Consumer LawConsumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1) (m) and Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Maintainability of the complaint filed by Insured Company (registered under the Companies Act, 1956) before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission is in question – Whether 'company' is covered by the definition of 'person' under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986? – Held,...
Consumer Law
Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1) (m) and Consumer Protection Act, 2019 – Maintainability of the complaint filed by Insured Company (registered under the Companies Act, 1956) before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission is in question – Whether 'company' is covered by the definition of 'person' under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986? – Held, the definition of 'person' as provided in the Act of 1986 is inclusive and not exhaustive. Consumer Protection Act being a beneficial legislation, a liberal interpretation has to be given to the statute. The very fact that in the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, a body corporate has been brought within the definition of 'person', by itself indicates that the legislature realized the incongruity in the unamended provision and has rectified the anomaly by including the word 'company' in the definition of 'person'. (Para 15) Kozyflex Mattresses Pvt. Ltd. v. SBI General Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 255
Observation made by the Consumer Commission that Apple India has the duty to trace stolen iPhone with the help of a unique identity number was unwarranted. Apple India Pvt Ltd v. Harish Chandra Mohanty, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 138
Compensation in cases of medical negligence – The idea of compensation is based on restitutio in integrum, which means, make good the loss suffered, so far as money is able to do so, or, take the receiver of such compensation, back to a position, as if the loss/injury suffered by them hadn't occurred. Further, what qualifies as just compensation, as noticed above, has to be considered in the facts of each case. Held, compensation awarded is too less for the suffering caused due to medical negligence and deficient services. Hence, compensation is enhanced. (Para 12.3.2, 12.3.3, 16 & 18) Jyoti Devi v. Suket Hospital, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2024 Cri LJ 2362 : AIR 2024 SC 2567
Eggshell Skull Rule – A person who has an eggshell skull is one who would be more severely impacted by an act, which an otherwise “normal person” would be able to withstand. It is otherwise termed as “taking the victim as one finds them” and, therefore, a doer of an act would be liable for the otherwise more severe impact that such an act may have on the victim. Held, claimant-appellant not proved to have an eggshell skull, i.e. a pre-existing vulnerability or medical condition, because of which the claimant may have suffered 'unusual damage' is not found. (Para 12.4 & 17) Jyoti Devi v. Suket Hospital, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2024 Cri LJ 2362 : AIR 2024 SC 2567
Maintainability of commercial disputes – Appropriate remedy in commercial disputes – Investment made by the complainant was for deriving benefit, therefore, it would be an investment for profit/gain and such commercial transactions would be outside the purview of the 1986 Act. Commercial disputes cannot be decided in summary proceeding under the 1986 Act but the appropriate remedy for recovery of the said amount, would be before the Civil Court. The complaint was thus not maintainable. The District Forum, the State and the National Commissions fell in error in allowing the complaint. (Para 7) Annapurna B. Uppin v. Malsiddappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : AIR 2024 SC 2015
Maintainability of complaint when complainant deemed partner of firm – There was a registered partnership deed of the firm and there is no further document placed on record by the complainant regarding dissolution of the said registered deed. The said registered deed continued till the time when the investment was made by the complainant, hence, the complainant would be deemed to be partner of the firm. Once the complainant himself was a partner as per the registered partnership deed, he could not have maintained the complaint for settling the dispute with respect to the partnership firm. (Para 4.5 & 6) Annapurna B. Uppin v. Malsiddappa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 284 : AIR 2024 SC 2015
Section 2(1)(c) – Consumer complaint alleging 'deficiency of service' and 'unfair trade practice'– On grounds that a song that is shown in the promotional trailer is not played in the film – Held, a promotional trailer is unilateral and is only meant to encourage a viewer to purchase the ticket to the movie, which is an independent transaction and contract from the promotional trailer. A promotional trailer by itself is not an offer and neither intends to nor can create a contractual relationship. Therefore, there is no offer, much less a contract, between the appellant and the complainant to the effect that the song contained in the trailer would be played in the movie and if not played, it will amount to deficiency in the service. (Para 14) Yash Raj Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Afreen Fatima Zaidi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : AIR 2024 SC 2333
Section 2(1)(g) – 'Deficiency' – There is deficiency when there is a fault, imperfection, shortcoming or inadequacy in the quality, nature, and manner of performance that is required to be maintained either in terms of a law or in terms of a contract. Held, there is no contract between the complainant and appellant. Hence, no question of deficiency in service arises. (Para 11) Yash Raj Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Afreen Fatima Zaidi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : AIR 2024 SC 2333
Section 2(1)(r)(1) – 'Unfair trade practice' – The promotional trailer does not make any false statement or does not intend to mislead the viewers. Burden is on the complainant to produce cogent evidence that proves unfair trade practice. No such evidence produced. Hence, no case for unfair trade practice is made out in the present case. (Para 18) Yash Raj Films Pvt. Ltd. v. Afreen Fatima Zaidi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : AIR 2024 SC 2333
Contract – Acceptance of the policy by the insurer – The First Premium Receipt would justify drawing of presumption of acceptance of the policy – Held, all the circumstances discussed above justify the conclusion of acceptance of the proposal prior to the death of 'the deceased'. Held, no material irregularity or illegality could be found in the conclusions drawn with regard to the acceptance of proposal by the District Forum which was confirmed by the State Commission. There was absolutely no reason for NCDRC to upturn the concurrent orders and to order for the dismissal of the complaint. Hence, appeal is allowed. (Para 25, 26 & 27) Bhumikaben N. Modi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : AIR 2024 SC 2444
(i) The very purpose and object of the CP Act 1986 as re-enacted in 2019 was to provide protection to the consumers from unfair trade practices and unethical business practices, and the Legislature never intended to include either the Professions or the services rendered by the Professionals within the purview of the said Act of 1986/2019. (ii) The Legal Profession is sui generis i.e. unique in nature and cannot be compared with any other Profession. (iii) A service hired or availed of an Advocate is a service under “a contract of personal service,” and therefore would fall within the exclusionary part of thedefinition of “Service” contained in Section 2 (42) of the CP Act 2019. (iv) A complaint alleging “deficiency in service” against Advocates practising Legal Profession would not be maintainable under the CP Act, 2019. (Para 42) Bar of Indian Lawyers v. D.K.Gandhi PS National Institute of Communicable Diseases, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 372 : AIR 2024 SC 2659
2(1)(b) – Complainant – To file a complaint, one must be a complainant and for one to be a complainant, he must be a consumer. If a person fails to come within the definition of a consumer, he cannot be a complainant and therefore, such person cannot file a complaint under the Act. (Para 17) Shriram Chits (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Raghachand Associates, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 368
Section 2(7) – Onus of proof – The onus of proving the first part i.e. that the person had bought goods/availed services for a consideration, rests on the complainant himself. The onus of proving that the person falls within the carve out, i.e. to exclude the complainants from availing benefits under the Act, must necessarily rest on the service provider and not the complainant. Only if, the service provider discharges its onus of showing that the service was availed, in fact for a commercial purpose, does the onus shift back to the complainant to bring its case within the third part, i.e. the Explanation (a) to Section 2(7) – to show that the service was obtained exclusively for the purpose of earning its livelihood by means of self-employment. This is in sync with the general principle embodied in Section 101 and 102 of the Evidence Act that 'one who pleads must prove'. Since it is always the service provider who pleads that the service was obtained for a commercial purpose, the onus of proving the same would have to be borne by it. Hence, the onus to prove that the service was obtained for a commercial purpose is on the service provider. (Para 20, 21 & 22) Shriram Chits (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Raghachand Associates, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 368
Section 2(7)(i) – Consumer – Maintainability of complaint in question – Whether the service obtained by the complainant was for a commercial purpose? – Held, the OP has merely pleaded in its version that the complainant does not satisfy the definition of consumer since the service was obtained for a commercial purpose. No evidence has been led to probabilise its case other than merely restating its claim on affidavit. It is now well too settled that a plea without proof and proof without plea is no evidence in the eyes of law. Held, not addressing merits of the issue as three forums have concurred in their finding that there was proved deficiency of service. Hence, appeal is dismissed. (Para 18, 23 & 24) Shriram Chits (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Raghachand Associates, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 368
Section 21 (b) – Power of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) to reverse order in exercise of revisional jurisdiction – Held, in the absence of anything suggesting that the State Commission had acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with materially irregularity, interference with an order of the State Commission in exercise of the limited revisional power under Section 21 (b) of the Act, by NCDRC, is without rhyme or reason and cannot be sustained. (Para 27) Bhumikaben N. Modi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : AIR 2024 SC 2444
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
It is a matter of serious concern that nowadays there has been a profuse misuse of social media platforms on which the messages, comments, articles etc. are being posted in respect of the matters pending in the Court. Though, our shoulders are broad enough to bear any blame or criticism, the comments or posts published in respect of the matters pending in the Court, through social media platforms under the guise of right to freedom of speech and expression, which have the tendency of undermining the authority of the Courts or of interfering with the course of justice, deserves serious consideration. It is very usual that the Judges do react during the course of arguments being made by the lawyers, sometimes in favour of and sometimes against a party to the proceeding. However, that does not give any right or leeway to either of the parties or their lawyers to the proceedings to post comments or messages on the social media distorting the facts or not disclosing the correct facts of the proceedings. The matter is required to be taken up more seriously when any such attempt is sought to be made by the party to the proceedings to cause prejudice to the proceedings or interfere with the course of administration of justice. Aminul Haque Laskar v. Karim Uddin Barbhuiya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : AIR 2024 SC 2193
Maintainability of contempt petition – Even consent terms incorporated in the Court's order when breached would give rise to allegations of contempt, but by mere filing of a civil suit asserting certain legal rights over the lands in question, it cannot be stated that the plaintiffs have breached the consent terms. Filing of the suit for asserting the rights of the plaintiffs/respondents could not be said to be amounting to contempt of the Court. Hence, no interference is warranted in the impugned order. (Para 10 & 25) Shah Enterprises v. Vaijayantiben Ranjitsingh Sawant, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 224
Substantially the same cause of action – The cause of action for filing the Contempt Petition and the alleged cause of action for filing the complaint case was substantially the same. Taking cognizance in a substantially same complaint case, after the dismissal of the Contempt Petition by a detailed order is an abuse of the process of law. The first respondent did not challenge the dismissal of the Contempt Petition and came up with a complaint case. Further, though the Contempt Petition was already filed in 2016, the said fact has not been mentioned in the complaint filed by the first respondent in the year 2017. Hence, prosecution of the complaint was itself an abuse of the process of law and ought to be quashed. (Para 9 & 10) Murari Lal Chhari v. Munishwar Singh Tomar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : AIR 2024 SC 1437
Mere delay in complying with the order, unless there is a deliberate or wilful act on the part of the alleged contemnors would not attract the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. L.V. Subrahmanyam, IAS v. Registrar General, High Court of Judicature At Hyderabad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 104
An apology must evidence remorse with respect to the contemptuous acts and is not to be used as a weapon to purge the guilty of their offence. Further, an apology lacking in sincerity and not evidencing contriteness, cannot be accepted. (Para 22) Gulshan Bajwa v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 69 : AIR 2024 SC 1060
'Civil Contempt' - An act that violates a status quo order constitutes 'civil contempt'. When a party violates a status quo order, contempt proceedings must be initiated instead of merely vacating the interim order. (Para 16 & 17) Amit Kumar Das v. Shrimati Hutheesingh Tagore Charitable Trust, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 73
Conviction of Advocate - The appellant's conduct before the High Court and for that matter, even before this Court, amounts to undermining the system of the law and interfering with the course of justice administration. The High Court observed a pattern in the behaviour of the appellant. He has had a habit of misbehaving with a Bench which is not agreeing with him. The misbehaviour goes to the extent of casting aspersions and threatening the Judges hearing the matters. The High Court correctly rejected the apology. (Para 21 & 22) Gulshan Bajwa v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 69 : AIR 2024 SC 1060
There is a need to maintain the dignity and reputation of judicial officers and to protect them from motivated, libellous and unfounded allegations. The High Court was correct in not accepting the apology tendered by the appellant since it was not bonafide and lacked sincerity, apart from being belated and a mere 'lip service'. (Para 17) Gulshan Bajwa v. Registrar, High Court of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 69 : AIR 2024 SC 1060
'Civil Contempt' and 'Criminal Contempt' - The Act makes a clear distinction between two types of contempt. 'Wilful disobedience' of a judgement, decree, direction, order, writ, or process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court amounts to 'civil contempt'. On the other hand, the threshold for 'criminal contempt' is higher and more stringent. It involves 'scandalising' or 'lowering' the authority of any court; prejudicing or interfering with judicial proceedings; or interfering with or obstructing the administration of justice. (Para 32) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Criminal Contempt cannot be initiated against a party for availing legal remedies and raising a legal challenge to an order. (Para 31 – 37) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
The power of the High Courts to initiate contempt proceedings cannot be used to obstruct parties or their counsel from availing legal remedies. (Para 34) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
The Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) on personal appearance of government officials in court proceedings framed by this Court in Para 45 of this Judgement must be followed by all courts across the country. All High Courts shall consider framing rules to regulate the appearance of Government officials in court, after taking into account the SOP. (Para 45) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Section 14 - Summoning of Government Officials before Courts - The use of the power to summon the presence of government officials must not be used as a tool to pressurize the government, particularly, under the threat of contempt. (Para 38) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Section 14 - Summoning of Government Officials before Courts - Law officers act as the primary point of contact between the courts and the government. Courts must refrain from summoning officials as the first resort. While the actions and decisions of public officials are subject to judicial review, summoning officials frequently without just cause is not permissible. Exercising restraint, avoiding unwarranted remarks against public officials, and recognizing the functions of law officers contribute to a fair and balanced judicial system. Courts across the country must foster an environment of respect and professionalism, duly considering the constitutional or professional mandate of law officers, who represent the government and its officials before the courts. Constantly summoning officials of the government instead of relying on the law officers representing the government, runs contrary to the scheme envisaged by the Constitution. (Para 41 & 44) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Association of Retired Judges, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2024) 3 SCC 1
Contract
Contract Law - If there is a repugnancy between the earlier and later clauses of a deed, whereby a later clause destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, then the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant to the earlier clause and the earlier clause prevails. (Para 30) Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : AIR 2024 SC 1071
Life insurance – Object – To ensure absolute security to the policy-holder in the matter of his life insurance protection. (Para 28) Bhumikaben N. Modi v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 365 : AIR 2024 SC 2444
Contract Act, 1872
Section 182 - Distributor, not agent: independent contractor. Bharti Cellular Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 176
Section 202 – Contract of agency – Transfer of power of attorney – Right to continue proceedings – The original contractor had assigned all the rights and liabilities arising out of the said contract in favour of the appellant via an assignment deed. Held, Since the appellant had an interest in the said contract, he was is entitled to continue with the proceedings in spite of the death of the original contractor. Held, the learned trial Judge rightly construing this position, allowed the application of the appellant. Further held, the learned Single Judge failed to take into consideration that on account of the assignment deed, an interest accrued in the said contract in favour of the appellant. Hence, the impugned order is set aside. (Para 15, 16, 18 & 22) P. Seshareddy v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 379
Novation – As it was not open to one of the parties, to unilaterally change the agreed terms and conditions, there was no novation in contract. Mere exchange of correspondence between the parties prior to expiry of the grace period, cannot be held against them by treating it as an act in acceptance of or acquiescence with the change impliedly suggested by the respondent-company. Hence, the action of the appellants in terminating the Agreement immediately after expiry of the grace period, by getting a legal notice issued, cannot be found fault with. (Para 19) Venkataraman Krishnamurthy v. Lodha Crown Buildmart Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : AIR 2024 SC 1218
Once the parties committed themselves to a written contract, whereby they reduced the terms and conditions agreed upon by them to writing, the same would be binding upon them. The National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) cannot rewrite the terms and conditions of the contract between the parties and apply its own subjective criteria to determine the course of action to be adopted by either of them. The right of election of the appellants to either continue or to terminate the Agreement within ninety days from the expiry of the grace period was absolute and it was not open to the NCDRC to apply its own standards. The NCDRC overstepped its power and jurisdiction in ignoring the binding covenants in the Agreement and in introducing its own logic and rationale to decide as to what the future course of action of the parties. (Para 15 & 22) Venkataraman Krishnamurthy v. Lodha Crown Buildmart Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : AIR 2024 SC 1218
Pre-contractual correspondence – As per English jurisprudence, pre-contractual correspondence loses its significance once the contract comes into existence. When the parties have signed the agreement, the terms agreed therein would bind the parties and the email exchanged between the parties prior to the agreement, cannot override the policy decisions. In order to contend that the appellant has been misled, the appellant ought to have raised such contention when the agreement was to be signed. Further, the appellant having repaid the loan amount with interest as per the terms of agreement cannot make out a grievance in hindsight and seek refund of the amount paid. No error has been committed so as to call for interference. (Para 13 & 14) Rajesh Monga v. Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : AIR 2024 SC 1305
Sections 37 and 40 - In the case of a personal obligation imposed on a person under the contract and on the demise of such person, his estate does not become liable and therefore, the legal representatives who represent the estate of a deceased would obviously not be liable and cannot be directed to discharge the contractual obligations of the deceased. (Para 27) Vinayak Purushottam Dube v. Jayashree Padamkar Bhat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 181
Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002
Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 – Effective Implementation – Machinery for Oversight and Grievance Redressal – Survey of Highways – Removal of unauthorized encroachments on highway land – Compliance with Amendments – Directions Issued. Gyan Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 164
Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992
Article 8 – Principle of Ecological Restitution – Article 8(f) requires the contracting parties to, as far as possible and as appropriate, to rehabilitate and restore the degraded ecosystems and promote the recovery of threatened species. The focus has to be on restoration of the ecosystem as close and similar as possible to the specific one that was damaged. The State, apart from preventing such acts in the future, should take immediate steps for restoration of the damage already done; undertake an exercise for determining the valuation of the damage done and recover it from the persons found responsible for causing such a damage. (Para 150, 156 & 158) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2024 SC 1955
Corruption
Allegations of faulty contracts awarded by the State of Arunachal Pradesh to near relatives of the then Chief Minister. Direction for examination by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG). Voluntary Arunachal Sena v. State of Arunachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 283
Bribery not protected by legislative privileges - No immunity for MPs / MLAs taking bribes for vote/speech in legislature. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
Corruption and bribery of members of the legislature erode the foundation of Indian parliamentary democracy. It is disruptive of the aspirations and deliberative ideals of the Constitution and creates a polity which deprives citizens of a responsible, responsive, and representative democracy. (Para 104) Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
Offence of bribery not dependent on actual performance of act for which bribe is taken, mere acceptance of bribe enough. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
The contention that the commitments by a political party in its manifesto, which eventually lead to direct or indirect financial help to the public at large, will also amount to corrupt practice by a candidate of that party, is too far-fetched and cannot be accepted. Shashanka J. Sreedhara v. B.Z. Zameer Ahmed Khan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 410
The offence of bribery is complete the moment illegal gratification is accepted and is not dependent on the actual performance of the promise for which the bribe was sought. Offence is complete one mere acceptance of undue advantage. Sita Soren v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : AIR 2024 SC 1701 : (2024) 5 SCC 629
Cow Slaughter
Prevention of Cow Slaughter and Cattle Preservation Act, 1964 (Karnataka); Section 10 – Power of competent authority to enter and inspect – The power of the authorized person was confined to enter and inspect. As per the provisions, the assistant director had no power to seize any sample of meat. (Para 9) Joshine Antony v. Asifa Sultana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 195
Criminal Justice System
It is the bounden duty of every Court of law that injustice wherever visible must be hammered and the voice of a victim of the crime is dispassionately heard. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110
In recent years the machinery of criminal justice is being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric of our society must be nipped in the bud. Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 96
Criminal Law
Bail order is challenged – Held, respondent having been enlarged on bail conditionally and the conditions so stipulated having not been violated – There are no overwhelming material on record to set aside the order granting bail which outweighs the liberty granted by the High Court. Further held, the appellant-state having not sought for cancellation of the bail would be a prime reason for the court to not entertain the appeal. Hence, interference in impugned bail order is not warranted. (Para 16, 17) Union of India v. Mrityunjay Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 367
Entries in History Sheet challenged – Direction given to state governments and police authorities – Held, the police authorities may consider the desirability of ensuring that no mechanical entries in History Sheet are made of innocent individuals, simply because they happen to hail from the socially, economically and educationally disadvantaged backgrounds, along with those belonging to Backward Communities, Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes. All the State Governments are therefore expected to take necessary preventive measures to safeguard such communities from being subjected to inexcusable targeting or prejudicial treatment. Further held, a periodic audit mechanism overseen by a senior police officer, as directed for the NCT of Delhi, will serve as a critical tool to review and scrutinize the entries made, so as to ascertain that these are devoid of any biases or discriminatory practices. (Para 14 & 16) Amanatullah Khan v. Commissioner of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : AIR 2024 SC 2340
Grant of interim bail/release – Interim bail is granted as per facts of each case – While examining the question of grant of interim bail/release, the courts always take into consideration the peculiarities associated with the person in question and the surrounding circumstances and to ignore the same would be iniquitous and wrong – Further held, once the matter is sub-judice and the questions relating to legality of arrest are under consideration, a more libertarian view is justified, in the background that the 18th Lok Sabha General Elections are being held – The 18th Lok Sabha General Elections is an intervening factor which has prompted the court to consider the interim bail application of the appellant – The appellant is directed to be released on interim bail. (Para 8, 14 & 15) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 363
History Sheet entries challenged – Applicability of amended standing order – Held, as per the amended Standing Order, in the column of “relations and connection” no details of any minor relatives, i.e., son, daughter, siblings shall be recorded, unless there is evidence that such minor, has or earlier had, afforded shelter to the offender. Further held, the amended provision mandates that Section 74 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 shall be meticulously followed, whereunder there is a prohibition on disclosing the identity of a child in conflict with law or a child in need of care and protection or a child victim or a witness of a crime through a report etc. Held, the amended Standing Order be given effect in the present case. (Para 6, 7 & 10) Amanatullah Khan v. Commissioner of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : AIR 2024 SC 2340
Appropriate sentence – Principle of proportionality – The aggravating and mitigating circumstances which the Court considers while deciding commutation of penalty from death to life imprisonment, have a large bearing in deciding the number of years of compulsory imprisonment without remission, too. In the process of arriving at the number of years which the convict will have to undergo before which the remission powers could be invoked, some of the relevant factors that the courts bear in mind are:- (a) the number of deceased who are victims of that crime and their age and gender; (b) the nature of injuries including sexual assault if any; (c) the motive for which the offence was committed; (d) whether the offence was committed when the convict was on bail in another case; (e) the premeditated nature of the offence; (f) the relationship between the offender and the victim; (g) the abuse of trust if any; (h) the criminal antecedents; and whether the convict, if released, would be a menace to the society. Some of the positive factors have been, (1) age of the convict; (2) the probability of reformation of convict; (3) the convict not being a professional killer; (4) the socioeconomic condition of the accused; (5) the composition of the family of the accused and (6) conduct expressing remorse. The Court would be additionally justified in considering the conduct of the convict in jail; and the period already undergone to arrive at the number of years which the Court feels the convict should, serve as part of the sentence of life imprisonment and before which he cannot apply for remission. These are not exhaustive but illustrative and each case would depend on the facts and circumstances therein. No interference required for sentence of offences under Section 449 and Section 309. However, sentence under Section 302 is modified from 30 years imprisonment without remission to 25 years imprisonment without remission. (Para 57) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2024 CriLJ 1797
Framing of charge – Even a strong suspicion founded on material on record which is ground for presuming the existence of factual ingredients of an offence would justify the framing of charge against an accused person. (Para 43) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : AIR 2024 SC 2046
Quashing of Charge – Appellants have not made out a case for interference with the order on charge and the order of framing charge. The Court is only required to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of charge without blindly accepting the decision of the prosecution. (Para 43) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : AIR 2024 SC 2046
Quashing of FIR – Second FIR on the same set of allegations – Held, respondent had been misusing their official position by lodging complaints one after the other. Further, their conduct of neither appearing before the Trial Court nor withdrawing their first complaint, would show that their only intention was to harass the appellant by first making him face a trial at both the places. Second FIR quashed. (Para 11 & 12) Parteek Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 317
Power of appellate court in reversal of acquittal – Unless the finding of acquittal is found to be perverse or impossible, interference with the same would not be warranted. Held, no perversity or impossibility could be found in the approach adopted by the learned trial Judge. The elaborate exercise of the trial Judge, has been washed away by the High Court in a totally cursory manner. The judgment of High Court is based on conjectures and surmises. Impugned judgment of High Court is quashed and accused persons are acquitted. (Para 9, 14, 19 & 23) Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : AIR 2024 SC 1678
