahmadi argued that the plaintiff has, in the plaint, admitted the compromise of 1968 and the fact that the possession of the land (where Idagh is built) is under the control of the Mosque management and therefore, the suit, would be barred by the Limitation Act as well as the Places of Worship Act as it also admits the fact that the mosque in question was was built in 1669-70.
For context, the period of limitation for instituting civil suits is three years from the date on which the cause of action arose.
"3 years limitation to challenge the compromise of 1968 is long over. The plaint admits our possession. The Places of Worship Act will also apply because it is accepted in the compromise that the Masjid existed there...If we take the worst-case scenario, that the Mosque was built after the 1968 compromise, then also the bar of the Limitation Act will apply" she contended.
Advocate Ahmadi further argued that if the assertion in the plaint that the Mosque was constructed after the 1968 compromise is deemed accurate, then how can they claim in the suit that they got to know about the compromise in the year 2020?
Further, challenging the maintainability of the Original Suit no. 4, Ahmadi submitted that the plaint filed in the suit claims that Mughal ruler Aurangzeb had, in 1669, demolished the temple and raised the Eidgah Mosque at the disputed site and therefore, she contended, the plaintiff has admitted that the Mosque continued to exist there after 1669-70, and hence, the Limitation Act would bar the suit.
Similarly, challenging the maintainability of suit no. 9, she argued that the compromise of 1968 had been admitted in the plaint and therefore, the limitation under the Limitation Act would apply to that suit as well
"Plaint says that it is historically proved that Aurangzeb got demolished the Katra Keshav Dev Temple in 1669-70 and #EidgahMosque was constructed. Here also, it is admitted that the Mosque was there and hence, the Places of Worship Act will apply," she submitted.
Regarding the challenge made to the constitutionality of the provisions of the Places Of Worship Act in some of the suits before the HC, Advocate Ahmadi submitted that the issue of constitutionality can't be raised in a suit filed for a private dispute.
Importantly, she also argued that a prayer of permanent injunction can be granted only to a person who is in actual possession of the property on the date of suit and since, the plaintiffs are not in the possession of the Mosque, they can't pray for a permanent injunction.
Due to the paucity of time, the arguments couldn't conclude and hence, the matter was posted for a further hearing on February 29.
The dispute in brief
The entire controversy relates to Mughal emperor Aurangazeb-era Shahi Eidgah mosque at Mathura, which is alleged to have been built after demolishing a temple at the birthplace of Lord Krishna.
In 1968, a 'compromise agreement' was brokered between the Shri Krishna Janmasthan Seva Sansthan, which is the temple management authority, and the Trust Shahi Masjid Eidgah allowing both places of worship to operate simultaneously. However, the validity of this agreement has now been doubted by parties seeking various forms of relief in courts with respect to Krishna Janmabhoomi. The litigants' contention is that the compromise agreement was made fraudulently and is invalid in law. Claiming a right to worship at the disputed site, many of them have sought the Shahi Eidgah mosque's removal.
In May, the Allahabad High Court transferred to itself all the suits pending before the Mathura court praying for various reliefs pertaining to the Krishna Janmabhoomi-Shahi Eidgah Mosque dispute, allowing the transfer application filed by Bhagwan Shrikrishna Virajman and seven others.