Justice Mishra : Dr Dhavan, I'm short of time. I'm demitting office. So whether it is proper for me to take a call on this (reference to larger bench) is also an issue.
Justice Arun Mishra says that there has to be sufficient pleadings for framing questions and asks Dhavan if these questions can be considered without such pleadings.
Dhavan : These questions must be resolved for "once and for all". The Court's free speech jurisprudence has expanded and its impact on contempt law must be considered.
9. Whether the in-house procedure for dealing with complaints against judges laid down in C. RavichandranIyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 457 prevents complainants, participants in the procedure and others from discussing the matter in the public domain?
10. Whether the decision in C. RavichandranIyer v. Justice A.M. Bhattacharjee and Ors. (1995) 5 SCC 457 is compatible with constitutional limitations including those contained in Articles 19(2) and 14?
6. Whether, in light of the law laid down by this Hon'ble Court in Dadu v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 437 (paras 17&18) and, the absence of any provision for appeal against conviction in a suo-motu proceeding for criminal contempt initiated by this Hon'ble Court violates Article 21 of the Constitution of India?
7. Whether, after the interconnected reading of Articles 14, 19 & 21 in RC Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 (11 Judges) and in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 (7 Judges), the law of contempt should be subject to the concepts enumerated in these decisions, both in relation of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 as well as Articles 129 & 215 of the Constitution of India?
8. Whether cases relating to Section 2(c)(i) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 decided before its enactment need to be re-examined in the light of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and judgments interpreting it?
5. a) Whether the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ought to bear on the manner in which the vast discretion in relation to contempt proceedings under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution is exercised?
(b) Whether, in answer to the foregoing question, the conflicting pronouncements of this Hon'ble Court in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian (2001) 7 SCC 549 and In re Prashant Bhushan, SMC (Crim.) No. 1 of 2020 (decided 14th August 2020) deserve re-examination?
3. Whether the Supreme Court in exercise of its powers under Article 129 can curtail free speech and expression only to the strict and limited extent permissible under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971?
4. Whether the decisions in Ex Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India (2003) 2 SCC 45 and Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India (1998) 4 SCC 409 are mutually inconsistent and deserve to be reconciled by a bench of the appropriate strength, and whether in any event both judgments deserve to be referred to a larger bench in order to reconcile them with the issues raised in Question 3 above?
1. Whether the expression of a bona fide opinion about the extent of corruption in any section of the judiciary would amount to contempt of Court?
2. If the answer to Question 1 is in the affirmative, whether the person who expresses such an opinion about the extent of corruption in a section of judiciary is obliged to prove that his opinion is correct or whether it is enough to show that he bona fide held that opinion?
Senior Advocate Rajeev Dhavan submits that Bhushan has raised some questions of law and that the matter ought to be referred to Constitution Bench. Dhavan also urges the bench to hear Attorney General as issues of constitutional importance are involved.
The bench is now considering the 2009 contempt case taken against Prashant Bhushan for his interview to Tehelka