Setting aside of summoning order by the High Court is challenged – For summoning of an accused, prima facie case made out on the basis of allegations in the complaint and the pre-summoning evidence led by the complainant is sufficient – Held, the Session Court and High Court, have erred in not taking into account certain facts which makes a prima facie case against the accused for the offences for which they were summoned. Hence, prima facie case made out for issuing process against the accused to face trial. (Para 12.1 & 15) Aniruddha Khanwalkar v. Sharmila Das, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 332 : AIR 2024 SC 2802
Power of constitutional courts to transfer case to CBI – The powers of the Supreme Court for directing further investigation regardless of the stage of investigation are extremely wide. This can be done even if the chargesheet has been submitted by the prosecuting agency. Held, unresolved crimes tend to erode public trust in institutions which have been established for maintaining law and order. In the present case the investigation has been ineffective is self-evident. Hence, this case needs to be handed over to CBI, for a proper investigation and also to remove any doubts in the minds of the appellants, and to bring the real culprits to justice. Case shall be transferred from SIT to the CBI. (Para 14 & 16) Awungshi Chirmayo v. Government of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 263
Standard of proof – Beyond reasonable doubt – Various lapses cumulatively affect the overall sanctity of the prosecution case, making it fall short of the threshold of beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution case stands shaken beyond a point to which no conviction resting thereupon can be said to be just in the eyes of law. (Para 47) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667
Custodial Death
It is a fact that, in ordinary circumstances, we ought not to invoke our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to invalidate an order granting bail to an accused. But this criteria, while dealing with the question of granting bail, would not apply in a case of custodial death, where police officials are arraigned as accused. Such alleged offences are of grave and serious nature. Ajay Kumar Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 266
Custodial Violence
The High Court directs the Director General of Police to issue a circular for medical examination of persons brought to police stations for investigation, aiming to curb custodial violence. The State submitted that there cannot be an omnibus direction of this nature and that certain guidelines are required to be framed in that regard. The Supreme Court rejects State's plea to quash direction but permits State to formulate Standard Operating Procedure for guidance. (Para 1 - 7) State U.P v. Ramadhar Kashyap, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 148
Customs Act, 1962
Appeal – The transaction value in the bills of entry of the subsequent goods can be discarded if it is found that the importer has earlier brought/imported an identical goods or similar goods at a higher price from the same seller/exporter. Whether the previously imported goods identical or similar to the subsequently imported goods? – The court disbelieved the statement made by the appellant that the two goods aren't identical/similar to each other due to a little difference in the hardware and software functions in the disputed goods as compared to the earlier versions. In the order-in-original and in the impugned judgment of CESTAT on facts, it was found that Item nos. 1 and 3 were identical goods, and Item no. 2 was of similar goods. Detailed reasons have been recorded in the order-inoriginal as to why the transaction value of the imported goods has been discarded. Hence, there no error in the findings recorded by the CESTAT. (Para 8, 9 & 10) Global Technologies and Research v. Principal Commissioner of Customs, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : AIR 2024 SC 1571
The Importer's Bill of Entry of subsequent imported goods can be discarded if the subsequent imported goods are undervalued to the previously imported identical or similar goods. (Para 8 - 10) Global Technologies and Research v. Principal Commissioner of Customs, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : AIR 2024 SC 1571
Section 28AB, 71 & 72 – Applicability of custom duty – In 264 cases which were never placed inside the notified public bonded warehouse, custom duty is no applicable. Since the imported goods (264 cases) were never warehoused inside the notified public bonded warehouse but were unloaded outside the notified area but within the factory premises of the appellant and kept under a shed on permission granted by the Superintendent which permission was neither cancelled nor revoked, question of warehousing the goods covered by the 264 cases within the notified public bonded warehouse did not arise. As a corollary, the further question of improperly or unauthorisedly removing the 264 cases from the notified warehouse to outside the said area but within the factory premises of the appellant attracting Section 71 and the consequences following the same did not arise. Held, the demand raised by the respondent against the appellant as affirmed by the CESTAT qua the 264 cases including levy of customs duty and interest (under section 71 & 28AB) cannot be sustained. (Para 53, 58) Bisco v. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : AIR 2024 SC 1638
Section 28AB, 71 & 72 – Applicability of custom duty – In respect of the missing 27 cases which were found neither inside nor outside the notified warehouse and for which no explanation was given by the Appellant, the CESTAT had correctly held that those 27 cases were improperly or unauthorisedly removed from the notified public bonded warehouse. The demand of customs duty and interest (under section 71 & 28AB) on the 27 cases has been sustained. (Para 54, 58) Bisco v. Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : AIR 2024 SC 1638
Section 129A(2) – Limitation – Powers of the Committee of Commissioners of Customs – If the said Committee is of the opinion that an order passed by the Appellate Commissioner of Customs or Commissioner of Customs (Appeals) under Section 128 or 128A of the Customs Act is not legal and proper, it can direct the appropriate officer to file an appeal before the CESTAT and there is no prescribed period of limitation for passing such an order but the authority must take action within a reasonable time. The review order passed after 10 months was held to be reasonable time considering the extraordinary circumstances prevailing in those days due to COVID-19. (Para 7) Global Technologies and Research v. Principal Commissioner of Customs, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : AIR 2024 SC 1571
Section 27 - Deals with claim for refund of duty. As per subsection (1), any person claiming refund of any duty or interest paid by him or borne by him, may make an application in the prescribed form and manner, for such refund addressed to the designated authority before the expiry of one year from the date of payment of such duty or interest. Explanation below sub-section (1) clarifies that for the purpose of sub-section (1), the date of payment of duty or interest in relation to a person, other than an importer, shall be construed as the date of purchase of goods by such person. (Para 10) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645
Section 27 (2) - It says that if on the receipt of such application the designated authority is satisfied that the whole or any part of the duty and interest, if any, paid on such duty, paid by the applicant is refundable, he may make an order accordingly and the amount so determined shall be credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund established under Section 12C of the Central Excise Act. However, as per the proviso, the amount of duty and interest so determined shall be paid to the applicant instead of being credited to the Consumer Welfare Fund if such amount is relatable, amongst others, to drawback of duty payable under Sections 74 and 75 of the Customs Act. (Para 10.1) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645
Section 27A - Provides for interest on delayed refund. It says that, if any duty ordered to be refunded under sub-section (2) of Section 27 to an applicant is not refunded within three months from the date of receipt of the application, there shall be paid to that applicant interest at such rate not below five percent and not exceeding thirty percent per annum as is for the time being fixed by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, on such duty from the date immediately after the expiry of three months from the date of receipt of such application till the date of refund of such duty. (Para 11) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645
Section 75A - Deals with interest on drawback. Sub-section (1) of Section 75A says that, where any drawback payable to a claimant under Section 74 or Section 75 is not paid within a period of one month (earlier it was two months and prior thereto it was three months) from the date of filing a claim for payment of such drawback, there shall be paid to that claimant in addition to the amount of drawback, interest at the rate fixed under Section 27A from the date after the expiry of the said period of one month till the date of payment of such drawback. (Para 12) Union of India v. B.T. Patil and Sons Belgaum (Construction) Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 90 : AIR 2024 SC 927 : (2024) 3 SCC 645
Debt Recovery
Whether debts, which cannot be recovered by filing civil suits as they are time-barred under the Limitation Act 1963, can be recovered by invoking other remedies under special statutes for debt recovery ? The matter needs to be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India to constitute an appropriate three-judge bench. K.P. Khemka v. Haryana State Industrial and Infrastructure Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 357
Delay
Subsequent change in law cannot be a ground for condonation of delay. Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 415
Dispute
Nature of dispute – Dispute between the parties was essentially of a civil nature – There is no criminal element and consequently the case is nothing but an abuse of the process. The complainant has not been able to establish that the appellants had intention to cheat right from the beginning. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal offence in every case. Every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. (Para 4, 7, 8) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228
Settlement of dispute between parties – The additional amount paid by the appellants pursuant to a settlement is primarily to bring a quietus to the dispute and to have peace and to avoid litigation. The mere fact that the appellants have paid an additional amount pursuant to the settlement, cannot be presumed as an act of cheating. The allegation that the complainant was coerced into a settlement, looks unlikely because there is no FIR or Complaint that the complainant was coerced into this settlement and the amount was duly accepted by the complainant. Further the complainant does not dispute that the additional amount paid by the appellants under the terms of the compromise deed. Hence, the dispute is settled. (Para 4) Naresh Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 228
Doctrines
The doctrine of merger is a common law doctrine that is rooted in the idea of maintenance of the decorum of hierarchy of courts and tribunals. The doctrine is based on the simple reasoning that there cannot be, at the same time, more than one operative order governing the same subject matter. (Para 17) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224
There is a doctrine of necessity where under given circumstances an action is required to be taken under compelling circumstances. In the present case, had the Working President not convened the meeting, the elections of the executive body would have been in limbo for an unreasonable amount of time. The convening of the meeting by the Working President upon the requests by the 16 surviving members was a “necessity” at the time. (Para 15 & 18) Adv. Babasaheb Wasade v. Manohar Gangadhar Muddeshwar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 59 : AIR 2024 SC 768
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940
Sections 18A and 28 - Non-disclosure of the name of the manufacturer - The quantities of the 29 kinds of medicines recovered from the clinic run by the doctor were of small quantity. In such a situation, the non-disclosure of the name of the manufacturer/person from whom the said medicines were acquired cannot be said to endanger public interest (which obviously is the primary object of the prohibition in law) by allowing the circulation of such substances unauthorizedly. In the attending facts and circumstances, considering that the accused is a doctor, it was held that imposing a sentence of imprisonment would be unjustified, particularly when the intent to sell/distribute under Section 18(c) of the Act has been held unproven. Accordingly, the appeals were allowed, and the sentence of imprisonment was set aside; instead, a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- was imposed on the Appellant doctor. (Para 11 - 13) Palani v. Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : AIR 2024 SC 945
Proceedings under the Act initiated on the basis of the complaint of the Police Inspector is legally invalid. Accordingly, the cognizance order is found to be unjustified and is set aside. (Para 9) Rakesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 264
Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954
Rules, 1955; Section 3 (d) - Contempt of Court Proceedings – Violation of Undertaking – The Court restrained Patanjali Ayurved Limited from advertising products intended to cure diseases specified in relevant laws and cautioned against making statements against any system of medicine in the media, as previously undertaken. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 229
Dying Declaration
Dying declaration can be the sole basis of the conviction if it inspires the full confidence of the court. The Court is required to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or imagination. Where the Court is satisfied about the dying declaration being true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without any further corroboration. There cannot be an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule of prudence. If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no corroboration. (Para 7) Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : AIR 2024 SC 1381
Easements Act, 1882
Acquiring easementary right under Sale Deed – Easementary right could only be transferred via sale deed if the predecessor-in-interest had acquired or purchased the said property with any easementary right over the rasta in dispute. No evidence has been adduced to prove that, predecessor-in-interest, had perfected easementary rights over the disputed rasta and thus was legally entitled to transfer the same. Hence, failed to prove that easementary right is acquired under the sale deed. (Para 30, 36) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947
Section 4 – 'Easement' – A right which the owner or occupier of a land possesses for the beneficial enjoyment of his land on the other land which is not owned by him, to do and continue to do something or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done on the said land. The land which is to be enjoyed by the beneficiary is called 'Dominant Heritage' and the land on which the easement is claimed is called 'Servient Heritage'. The easementary right, therefore, is essentially a right claimed by the owner of a land upon another land owned by someone else so that he may enjoy his property in the most beneficial manner. (Para 19) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947
Section 13 – Acquiring easementary right by necessity – Such easementary right would arise if it is necessary for enjoying the Dominant Heritage. Held, if there is an alternative way to access the Dominant Heritage, which may be a little far away or longer, it demolishes the easement of necessity. Hence, not entitled to any easementary right by necessity. Easementary right under the Sale Deed would not stand extinguished even if the necessity has ceased to exist. (Para 32, 33 & 34) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947
Section 15 – Acquiring easementary right by prescription – For acquiring any easementary right by prescription, the said right must have been peaceably enjoyed in respect of the servient heritage without any interruption for over 20 years. The use of the term “last many years” is not sufficient to mean that they have been enjoying the same for the last 20 years. The pleadings fail to plead the essential legal requirement for establishing easementary right through prescription, hence, the same cannot be so construed as to impliedly include what actually has not been pleaded. A fact which is not specifically pleaded cannot be proved by evidence as evidence cannot travel beyond the pleadings. (Para 22 & 23) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947
