Drunk Driving | Medical Report Not Required In Every Case To Prove Intoxication And Guilt Of Accused U/S 304 IPC: Kerala High Court
The Kerala High Court on Thursday held that it would not be essential to insist upon documentary evidence to prove the fact of 'drunkenness' in every case of drunk driving, in order to establish the guilt of an accused under Section 304 IPC for offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas observed that if the circumstance of the case and the statement of...
The Kerala High Court on Thursday held that it would not be essential to insist upon documentary evidence to prove the fact of 'drunkenness' in every case of drunk driving, in order to establish the guilt of an accused under Section 304 IPC for offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas observed that if the circumstance of the case and the statement of the witnesses inspires the Court to come to a conclusion that the accused was driving the vehicle in a drunken state, in the absence of a statutory mandate for a medical report, the absence of such a report by itself need not deter the court from arriving at such a conclusion.
"For the purpose of bringing home the guilt of an accused, under section 304 IPC, based upon drunken driving and the resulting knowledge of the consequences, it is not essential, in every case, that there should be documentary evidence to prove the fact of drunkenness...Needless to observe, these are all matters for trial."
The Court added that rash or negligent driving on a public road with the knowledge of the dangerous character of his act, especially when he drives in an inebriated state, can fall in the category of culpable homicide, not amounting to murder, if the injured died as a result of the injuries.
"A person doing an act of rash or negligent driving, if aware of the risk that a particular consequence is likely to result and that result occurs, he can be proceeded against not only for the act but also for the result that ensued," it said.
The bench was hearing two revision petitions filed in connection with road rage case involving IAS Officer Sreeram Venkittaraman. One was filed by the State Government and the other by Wafa Firoz, Sreeram's friend who owned the car.
In 2019, a journalist K.M. Basheer was allegedly killed when a vehicle driven by Venkittaraman, ran over him at high speed, at Museum Junction in Thiruvananthapuram District of Kerala. It was alleged that Venkittaraman, who was accompanied by Firoz, was in an inebriated state, which led to the accident.
The Court today set aside the order of the Sessions Court dropping culpable homicide charges against Venkittaraman. The order was however upheld to the extent it discharged Venkittaraman under Sections 184 and 185 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that relates to dangerous driving and drunken driving, and Section 3(2) of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property. As regards the alleged offence of abetment against Firoz, the Court was of the view that there was no material to indicate that she had intentionally aided/instigated/conspired to commit the offence with Venkittaraman, and accordingly, set aside the same.
As per the factual circumstances of the case, it could be ascertained that Venkittaraman was not subjected to any medical test at the hospital he was first taken to although the doctor who had first examined him had written that there was the smell of alcohol. He was thereafter referred to the Medical College. The police officer accompanying Venkittaraman, then permitted his friend to transfer him in his private car to the Medical College Hospital, which he never reached, but was instead, taken to a private hospital called MIMS Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram.
The Court observed that as per the statement of a nurse at the said hospital, the accused avoided permitting her to take a blood test until 10.30 am under one pretext or the other, and by the time the blood test was finally taken, the sample did not reveal the presence of alcohol.
In this context, the Court observed that facts can be proved by oral evidence as per Section 59 of the Evidence Act, 1872, except, the proof of contents of a document, and added that if the adduced oral evidence would inspire the confidence of the Court or is worthy of credit, the same would be sufficient.
The Court noted that in this case, the Sessions Judge had considered the absence of a medical test report regarding the level of intoxication as significant.
"In this context, it is pertinent to notice that the first accused is an IAS officer and a medical doctor by education. The doctor who initially attended to the revision petitioner at the General Hospital, Thiruvananthapuram, despite noting that there was the smell of alcohol, did not, curiously, subject him to a medical test. Statements have been given by witnesses conveying to the said doctor even before the first accused had reached the hospital that an IAS officer, who himself is a doctor, was being brought to the hospital. Apart from the above, after referring the revision petitioner to the Medical College Hospital, the police officer permitted the first accused to be taken by a private person in a private vehicle. These circumstances raise eyebrows," the Court observed.
On the basis of the same, the Court was of the prima facie view that Venkittaraman had been over-speeding and driving the vehicle after consuming alcohol and had even caused the destruction of evidence relating to the offence.
The Court thus noted that while absence of a medical test report may be fatal for establishing the offence under Section 185 of the M.V. Act, the same could not be a reason for discharge of the accused under Section 304 IPC if there were other materials to prima facie arrive at the conclusion that the accused was driving the vehicle after consuming alcohol.
"On an appreciation of the above aspects arising in the case, it is evident that the materials brought out after investigation, if proven, can bring out the guilt of the first accused for the offence under section 304 and Section 201 IPC. In such circumstances, the first accused cannot be discharged for the offence under Section 304 and Section 201 IPC. Resultantly, the discharge of the first accused for those two offences by the order impugned is improper and irregular," the Court ruled.
Public Prosecutor S.U. Nazar appeared on behalf of the State. Advocates S. Rajeev, V. Vinay, M.S. Aneer, Sarath K.P., and Prerith Philip Joseph appeared on behalf of the 1st accused Venkittaraman. Wafa Firoz was represented by Advocates G. Ranju Mohan, S. Suresh, M. Santhi, and Arya S.
Case Title: State of Kerala v. Sreeram Venkitaraman and Wafa Najim @ Wafa Firoz v. State of Kerala
Citation: 2023 LiveLaw (Ker) 188