Krishna Janmabhumi-Shahi Idgah Dispute | Constitutionality Of 'Places Of Worship Act' Can't Be Challenged In A Civil Suit: Masjid Committee In Allahabad HC

Appearing for the Mosque committee, Advocate Tasneem Ahmadi contended that in the majority of the suits pending before the HC, the plaintiffs are seeking the right to the title of the land, which was the subject matter of a compromise arrived at in 1968 between Shree Krishna Janmasthan Seva Sangh and the management of the Shahi Masjid Idgah, dividing the disputed land and asking the 2 groups to stay away from each other's areas (within the 13.37-acre complex), however, the suits are specifically barred by law (the Places of Worship Act 1991, Limitation Act 1963 as well as the Specific Relief Act 1963).

For context, the period of limitation for instituting civil suits is three years from the date on which the cause of action arose.

"The compromise was entered into in 1967, which is admitted even in the suit, hence, when they filed suit in 2020, the same would be barred by the Limitation Act (3 years)...Even if it is assumed that the Mosque was built in 1969 (after the compromise), even then, the suit can not now be filed as it would be barred by the Limitation Act. Over 50 years of delay...It is an old cause of action, as it can't be said that they were refused entry to the premises only in 2023 when they admitted that the disputed property had been under the control of the Mosque management since 1968-69" she contended.

Advocate Ahmadi further argued that if the assertion in the plaint that the Mosque was constructed after the 1968 compromise is deemed accurate, then how can they claim in the suit that they got to know about the compromise in the year 2020?

Importantly, she also argued that a prayer of permanent injunction can be granted only to a person who is in actual possession of the property on the date of suit and since, the plaintiffs are not in the possession of the Mosque, they can't pray for a permanent injunction.

"The plaint admits the possession of the management of the Mosque, however, since the suit is for a declaration without seeking the consequential relief of possession, it would barred by proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act...An injunction can't be sought by them without the plaintiffs' being in the possession of the disputed property." she submitted

She strongly contended that whosoever objects to the character of a Waqf Property (whether or not Shahi Idgah Mosque is so), has to be decided by the Waqf Tribunal and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be barred by law. 

Due to the paucity of time, the arguments couldn't conclude and hence, the matter was posted for a further hearing on March 13.

The dispute in brief

The entire controversy relates to Mughal emperor Aurangazeb-era Shahi Eidgah mosque at Mathura, which is alleged to have been built after demolishing a temple at the birthplace of Lord Krishna.

In 1968, a 'compromise agreement' was brokered between the Shri Krishna Janmasthan Seva Sansthan, which is the temple management authority, and the Trust Shahi Masjid Eidgah allowing both places of worship to operate simultaneously. However, the validity of this agreement has now been doubted by parties seeking various forms of relief in courts with respect to Krishna Janmabhoomi. The litigants' contention is that the compromise agreement was made fraudulently and is invalid in law. Claiming a right to worship at the disputed site, many of them have sought the Shahi Eidgah mosque's removal.

In May, the Allahabad High Court transferred to itself all the suits pending before the Mathura court praying for various reliefs pertaining to the Krishna Janmabhoomi-Shahi Eidgah Mosque dispute, allowing the transfer application filed by Bhagwan Shrikrishna Virajman and seven others.