E-filing
The Supreme Court asks Allahabad High Court to enable e-filing and virtual appearance facilities at the Uttar Pradesh District Courts. Md. Anas Chaudhary v. Registrar-General High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 323
Election
Representation of the People's Act, 1951 (RP Act); Section 100(1)(b), 100(1)(d)(i), 123(2) & 83(1)(b) – Election petition – Invalidation of election – On grounds that the appellant has committed corrupt practice and the result of the election was materially affected by the improper acceptance of nomination. Held, none of the allegations with regard to the false statements, and suppression and misrepresentation of facts with regard to his educational qualification or with regard to his liability in respect of the loan availed by him for his partnership firm or with regard to his default in depositing the employer's contribution to provident fund, would fall within the definition of “Corrupt practice” of “undue influence” as envisaged in Section 123(2) of the RP Act. (Para 16 & 19) Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : AIR 2024 SC 2193
Representation of the People's Act, 1951; Section 83(1) (a) & 87 and Civil Procedure Code, 1908 Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of election petition on grounds of incomplete contents of the petition – Lack of cause of action – The pleadings with regard to the allegation of corrupt practice have to be precise, specific and unambiguous. The Election petition lacks concise statement of “material facts” as contemplated in Section 83(a), and lacks “full particulars” of the alleged Corrupt practice as contemplated in Section 83(b) of the RP Act. Held, mere bald and vague allegations without any basis would not be sufficient compliance of the requirement of making a concise statement of the “material facts” in the Election Petition. If the allegations contained in Election Petition do not set out grounds as contemplated in Section 100 and do not conform to the requirement of Section 81 and 83 of the Act, the Election Petition is liable to be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of CPC. An omission of a single material fact leading to an incomplete cause of action or omission to contain a concise statement of material facts on which the Election petitioner relies for establishing a cause of action, would entail rejection of Election Petition. (Para 19. 20, 21 & 24) Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : AIR 2024 SC 2193
Election Petition – Right to contest election or to question the election by means of an Election Petition is neither common law nor fundamental right. It is a statutory right governed by the statutory provisions of the RP Act. (Para 12) Karim Uddin Barbhuiya v. Aminul Haque Laskar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 287 : AIR 2024 SC 2193
Representation of the People Act, 1951; Section 100(1)(d)(iv) – Invalidation of election on grounds of non-compliance of Section 100(1)(d)(iv) – Candidates failure in disclosing the fact that he had occupied government accommodation and in filing the 'No Dues Certificate' in that regard, with his nomination form, cannot be said to be a defect of any real import as there were no actual outstanding dues payable by him in relation to the government accommodation occupied by him earlier. Every defect in the nomination cannot straightaway be termed to be of such character as to render its acceptance improper and each case would have to turn on its own individual facts, insofar as that aspect is concerned. There must be a distinction between non-disclosure of substantial issues as opposed to insubstantial issues, which may not impact one's candidature or the result of an election. Held, plaintiff did not sufficiently plead or prove a specific breach or how it materially affected the result of the election. (Para 40, 42, 48) Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : AIR 2024 SC 2121
Representation of the People Act, 1951; Section 123(2), Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; Section 2(30) and Sale of Goods Act, 1930; Section 19 – Invalidation of election on grounds of corrupt practices by candidate – Non-disclosure of 3 vehicles – As per Section 2(30) of Act of 1988, an “Owner” is a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered. As per Section 19 of Act of 1930, where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred. Held, mere failure to get registered the name of the new owner of an already registered vehicle does not mean that the sale/gift transaction would stand invalidated and such a vehicle, despite being physically handed over to the new owner, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be treated as still being in the possession and control of the former owner. Held, once it is accepted that the three vehicles in question were either gifted or sold before the filing of the nomination by candidate, the said vehicles cannot be considered to be still owned by candidate's wife and son for purposes other than those covered by the Act of 1988. Non-disclosure of the three vehicles registered in the names of the wife and son of candidate, could not be treated as an attempt of candidate to unduly influence the voters. Such non-disclosure cannot lead to invalidation of election on grounds of corrupt practices under Section 123(2). (Para 22, 27 & 28) Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : AIR 2024 SC 2121
Constitution of India – Voters right to know – Candidates non-disclosure of fact of substantial character – Held, 'right to privacy' of the candidate would still survive as regards matters which are of no concern to the voter or are irrelevant to his candidature for public office. In that respect, non-disclosure of each and every asset owned by a candidate would not amount to a defect of a substantial character. Every case would have to turn on its own peculiarities and there can be no hard and fast or straitjacketed rule as to when the non-disclosure of a particular movable asset by a candidate would amount to a defect of a substantial character. (Para 44) Karikho Kri v. Nuney Tayang, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 290 : AIR 2024 SC 2121
EVMs can't be tampered with, return to ballot paper will undo electoral reforms. Association of Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 328
VVPAT Case - Supreme Court allows runner-up candidates to seek verification of burnt memory of 5% EVMs per assembly segment. Association of Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 328
Supreme Court rejects plea for 100% EVM-VVPAT verification, issues directions to seal symbol loading unit. Association of Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 328
The Supreme Court declined to entertain a petition seeking voting arrangements for approximately 18,000 who got displaced from Manipur due to the ethnic clash to cast their votes in their home constituency in the Lok Sabha General Elections scheduled to take place on April 19 and 26. It would not be practical to direct the Election Commission of India (ECI) to make accommodations for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) located in nearby areas of Shillong, Kolkata, Guwahati, Hyderabad, Delhi NCR, Bangalore, Kohima three days before the commencement of the General Elections in Manipur. Naulak Khamsuanthang v. Election Commission of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 311
Chandigarh Municipal Corporation (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations 1996; Regulation 6(10) – Regulation 6(10) stipulates the three eventualities when the ballot paper can be treated as invalid namely: (i) Where a member has voted for more than one candidate; (ii) Where a member places any mark on the paper by which he may be identified; and (iii) If the mark indicating the vote is placed on the ballot paper in such a manner as to make it doubtful over which candidate the vote has been cast. None of the above eventualities are fulfilled in the present case. In each of the eight ballots the vote was cast for one person, there is no mark on the ballot which would indicate that the person who cast the vote would be identified and the ballots left no manner of doubt about the candidate for whom the ballot was cast. Even if the mark which was placed by the Presiding Officer is taken into consideration, that mark does not create any doubt about the candidate in favour of whom the vote was cast. (Para 28) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526
Chandigarh Municipal Corporation (Procedure and Conduct of Business) Regulations 1996; Regulation 6(1) – Regulation 6(1) requires the nomination of a councillor who is not a candidate at the election to preside over the meeting. This provision has been made to ensure that the person who acts as Presiding Officer would do so with objectivity. It is evident that the Presiding Officer in the present case has made a deliberate effort to deface the eight ballots evidently put his own mark on the bottom half of the ballots to create a ground for treating the ballot to have been invalidly cast. In doing so, the Presiding Officer has clearly acted beyond the terms of his remit under the statutory regulations. The Presiding Officer is guilty of a serious misdemeanour in doing what he did in his role and capacity as Presiding Officer. The result declared by the Presiding Officer is plainly contrary to law and shall stand quashed and set aside. (Para 31) Kuldeep Kumar v. U.T. Chandigarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 146 : (2024) 3 SCC 526
General Elections supply the vis viva to a democracy – Held, grant of interim bail/release on account of general election would not be placing the politicians in a benefice position compared to ordinary citizens of this country. (Para 8) Arvind Kejriwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 363
Electricity
The State Electricity Regulatory Commission has the power to reject the adoption of tariff if it is not aligned with market prices. While adopting the tariff, the Commission is bound to take into consideration the protection of consumer interest. Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (Madhya Pradesh) Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 24
Electricity Act, 2003; Section 14(b) and Electricity Licence (Additional Requirements of Capital Adequacy, Creditworthiness and Code of Conduct) Rules, 2005; Rule 3 and Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013; Regulation 12 – Whether a deemed distribution licensee is conditional upon the appellant satisfying the requirements of section 14 of the Electricity Act which provides for compliance with additional requirements like capital adequacy? – Held, application of Regulation 12 does not extend to applicants who are otherwise deemed licensees. The interpretation of regulation 12 as requiring additional capital infusion for an applicant for acceptance of a deemed licensee status appears to be at odds with the language and intent of the 2013 Regulations. Hence, Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission (TSERC) in interpreting regulation 12 that it applies to a person who is a deemed licensee, has aimed to achieve indirectly what it could not directly. Regulation 12 does not apply to a deemed licensee because the primary legislation, the Electricity Act, under section 14(b), confers deemed licensee status upon Special Economic Zone (SEZ) developers without imposing any specific conditions and the 2013 Regulations make a clear distinction between an applicant seeking a licence [as defined under regulation 2(d)] and a deemed distribution licensee seeking recognition as such [as defined under regulation 2(h)]. Regulation 12 pertains solely to regular distribution licensees as defined under regulation 2(h), not to deemed licensees. Therefore, the recognition of the status of a deemed distribution licensee cannot hinge on compliance with rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules read with regulation 12 of the 2013 Regulations. (Para 26, 29 & 34) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393
Electricity Act, 2003; Section 181 – Power on the State Commissions to make Regulations – Such regulations must be consistent with the provisions of the primary enactment and the rules framed thereunder generally. (Para 33) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393
Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013 (Andhra Pradesh); Regulation 49 – Regulation 49, situated within Chapter-4 [General Conditions of Distribution Licence] of the 2013 Regulations, specifies that “these general conditions shall apply to distribution licensees and to all deemed distribution licensees”. A straightforward reading reveals that the term 'general conditions' in regulation 49 pertains exclusively to the general conditions outlined in Chapter-4. Held, TSERC's reliance on regulation 49 to enforce the applicability of regulation 12 appears to be flawed and by no stretch of imagination could the scope of this provision be widened so as to include within its ambit regulation 12, which forms part of Chapter-3 [Procedure for Grant of Distribution Licence] of the 2013 Regulations. (Para 36) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393
Enemy Property Act, 1968
Union of India cannot assume ownership of the enemy properties once the said property is vested in the Custodian. This is because, there is no transfer of ownership from the owner of the enemy property to the Custodian and consequently, there is no ownership rights transferred to the Union of India. Therefore, the enemy properties which vest in the Custodian are not Union properties. (Para 22) Lucknow Nagar Nigam v. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab. Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 156
Enforcement of Law
Power to court to enforce laws – It is not the function of the court to see the day-to-day enforcement of the law; that being the function of the Executive, but because of the non-functioning of the enforcement agencies, the courts out of necessity may pass orders directing the enforcement agencies to implement the law. (Para 77) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2024 SC 1955
Environment
Delhi Preservation of Trees Act, 1994 - The Forest Department of the Delhi Government and the Tree Authority to keep a constant vigil in the entire area of the National Capital Territory of Delhi about the activities of illegal felling or damaging of trees. Unless these two Authorities do so, the very purpose of enacting various forest and tree laws will be completely frustrated. (Para 11) Bindu Kapurea v. Subhasish Panda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 433
Environmental regulations is to ensure that developmental projects, are undertaken in a manner that minimizes adverse ecological impacts and safeguards the well-being of both the environment and local communities – Paragraph 2 of the notification dated 14 September 2006 requires prior Environmental Clearance “before any construction work or preparation of land by the project management is carried out except for the securing of land”. Held, the authorities, have acted in violation of the provisions contained in Para 2 of the notification by carrying out an extensive clearance at the site even in the absence of an Environmental Clearance. Hence, impugned dismissal order of National Green Tribunal is set aside and appeal is allowed. (Para 15, 19 & 25) Tapas Guha v Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 370
Policy decision in conflict with environmental regulations – The decision on whether an airport is situated at a particular place is a matter of policy. However, when the law prescribes specific norms for carrying out activities requiring an Environmental Clearance, those provisions have to be strictly complied with. The decision to establish an airport must be executed within the confines of legal frameworks designed to protect the environment and ensure responsible resource management. Failure to adhere to these norms not only undermines the integrity of environmental governance but also risks long-term environmental degradation and societal discord. (Para 21) Tapas Guha v Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 370
Fundamental right to a healthy environment – Sustainable development – All human beings have a fundamental right to a healthy environment, commensurate with their well-being, coupled with a corresponding duty of ensuring that resources are conserved and preserved in such a way that the present as well as future generations will be aware of them equally. (Para 77) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : AIR 2024 SC 1955
Order of closure of industry – The closure of the industry is a matter of last option and that an opportunity for remediation ought to be granted. The nature of the violations and severity of breach of environmental norms, left neither the statutory authorities nor the High Court with the option to take any other view. The TNPCB would be acting within the scope of its statutory powers while directing closure of plant, for the protection of the environment in accordance with law. (Para 21 & 24) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Polluter pays principle – Those who pollute or degrade the environment should bear the costs of mitigation and restoration. Economic activities should not come at the expense of environmental degradation or the health of the population. (Para 24) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Principle of Sustainable Development – The concept of intergenerational equity – The “present residents of the earth hold the earth in trust for future generations and at the same time the present generation is entitled to reap benefits from it.” The planet and its invaluable resources must be conscientiously conserved and responsibly managed for the use and enjoyment of future generations, emphasising the enduring obligation to safeguard the environmental heritage for the well-being of all. (Para 27) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Right to a clean environment – All persons have the right to breathe clean air, drink clean water, live a life free from disease and sickness, and for those who till the earth, have access to uncontaminated soil. These rights are not only recognized as essential components of human rights but are also enshrined in various international treaties and agreements, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Paris Agreement. These rights must be protected and upheld by governments and institutions worldwide, recognizing that they are essential for sustainable progress. (Para 26 & 28) Vedanta Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 211
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; Section 3 (3) - Central Empowered Committee (CEC) - Effective functioning of environmental bodies is imperative for the protection, restitution, and development of the ecology. The court directed the CEC to adopt measures to promote institutional transparency, efficiency and accountability - Issued Guidelines. (Para 21 & 31) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 74
Role of Constitutional Courts - The role of the constitutional courts is to ensure that such environmental bodies function vibrantly, and are assisted by robust infrastructure and human resources. The constitutional courts will monitor the functioning of these institutions so that the environment and ecology is not only protected but also enriched. (Para 32) In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 74
Town and Country Planning Act, 1977 (Himachal Pradesh) - The first order of NGT is liable to be set aside on the short ground that it has transgressed its limitations and attempted to encroach upon the field reserved for the delegatee to enact a piece of delegated legislation. When the TCP Act empowers the State Government and the Director to exercise the powers to enact a piece of delegated legislation, the NGT could not have imposed fetters on such powers and directed it to exercise its powers in a particular manner. (Para 70) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Yogendera Mohan Sengupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : AIR 2024 SC 859
Town and Country Planning Act, 1977 (Himachal Pradesh) - The exercise of power for the preparation, finalization and approval of development plan is a power exercised by the delegatee for enacting a subordinate piece of legislation. (Para 61) State of Himachal Pradesh v. Yogendera Mohan Sengupta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 32 : AIR 2024 SC 859
The National Green Tribunal (NGT) is not supposed to apply strict rigors of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when a citizen approaches with a grievance. Nabendu Kumar Bandyopadhyay v. Additional Chief Secretary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 29
The National Green Tribunal's recurrent engagement in unilateral decision making, provisioning ex post facto review hearing and routinely dismissing it has regrettably become a prevailing norm. In its zealous quest for justice, the Tribunal must tread carefully to avoid the oversight of propriety. The practice of ex parte orders and the imposition of damages amounting to crores of rupees, have proven to be a counterproductive force in the broader mission of environmental safeguarding. It is imperative for the Tribunal to infuse a renewed sense of procedural integrity, ensuring that its actions resonate with a harmonious balance between justice and due process. Only then can it reclaim its standing as a beacon of environmental protection, where well-intentioned endeavors are not simply washed away. (Para 4 & 5) Veena Gupta v. Central Pollution Control Board, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 97
The Union of India should formulate a policy of phasing out heavy-duty diesel vehicles and replacing them with BS VI vehicles. Container Corporation of India Ltd. v. Ajay Khera, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 31 : AIR 2024 SC 1153 : (2024) 3 SCC 216
Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986
Rule 5(3) and Constitution of India; Article 21 – Procedure of inviting objections to the draft Environmental clearance (EC) notification – Held, before the issue of the second EC notification, the procedure of inviting objections to the draft notification was followed, and the objections were considered. Hence, there is no reason to dispense with the requirement of inviting objections before publishing the impugned notification. Article 21 guarantees a right to live in a pollution-free environment and therefore, the participation of the citizens is very important by allowing them to raise objections to the proposed notification. Hence, their participation cannot be prevented by casually exercising the power under sub-rule (4) of Rule 5. (Para 22) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : AIR 2024 SC 1871
Rule 5(4) – Requirement of public notice for modifying EC notifications can be dispensed with in 'public interest' – The Central Government for modifying EC notifications came to the conclusion that in the public interest, the requirement of prior publication of notice was required to be dispensed with. The document recording the satisfaction of the competent authority about the existence of public interest and the nature of the public interest ought to have been produced by the Ministry. As no such document was produced it can be concluded that the drastic decision to invoke Rule 5(4) was made without any application of the mind. Hence, the decision-making process has been vitiated. Therefore, the inclusion of item 6 of the substituted Appendix-IX will have to be held illegal. (Para 23 & 24) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : AIR 2024 SC 1871
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and Environment (Protection) Rules, 1986 – Object – The object of the EP Act is to provide for the protection and improvement of the environment. Object of mandatory requirement of obtaining environmental clearance notification for projects was to minimize the damage to environment while implementing projects. (Para 9 & 25) Noble M. Paikada v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 252
Exemplary Cost
The State of Madhya Pradesh is directed to pay costs to the appellant. The State Government is directed to recover the said amount from the officer(s) who were responsible of taking deliberate, illegal, mala fide actions for denying relief to the appellant. (Para 11) Smita Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 424 : AIR 2024 SC 2292
Eviction
Eviction - illegal demolition of premises with the support of the local police - Imposed a cost amounting to Rs. 6 lakhs on six police personnel for conspiring and illegally detaining tenants, coercing them to sign documents against their will, and demolishing the premises in question without any order from a competent court. (Para 9) Shatrughna Atmaram Patil v. Vinod Dodhu Chaudhary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 77 : AIR 2024 SC 1068 : (2024) 4 SCC 458
While upholding the demolition drive of the Lucknow Development Authority (LDA) against unauthorized constructions in the Akbarnagar area of Lucknow city, the Supreme Court clarified that no slum dweller should be evicted without being given alternative accommodation. Shakeel Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 398
Evidence
Appreciation of Evidence – The High Court fails to appreciate evidence in a thorough manner and merely relied on a limited set of facts to arrive at a finding. In an appeal, as much as in a trial, appreciation of evidence essentially requires a holistic view and not a myopic view. Appreciation of evidence requires sifting and weighing of material facts against each other and a conclusion of guilt could be arrived at only when the entire set of facts, lined together, points towards the only conclusion of guilt. Appreciation of partial evidence is no appreciation at all, and is bound to lead to absurd results. (Para 35) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544
As soon as an accused or suspected person comes into the hands of a police officer, he is no longer at liberty and is under a check, and is, therefore, in “custody” within the meaning of Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act. (Para 28) Perumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8 : AIR 2024 SC 460 : 2024 CriLJ 1013
Ballistic expert - It is not that in each and every case where the death of the victim is due to gunshot injury that the opinion of the ballistic expert should be obtained and the expert be examined. When there is direct eye witness account which is found to be credible, omission to obtain ballistic report and non-examination of ballistic expert may not be fatal to the prosecution case but if the evidence tendered including that of eyewitnesses do not inspire confidence or suffer from glaring inconsistencies coupled with omission to examine material witnesses, the omission to seek ballistic opinion and examination of the ballistic expert may be fatal to the prosecution case. (Para 29) Ram Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 144 : AIR 2024 SC 1176 : 2024 CriLJ 1297 : (2024) 4 SCC 208
Burden of Proof – The threshold of the 'burden of proof' required to be discharged, when challenging a particular charge as an “illegal charge”, is only on the preponderance of probabilities, upon which the onus will shift on the authorities to establish how the particular charge is valid. Railways failed to establish that 444 kms was the correct chargeable distance, hence, it was declared that the said computation was illegal. (Para 121) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820
Circumstantial evidence – Chain of circumstances – The circumstances set out are by themselves consistent with the sole hypothesis that the accused and the accused alone is the perpetrator of these murders which were most foul. Held, the circumstances presented in evidence in this case meets the ingredients that are required to be established. Hence, no reason to interfere with the concurrent conviction recorded by the trial Court and the High Court against the appellant. (Para 15) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2024 CriLJ 1797
Circumstantial evidence – Entire case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence. The principles concerning circumstantial evidence are referred to as the “Panchsheel” principles. Essentially, circumstantial evidence comes into picture when there is absence of direct evidence. For proving a case on the basis of circumstantial evidence, it must be established that the chain of circumstances is complete and is consistent with the only conclusion of guilt. The chain of circumstantial evidence is essentially meant to enable the court in drawing an inference and the task of fixing criminal liability on the strength of an inference must be approached with abundant caution. The circumstances sought to be proved by the prosecution are inconsistent and the inconsistencies are unexplained by the prosecution. Drawing an inference of guilt on the basis of inconsistent circumstantial evidence would result into failure of justice. The evidence on record fails the test for the acceptability of circumstantial evidence. (Para 27) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : AIR 2024 SC 1208 : 2024 CriLJ 1282 : (2024) 4 SCC 735
Circumstantial evidence – Held, the statement of witness by itself provides a complete chain of circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused appellant. The prosecution has established the chain of incriminating circumstantial evidence pointing exclusively towards the guilt of the accused appellant and totally inconsistent with his innocence or the involvement of any other person in the crime. (Para 38 & 48) Sukhpal Singh v. NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : AIR 2024 SC 2724
Circumstantial evidence – In absence of direct evidence, case essentially falls back on circumstantial evidence. The prosecution has failed to complete the chain of circumstances. The circumstances are far from conclusive and a conclusion of guilt could not be drawn from them. To sustain a conviction, the Court must form the view that the accused “must have” committed the offence, and not “may have”. (Para 37 & 38) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 CriLJ 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544
Circumstantial evidence – Panchsheel or the five principles essential to be kept in mind while convicting an accused in a case based on circumstantial evidence: - (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established, (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (Para 14) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2024 CriLJ 1797
Circumstantial evidence – Proof of case based on circumstantial evidence – Circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The accused 'must be' and not merely 'may be' proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. It is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved'. The facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused. Suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt. An accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, and is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Held, chain of circumstances as complete as leading to only the guilt of accused, not established. (Para 9) Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : AIR 2024 SC 2087 : 2024 CriLJ 2039
Conclusive Evidence – The accused persons had sought to place reliance on income tax returns and income tax assessment orders. Held, income tax returns and orders may be admissible as evidence but are not themselves conclusive proof of lawful source of income under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and that independent evidence to corroborate the same would be required. The probative value of value of the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities, including the Order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and the subsequent Assessment Orders, would depend on the nature of the information furnished and findings recorded in the order, and would not ipso facto either conclusively prove or disprove a charge. The High Court has rightly not discharged the appellants based on the Orders of the Income Tax Authorities. (Para 29 & 32) Puneet Sabharwal v. CBI, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : AIR 2024 SC 2046
Conviction on sole evidence of victim – Conviction undoubtedly can be recorded on the sole evidence of a victim of crime; however, it must undergo a strict scrutiny through the well settled legal principles. (Para 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221
Conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence – Prosecution to prove case beyond reasonable doubt – It is necessary for the prosecution that the circumstances from which the conclusion of the guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It is a primary principle that the accused 'must be' and not merely 'may be' proved guilty before a court can convict the accused. The facts so established should be consistent only with the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probabilities the act must have been done by the accused. The suspicion, however strong it may be, cannot take the place of proof beyond reasonable doubt and an accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion. An accused is presumed to be innocent unless proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Held, the prosecution has failed to prove any of the incriminating circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and in no case, the chain of circumstances, which was so interlinked to each other that leads to no other conclusion, than the guilt of the accused persons. Held, the findings of the learned trial Judge are based on correct appreciation of the material placed on record. (Para 6, 7 & 13) Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : AIR 2024 SC 1678
Court has to strike a balance between testimonies of Injured Witness & Interested Witness. The evidence of an injured witness is considered to be on a higher pedestal than that of a witness simpliciter. (Para 28 & 34) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667
Credibility of Evidence – Held, the surveyor's report is a credible evidence and the court may rely on it until a more reliable evidence is brought on record. (Para 23) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2024 SC 2868
Credibility of testimony of the victim in matters involving sexual offences –The statement of the prosecutrix ought to be consistent from the beginning to the end (minor inconsistencies excepted), from the initial statement to the oral testimony, without creating any doubt qua the prosecution's case. The Court can rely on the victim as a “sterling witness” without further corroboration, but the quality and credibility must be exceptionally high. While a victim's testimony is usually enough for sexual offence cases, an unreliable or insufficient account from the prosecutrix, marked by identified flaws and gaps, casts serious doubt with regard to the veracity of the prosecution version and could make it difficult for a conviction to be recorded. Considering the evidence of a victim subjected to a sexual offence, the Court does not necessarily demand an almost accurate account of the incident and allows the victim to provide her version based on her recollection of events, to the extent reasonably possible for her to recollect. If the Court deems such evidence credible and free from doubt, there is hardly any insistence on corroboration of that version. Material contradictions apparent in the depositions of prosecution witnesses, including the victim, significantly undermine the credibility of the prosecution version. Enough missing links present to extend the benefit of doubt to the accused. (Para 15, 16, 17 & 22) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221
Delay in filing the FIR and delay in examination of prosecution witness – The delay therefore renders the circumstances questionable. Hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against the two accused persons beyond reasonable doubt warranting a conviction under Section 302 IPC. (Para 42) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667
Documentary evidence – The photocopy of a document is inadmissible in evidence. (Para 36) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947
Duty of public prosecutor to cross-examine hostile witness – It is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to cross-examine a hostile witness in detail and try to elucidate the truth & also establish that the witness is speaking lie and has deliberately resiled from his police statement recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. A good, seasoned and experienced Public Prosecutor will not only bring the contradictions on record, but will also cross-examine the hostile witness at length to establish that he or she had actually witnessed the incident as narrated in his/her police statement. Only bringing the contradictions on record and thereafter proving such contradictions through the evidence of the Investigating Officer is not sufficient. (Para 69) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 CriLJ 2377
Evidentiary value of a hostile witness – The evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. It was further held that the evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (Para 9) Selvamani v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : AIR 2024 SC 2273
Extra judicial confession – It is considered as a weak type of evidence and is generally used as a corroborative link to lend credibility to the other evidence on record. An extra judicial confession must be accepted with great care and caution. If it is not supported by other evidence on record, it fails to inspire confidence and in such a case, it shall not be treated as a strong piece of evidence for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion of guilt. The prosecution must establish that a confession was indeed made by the accused, that it was voluntary in nature and that the contents of the confession were true. The standard required for proving an extra judicial confession to the satisfaction of the Court is on the higher side and these essential ingredients must be established beyond any reasonable doubt. The standard becomes even higher when the entire case of the prosecution necessarily rests on the extra judicial confession. (Para 14) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : AIR 2024 SC 1208 : 2024 CriLJ 1282 : (2024) 4 SCC 735
Hostile witness – Appreciation of the evidence is challenged – The prosecutrix and her mother and aunt in their cross-examination, which was recorded three and a half months after the recording of the examination-in-chief, have turned around and not supported the prosecution case. Held, on account of a long gap between the examination-in-chief and cross examination, the witnesses were won over by the accused and they resiled from the version as deposed in the examination-in-chief which fully incriminates the accused. However, when the evidence of the victim as well as her mother and aunt is tested with the FIR, the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC and the evidence of the Medical Expert), there is sufficient corroboration to the version given by the prosecutrix in her examination-in-chief. Hence, no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the trial court as well as the High Court on appreciation of the evidence. (Para 8, 13 & 15) Selvamani v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : AIR 2024 SC 2273
illiterate witness - Appreciation of evidence led by such a witness has to be treated differently from other kinds of witnesses. It cannot be subjected to a hyper-technical inquiry and much emphasis ought not to be given to imprecise details that may have been brought out in the evidence. The evidence of a rustic/illiterate witness must not be disregarded if there were to be certain minor contradictions or inconsistencies in the deposition. (Para 27) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164 : 2024 CriLJ 1601
illiterate witness - However, the testimony of an illiterate witness suffers not merely from technical imperfections, there are glaring omissions and improvements that have been brought out in the cross-examination, which cannot be attributed to the illiteracy of the individual deposition. If there were minor contradictions and inconsistencies, that could have been ignored since the recollection of exact details as to location and time can be attributed to the lack of literacy. (Para 28) Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 13 : AIR 2024 SC 627 : (2024) 3 SCC 164
Incidental witnesses – The incident, which transpired partly within the confines of the house and extended slightly beyond the deceased's premises, the family members and close relatives naturally become the witnesses. These individuals cannot be considered incidental witnesses; instead, they emerge as the most natural witnesses. (Para 29) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : (2024) 4 SCC 469
Independent witness – No independent witnesses were examined – The non-examination of independent witnesses would not be fatal to a case set up by the prosecution but if witnesses examined are found to be 'interested' then, the examination of independent witnesses would assume importance. It is hard to conceive how the Trial Court concluded that despite being the first cousin of D-1 and himself a person injured in the incident, PW-1 was not an interested witness. Further, considering categorical statement that “the wine shop is in the main road” and “the wine shop would be crowded always” the joining of independent witnesses ought not to have been a difficult task but, yet, it remained unachieved. (Para 31) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667
Injured Witness - The importance of an injured witness in a criminal trial cannot be overstated. Unless there are compelling circumstances or evidence placed by the defence to doubt such a witness, this has to be accepted as extremely valuable evidence in a criminal Trial. (Para 11) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125
Insufficiency of evidence – Sufficiency of the materials on record - Ordinarily the court should not get into or look into the sufficiency of the materials on record on the basis of which the requisite subjective satisfaction is arrived at by the Detaining Authority. However, if the facts of the case are such that the court is required to go into such issues, it may be done. The detention of the detenue is only relied upon on his confessional statement before the police and there is no test identification parade carried out by the police. There is nothing to indicate that the nefarious activities of the detenu created an atmosphere of panic and fear in the minds of the people of the concerned locality. Held, it is a case of and it prima facie, appears that the detenu might have been picked up by the police on suspicion and then relied upon his confessional statement before the police. (Para 33) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 CriLJ 1733
Interested witness – Where a testimony is duly explained and inspires confidence, the Court is not expected to reject the testimony of an interested witness. However, when the testimony is full of contradictions and fails to match evenly with the supporting evidence the Court is bound to sift and weigh the evidence to test its true weight and credibility. (Para 33) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 CriLJ 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544
Ocular evidence is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused even if it unmatches with the doctor's expert evidence-Undoubtedly, only one kind of weapon i.e. chopper was used in committing the crime and, therefore, the evidence of the doctor may not be matching with that of the prosecution, but again, the ocular evidence of PW-3 and PW-4 is sufficient enough to prove that only chopper was used as a weapon of crime. In the light of the said evidence of the two eyewitnesses, the suggestion or opinion of the doctor cannot prevail as the opinion based upon probability is weak evidence in comparison to the ocular evidence of eyewitnesses. (Para 21) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475
Ocular Evidence - No doubt, they are members of the family and may be interested persons but their testimony cannot be discarded simply for the reason that they are family members in the scenario of the case that the incident took place inside the house of the deceased Shivanna, where there could not have been any other eyewitnesses other than the family members. The evidence of the aforesaid two eyewitnesses could not be shaken in the cross-examination. (Para 16) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475
Offence of sexual harassment in a public place, as opposed to one committed within the confines of a room or a house, or even in a public place but away from the view of the public, stands on different premise. If any doubt arises in the Court's mind regarding the veracity of the victim's version, the Court may, at its discretion, seek corroboration from other witnesses who directly observed the incident or from other attending circumstances to unearth the truth. (Para 18) Nirmal Premkumar v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 221
Power of the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence – There is no inhibition on the High Court to re-appreciate or re-visit the evidence on record. However, such power is a qualified power. For re-appreciating evidence, the court must consider, whether the Trial Court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence or whether the finding of the Trial Court is illegal or affected by an error of law or fact or whether the view taken by the Trial Court is a fairly possible view. (Para 25) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : 2024 CriLJ 1137 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : (2024) 3 SCC 544
Presumption of constitutionality – The presumption of constitutionality is based on two premises. First, it is based on democratic accountability, that is, legislators are elected representatives who are aware of the needs of the citizens and are best placed to frame policies to resolve them. Second, legislators are privy to information necessary for policy making which the Courts as an adjudicating authority are not. The presumption of constitutionality is rebutted when a prima facie case of violation of a fundamental right is established, upon which the onus would shift to the State to justify the infringement. The broad argument of the petitioners that the presumption of constitutionality should not apply to a specific class of statutes, that is, laws which deal with electoral processes cannot be accepted. Courts cannot carve out an exception to the evidentiary principle which is available to the legislature based on the democratic legitimacy which it enjoys. Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : AIR 2024 SC 1441
Presumption of innocence – The presumption is in favour of accused, unless proven guilty – The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal. (Para 24) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544
Prima facie means “at first sight”, “at first view”, or “based on first impression” – “Evidence sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact or establish the fact in question unless rebutted”. In both civil and criminal law, the term is used to denote that, upon initial examination, a legal claim has sufficient evidence to proceed to trial or judgment. In most legal proceedings, one party (typically, the plaintiff or the prosecutor) has a burden of proof, which requires them to present prima facie evidence for each element of the case or charges against the defendant. If they cannot present prima facie evidence, the initial claim may be dismissed without any need for a response by other parties. (Para 49) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 CriLJ 2377
Principles of circumstantial evidence – The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. (Para 37) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544
Re-appreciation of evidence – Reverse an order of acquittal - The Trial Court had appreciated the entire evidence in a comprehensive sense and the High Court reversed the view without arriving at any finding of perversity or illegality in the order of the Trial Court. The High Court, in exercise of appellate powers, may re-appreciate the entire evidence, however reversal of an order of acquittal is not to be based on mere existence of a different view or a mere difference of opinion. To reverse an order of acquittal in appeal, it is essential to arrive at a finding that the order of the Trial Court was perverse or illegal; or that the Trial Court did not fully appreciate the evidence on record; or that the view of the Trial Court was not a possible view. The High Court took a cursory view of the matter and merely arrived at a different conclusion on a re-appreciation of evidence. (Para 25) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : AIR 2024 SC 1208 : 2024 CriLJ 1282 : (2024) 4 SCC 735
Reasonable doubt – Minor inconsistencies could not be construed as reasonable doubts for ordering acquittal. A reasonable doubt is essentially a serious doubt which renders the possibility of guilt as highly doubtful. The inconsistencies in the case of the prosecution are not minor inconsistencies and the prosecution has miserably failed to establish a coherent chain of circumstances. The present case does not fall in the category of a light-hearted acquittal. (Para 29) Kalinga @ Kushal v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : AIR 2024 SC 1208 : 2024 CriLJ 1282 : (2024) 4 SCC 735
Standard of proof – Beyond reasonable doubt – The prosecution has failed to prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the impugned orders cannot be sustained, and they are hereby quashed and set aside. (Para 23) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274
Standard of proof – In civil cases including matrimonial disputes of a civil nature, the standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt 'but' the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more probable. Inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation. If there are no positive proved facts - oral, documentary, or circumstantial - from which the inferences can be drawn, the method of inference would fail and what would remain is mere speculation or conjecture. Held, weighing the evidence on preponderance of probabilities, it is the appellant who has established a stronger and more acceptable case. (Para 19, 20 & 35) Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 327 : AIR 2024 SC 2454
Tutored Witness – Benefit of doubt – Held, evidence of the PW2 – PW5 will have to be discarded as there is a distinct possibility that the said witnesses were tutored by the police on a day before it was recorded by trial court. This kind of interference by the Police with the judicial process, amounts to gross misuse of power by the Police machinery. Hence, there is a serious doubt created about the genuineness of the prosecution case and the benefit of this substantial doubt must be given to the appellants. Therefore, both the Sessions Court and the High Court have committed an error in convicting the appellants. (Para 8 & 9) Manikandan v. State by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 281 : AIR 2024 SC 1801
Two-views theory – When the appreciation of evidence results into two equally plausible views, the very existence of an equally plausible view in favour of innocence of the accused is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution and reinforces the presumption of innocence of accused. When two views are possible, following the one in favour of innocence of the accused is the safest course of action. It is also settled that if the view of the Trial Court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the High Court to convict the accused by re-appreciating the evidence. If such a course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the rights and liabilities in the eyes of law. (Para 26) Mallappa v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 115 : AIR 2024 SC 1252 : 2024 CriLJ 1137 : (2024) 3 SCC 544
Witness who was shown in the prosecution list but not examined by prosecution can be summoned as a defence witness. (Para 3 & 4) Sunder Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 98
Evidence Act, 1872
Section 6 – Res gestae – Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction – It is based on spontaneity and immediacy of such statement or fact in relation to the fact in issue. Provided that if there was an interval which ought to have been sufficient for purpose of fabrication then the statement recorded, even with slight delay may not be part of res gestae. Held, idea of search of the house of Accused No. 4, is an afterthought with an admitted time gap of 4045 minutes. The search conducted at the residence of the Accused No. 04 is not a continuance of action based on the secret information received. (Para 27 & 28) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778
Section 8 & 27 – Conduct – The conduct of the appellant in leading the Investigating Officer and others to a drain nearby his house and the discovery of the knife from the drain is a relevant fact. It would be admissible as 'conduct' under Section 8 irrespective of the fact whether the statement made by the accused falls within the purview of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The conduct of the accused alone, though may be relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act, cannot form the basis of conviction is only one of the circumstances which the court may take into consideration along with the other evidence on record, direct or indirect. (Para 56 & 61) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 CriLJ 2377
Section 9 – Test Identification parade – Identification of the appellant by witness is quite doubtful as no proper identification parade has been conducted. Witness clearly states that he has identified the accused persons out of two people shown by the police. In the absence of proper identification parade being conducted, the identification for the first time in the Court cannot be said to be free from doubt. (Para 6 & 7) Jafar v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 238
Section 14 – State of mind – Held, the accused went absconding after the murder and could not be traced out for almost 10 years which is also a strong circumstance pointing towards his guilty state of mind. (Para 45) Sukhpal Singh v. NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : AIR 2024 SC 2724
Sections 17 and 18 – Admission is a conscious and deliberate act and not something that could be inferred. An admission could be a positive act of acknowledgement or confession. To constitute an admission, one of the requirements is a voluntary acknowledgement through a statement of the existence of certain facts during the judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, which conclude as true or valid the allegations made in the proceedings or in the notice. The formal act of acknowledgement during the proceedings waives or dispenses with the production of evidence by the contesting party. The admission concedes, for the purpose of litigation, the proposition of fact claimed by the opponents as true. An admission is also the best evidence the opposite party can rely upon, and though inconclusive, is decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous by the other side. (Para 13.1) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : AIR 2024 SC 644
Section 18 – A statement made by a person is not only evidence against the person but is also evidence against those who claim through him. Section 18 of the Act lays down the conditions and the requirements satisfied for applying to a statement as an admission. (Para 14) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : AIR 2024 SC 644
Section 18 – Admission by party to proceeding or his agent - Section 18 of the Act deals with: (i) admission by a party to a proceeding, (ii) his agent, (iii) by a suitor in a representative character, (iv) statements made by a party in trusted subject matter, (v) statements made by a person from whom interest is derived. The qualifying circumstances to merit as admission are subject to satisfying the requirements. (Para 13.2 & 13.3) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : AIR 2024 SC 644
Section 25 – Confession before a police officer – The bar under Section 25 of the IEA 1872 is not applicable against the admissibility of confessional statement made to the officers empowered under Section 41 and 42 of the NDPS Act 1985. (Para 50) Najmunisha v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 298 : AIR 2024 SC 2778
Section 25 – Confession before a police office – Confession of an accused recorded by a Police Officer is not admissible in evidence as the same is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. (Para 23) Mohammed Khalid v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183 : (2024) 5 SCC 393
Section 27 - Four conditions to invoke Section 27 - First condition imposed and necessary for bringing the section into operation is the discovery of a fact which should be a relevant fact in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence. The second is that the discovery of such a fact must be deposed to. A fact already known to the police will fall foul and not meet this condition. The third is that at the time of receipt of the information, the accused must be in police custody. Lastly, it is only so much of information which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered resulting in recovery of a physical object which is admissible. Rest of the information is to be excluded. The word 'distinctly' is used to limit and define the scope of the information and means 'directly', 'indubitably', 'strictly' or 'unmistakably'. Only that part of the information which is clear, immediate and a proximate cause of discovery is admissible. (Para 22) Perumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8 : AIR 2024 SC 460 : 2024 CriLJ 1013
Section 27 - The expression “custody” under Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody. It includes any kind of restriction, restraint or even surveillance by the police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused ought to be deemed, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police. (Para 25) Perumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8 : AIR 2024 SC 460 : 2024 CriLJ 1013
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is frequently used by the police, and the courts must be vigilant about its application to ensure credibility of evidence, as the provision is vulnerable to abuse. However, this does not mean that in every case invocation of Section 27 of the Evidence Act must be seen with suspicion and is to be discarded as perfunctory and unworthy of credence. (Para 24) Perumal Raja @ Perumal v. State rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 8 : AIR 2024 SC 460 : 2024 CriLJ 1013
Section 27 – Discovery – It is only so much of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered would be admissible. It will be necessary for the prosecution to establish that, the information given by the accused while in police custody had led to the discovery of the fact, which was distinctly within the knowledge of the maker of the statement. Held, the prosecution will have to establish that, before the information given by the accused persons on the basis of which the dead body was recovered, nobody had the knowledge about the existence of the dead body at the place from where it was recovered. A perusal of the evidence reveals that the police as well as these witnesses knew about the death and the dead body being found prior to the statements of the accused persons being recorded under Section 27. Hence, the prosecution has failed to prove that the discovery of the dead body was only on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the accused persons under Section 27 and that nobody knew about the same before that. (Para 13, 14, 21 & 22) Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : AIR 2024 SC 2087 : 2024 CriLJ 2039
Section 27 – Discovery – Rationale behind the provision – If a fact is actually discovered in consequence of the information supplied, it affords some guarantee that the information is true and it can therefore be safely allowed to be admitted in evidence as an incriminating factor against the accused. (Para 13) Ravishankar Tandon v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : AIR 2024 SC 2087 : 2024 CriLJ 2039
Section 27 – To prove disclosure statement and the discoveries made in furtherance – The statement of an accused recorded by a police officer under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is basically a memorandum of confession of the accused recorded by the Investigating Officer (IO) during interrogation and taken down in writing. The confessional part of such statement is inadmissible and only the part which distinctly leads to discovery of fact is admissible in evidence. Held, mere exhibiting of memorandum prepared by the IO during investigation cannot tantamount to proof of its contents and the IO, while testifying on oath, would be required to narrate the sequence of events which transpired leading to the recording of the disclosure statement. By the interrogation memos, it is clear that the IO gave no description of the disclosure statements. Hence, the disclosure statements cannot be read in evidence and the recoveries made in furtherance thereof are non est in the eyes of law. (Para 59, 65 & 66) Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : AIR 2024 SC 2252 : 2024 CriLJ 2021
Section 32(1) – Dying Declaration – Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is an exception to the general rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. Once a dying declaration is found to be authentic inspiring confidence of the court, then the same can be relied upon and can be the sole basis for conviction without any corroboration. However, before accepting such a dying declaration, court must be satisfied that it was rendered voluntarily, it is consistent and credible and that it is devoid of any tutoring. Held, the contents of the dying declaration have been proved by prosecution witnesses. Certain inconsistencies in evidence of witness may take place due to the time gap of 5 years from the date of incident to the date of evidence given. Further held, though there are inconsistencies and improvements in the version of the prosecution witnesses, there is however convergence with the core of the narration of the deceased made in the dying declaration and the medical history recorded by the doctor. Hence, dying declaration is accepted as a valid piece of evidence and it clearly establishes the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt. (Para 24, 25 & 35) Rajendra Ramdas Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 406 : AIR 2024 SC 2682
Section 60 – Oral evidence must be direct – The section mandates that no secondary/hearsay evidence can be given in case of oral evidence, except for the circumstances enumerated in the section. In case of a person who asserts to have heard a fact, only his evidence must be given in respect of the same. (Para 61) Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : AIR 2024 SC 2252 : 2024 CriLJ 2021
Section 65B – Admissibility of electronic record – Certificate to prove electronic evidence – The call records were discarded by the High Court as there was no certification under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The Investigating Officer, was not aware of the procedure to be followed for obtaining a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The State Government must ensure that the Police Officers are imparted proper training on this aspect. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : (2024) 5 SCC 258
Section 73 - Certified copy of a document issued by a Bank is itself admissible under the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 without any formal proof thereof. Hence, in an appropriate case, the certified copy of the specimen signature maintained by the Bank can be procured with a request to the Court to compare the same with the signature appearing on the cheque by exercising powers under Section 73 of the Act. (Para 15) Ajitsinh Chehuji Rathod v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 64 : AIR 2024 SC 787
Section 90 – Presumption for 30 years old documents – If the document is more than 30 years old and is being produced from proper custody, a presumption is available to the effect that signatures and every other part of such document, which purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person, is in that person's handwriting and in case a document is executed or attested, the same was executed and attested by the persons by whom it purports to be executed and attested. This does not lead to a presumption that recitals therein are correct. (Para 17) Urban Improvement Trust v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 153
Section 105 – Presumption – Burden to prove case within exception – It is for the accused to show the applicability of Exception 4 of Section 302. (Para 78) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 CriLJ 2377
Section 106 – Burden of proof – The burden is upon the accused to prove. Held, the bald plea of denial offered by the accused is not sufficient to absolve him of the burden cast upon him. Failure of the accused to offer explanation for the homicidal death of his wife in the night time when only the accused and deceased were present in the house lead to the interference of guilt of accused. (Para 46 & 47) Sukhpal Singh v. NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 359 : AIR 2024 SC 2724
Section 106 – Burden of proof – When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. The word “especially” means facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. Section 106 of the Evidence Act is an exception to Section 101 of the Evidence Act. Section 101 with its illustration (a) lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and Section 106 is certainly not intended to relieve it of that duty. On the contrary, it is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult, for the prosecution to establish the facts which are, “especially within the knowledge of the accused and which, he can prove without difficulty or inconvenience”. Section 106 of the Evidence Act would apply to cases where the prosecution could be said to have succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding guilt of the accused. (Para 35, 36 & 50) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 CriLJ 2377
Section 106 – Burden of proof – When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Section 106 is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its duty. However, in exceptional cases where it could be impossible or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish the facts which are especially within the knowledge of the accused, the burden will be on the accused since he could prove as to what transpired in such scenario, without difficulty or inconvenience. In this case, when an offence like multiple murders is committed inside a house in secrecy, the initial burden has to be discharged by the prosecution and once the prosecution successfully discharged the burden cast upon it, the burden did shift upon the appellant being the only other person inside the four corners of the house to offer a cogent and plausible explanation as to how the offences came to be committed. The appellant has miserably failed to prove. (Para 12) Navas @ Mulanavas v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2024 CriLJ 1797
Section 113A – Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married women – The words 'may presume' makes the presumption discretionary. Before the presumption under Section 113A is raised, the prosecution must show (1) that her husband or relatives subjected her to cruelty and (2) that the married woman committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage. The presumption would not be automatically applied on the mere fact that the deceased committed suicide within a period of seven years of her marriage. The legislative mandate is that where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act may be raised, having regard to all other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561
Section 114A – Applicability of presumption as to absence of consent for offences under Section 376(2) – The condition precedent for applicability of Section 114A is that the prosecution must be for the offence of rape under various clauses set out under Section 376(2) of the IPC. No charge was framed against the appellant accused for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC. In the absence of the charge framed under Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC, neither the prosecution nor the victim can contend that Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC was applicable. Therefore, the presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act will not apply, and the burden will be on the prosecution to prove that the sexual intercourse was without the consent of the Prosecutrix. (Para 11) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274
Section 145 – To contradict the witness – While recording the deposition of a witness, it becomes the duty of the trial court to ensure that the part of the police statement with which it is intended to contradict the witness is brought to the notice of the witness in his cross-examination by reproducing it. If the witness admits the part intended to contradict him, it stands proved and there is no need of further proof of contradiction and it will be read while appreciating the evidence. If he denies having made that part of the statement, the contradiction is merely brought on record, but it is yet to be proved. (Para 66) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 CriLJ 2377
Section 145 and 161 - When a police officer uses a case diary for refreshing his memory, an accused automatically gets a right to peruse that part of the prior statement as recorded in the police officer's diary by taking recourse to Section 145 or Section 161, as the case may be, of the Evidence Act. (Para 26) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162
Section 145 and 161 - Accused has a right to cross-examine a police officer as to the recording made in the case diary whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory. Similarly, in a case where the court uses a case diary for the purpose of contradicting a police officer, then an accused is entitled to peruse the said statement so recorded which is relevant, and cross-examine the police officer on that count. Although the accused or his agents have no right to seek production of the case diaries as per Section 172(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, whenever the police officer uses it to refresh his memory, the accused will get a right to access it for the purpose of cross-examination. (Para 22, 26 & 27) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162
Section 145 and 161 - While it is the responsibility and duty of the Investigating Officer to make a due recording in his case diary, there is no corresponding right under subsection (3) of Section 172 of CrPC for accused to seek production of such diaries, or to peruse them, except in a case where they are used by a police officer maintaining them to refresh his memory, or in a case where the court uses them for the purpose of contradicting the police officer. In such a case, the provision of Section 145 or Section 161, as the case may be, of the Evidence Act, shall apply. (Para 22) Shailesh Kumar v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 162
Section 165 and Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 311 – The courts have to take a participatory role in the trial and not act as mere tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. The judge has uninhibited power to put questions to the witness either during the chief examination or cross-examination or even during re-examination for this purpose. The trial judge must exercise the vast powers conferred under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and Section 311 of the Cr.P.C. respectively to elicit all the necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process. (Para 69, 73 & 74) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 CriLJ 2377
Fair Opportunity
Neither arbitrariness nor malice found in the decision of the appellant-Board – The appellant-Board initially tried to purchase cardamom by issuing tenders and calling for bids, however due to failure of bidders to qualify the appropriate quality, the Board authorised the Chief Executive Officer to procure cardamom from local sources. Further, notice to purchase cardamom was published on the notice board and after price negotiations, respondent no. 2 was given supply orders after quoting the lowest rates. Hence, the decision of the appellant Board is legal, fair and transparent. There is neither arbitrariness nor malice in the decision of the appellant-Board as all the prospective bidders were given a fair chance. (Para 22) Travancore Devaswom Board v. Ayyappa Spices, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 207
Family Law
Custody of minor children – Parental Alienation Syndrome (PAS) – It is challenged that the Minor Children have been influenced against the Respondent and the preference indicated by the Minor Children ought not to be considered representative of the their true emotions. Held, courts ought not to prematurely and without identification of individual instances of 'alienating behaviour', label any parent as propagator and / or potential promoter of such behaviour. The aforesaid label has far-reaching implications which must not be imputed or attributed to an individual parent routinely. Further held, the Minor Children could not be said to have exhibited any indication of 'parental alienation' i.e., there was no overt preference expressed by the Minor Children between the parents and thus, the foundation for any claim of parental alienation was clearly absent. The High Court proceeded on an unsubstantiated assumption of parental alienation and was not justified in interfering with the order granting custody of the Minor Children to the Appellant. (Para 17, 22, 23, 24 & 26) Col. Ramneesh Pal Singhv v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 356
Custody of minor children – Decided on the basis of – (i) The socioeconomic and educational opportunities which may be made available to the Minor Children; (ii) healthcare and overall wellbeing of the children; (iii) the ability to provide physical surroundings conducive to growing adolescents; (iv) the preference of the Minor Children as mandated under Section 17(3) of the Act and also (v) the stability of surrounding(s) of the Minor Children. (Para 12) Col. Ramneesh Pal Singhv v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 356
Custody of minor children – Welfare – The Court must construe the term 'welfare' in its widest sense i.e., the consideration by the Court would not only extend to moral and ethical welfare but also include the physical well-being of the minor children. (Para 11) Col. Ramneesh Pal Singhv v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 356
Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006
If a case is registered against an accused for food adulteration under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), then by virtue of the overriding effect of Section 89 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (“FSSA”), the proceedings under IPC cannot be continued against the accused. There cannot be simultaneous prosecution under the IPC and FSSA because by virtue of Section 89 of FSSA, Section 59 of FSSA would override the provisions of Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC. Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
Section 3 (zz) and (zx) - “unsafe food” - the concept of unsafe food is more comprehensive than the concept of adulterated food. Unsafe food means an article of food whose nature, substance or quality is so affected as to render it injurious to health. Substandard food cannot be unsafe food. By adding a substance directly or as an ingredient which is not permitted makes an article of food unsafe food. The presence of any harmful substance in the article of food makes it unsafe food. Therefore, if any adulterant is added to an article of food, which renders the article of food injurious to health, the food article becomes unsafe food. (Para 9 - 11) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
Section 273 of the IPC applies when a person sells or, offers or exposes for sale any article of food or drink which has been rendered noxious or has become unfit for food or drink. Section 273 incorporates requirements of knowledge or reasonable belief that the food or drink sold or offered for sale is noxious. Section 59 of the FSSA does not require the presence of intention as contemplated by Section 272 of the IPC. Under Section 59 of the FSSA, a person commits an offence who, whether by himself or by any person on his behalf, manufactures for sale or stores or sells or distributes any article of food for human consumption which is unsafe. So, the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA is made out even if there is an absence of intention as provided in Section 272 of the IPC. (Para 18) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
The prosecution under IPC can't be continued because Section 89 of FSSA provides an overriding effect to the provisions of the FSSA over any other law in so far as the law applies to the aspects of food in the field covered by the FSSA. Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
The title of the section indeed indicates that the intention is to give an overriding effect to the FSSA over all 'food related laws'. However, in the main Section, there is no such restriction confined to 'food related laws', and it is provided that provisions of the FSSA shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. So, the Section indicates that an overriding effect is given to the provisions of the FSSA over any other law. (Para 20) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
When the offences under Section 272 and 273 of the IPC are made out, even the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA will be attracted. In fact, the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA is more stringent. (Para 20) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
Foreign Liquor
Foreign Liquor Rules, 1996 (Madhya Pradesh); Rule 19 – Penalty imposed as per the old Rule 19 is challenged to be invalid – Rule 19 amended by way of substitution – Process of substitution consists of two steps: first, the old rule is repealed, and next, a new rule is brought into existence in its place – A repealed provision will cease to operate from the date of repeal and the substituted provision will commence to operate from the date of its substitution subject to specific statutory prescription. Substituted Rule 19 is not been notified to operate from any other date by the Government. Held, the old Rule stood repealed from the statute book and only the substituted Rule applies to all pending and future proceedings. If the amendment by way of a substitution is intended to reduce the quantum of penalty for better administration and regulation there is no justification to ignore the subject and context of amendment and permit the State to recover the penalty as per the unamended Rule. (Para 7, 9, 12, 13, 17 & 32) Pernod Ricard India (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 321
Forest
Forest Conservation Act, 1980 - The existing criteria for identification of private forests in the State of Goa are adequate and valid, hence, they require no alteration. (Para 69) Goa Foundation v. State of Goa, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 61
States/UTs must follow the definition of 'forest' given by Godavarman Judgment till forests are identified as per 2023 rules. Ashok Kumar Sharma IFS (Retd) v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 170
Interim Order restricting zoos / safaris within forests will operate only till final Judgment of coordinate Bench. Ashok Kumar Sharma IFS (Retd) v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 170
Forest Act, 1967 (Andhra Pradesh); Section 15 & 16 – Maintainability of a suit for the relief of declaration of title – Suit filed after finality of proceedings under Section 15 & 16 declaring the land as reserved forest – The State Government would declare the proposed land as a reserved forest by issuing a notification under Section 15, thereafter, the vesting of the land takes place giving the land the status of a reserved forest. Any right not claimed with respect to the land, shall stand extinguished after the publication under Section 15 as declared expressly under Section 16, by way of a reinforcement. The completion of the process as prescribed under Section 15 would result in changing the character of land, including a forest land into a reserved forest. Held, the suit filed is not maintainable as the plaintiff has not challenged the proceedings under Section 15, hence, the proceedings became final and conclusive in view of the express declaration provided under Section 16. (Para 12, 13 & 57) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466
Forest Act, 1967 (Andhra Pradesh) – Object – Enacted with a laudable objective of conserving, protecting and extending the forest cover, with a sound mechanism to deal with all the disputes arising thereunder while declaring land as reserved forest. (Para 6) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466
Frivolous Petition
The Supreme Court imposed a cost of Rs. 5,00,000/ on the Union of India challenging an order passed by the Meghalaya High Court based on the Union's own concession that a previous decision covered the matter. Deprecating the Union's move to challenge the High Court's order, the Supreme Court recorded that this was a “sheer abuse of the process of law” and cautioned the Union against filing frivolous petitions. Union of India v. Sudipta Lahiri, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 326
General Clauses Act, 1897
Section 3(22) – Good faith – Is an act done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. (Para 8) State of Gujarat v. Paresh Nathalal Chauhan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 295
Goonda Act
Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of BootLeggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Act 1986); Section 2(g) – Preventive detention is challenged – Difference between 'law and order' and 'public order' – In order to pass an order of detention under the Act 1986 against any person, the Detaining Authority must be satisfied that he is a “GOONDA” within the meaning of Section 2(g) and to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it necessary that he is preventively detained. Held, mere registration of the two FIRs for the alleged offences of robbery etc. could not have been made the basis to preventively detaining the appellant herein on the assumption that he is a “GOONDA”. What has been alleged against the detenu could have raised the problems relating to 'law and order' but it is difficult to say that they impinged on 'public order'. Further held, to bring the activities of a person within the expression of “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” the activities must be of such a nature that the ordinary laws cannot deal with them or prevent subversive activities affecting society. The true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its reach upon society. Inability on the part of the state's police machinery to tackle the law and order situation should not be an excuse to invoke the jurisdiction of preventive detention. (Para 20, 31, 32) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610
Act 1986; Section 3(2) – Subjective satisfaction of detaining authority – The Detaining Authority should take into consideration only relevant and vital material to arrive at the requisite subjective satisfaction. There is an implicit duty to apply mind to the pertinent and proximate matters and eschew those which are irrelevant & remote. If the detaining authority does not consider relevant circumstances or considers wholly unnecessary, immaterial and irrelevant circumstances, then such subjective satisfaction would be vitiated. The satisfaction cannot be inferred by mere statement in the order that “it was necessary to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order”. To arrive at a proper satisfaction, the detaining authority must examine (i) the material adduced against the prospective detenu to satisfy itself whether his conduct or antecedent(s) reflect that he has been acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order and, (ii) whether it is likely that the said person would act in a manner prejudicial to the public order in near future unless he is prevented from doing so by passing an order of detention. Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Act 1986; Section 2(a) –The Explanation to Section 2(a) provides that a person shall be deemed to be “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order” when such person is a “GOONDA” and engaged in activities which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order. 'Public order' shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely, inter alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in Section 2(a) directly or indirectly, are causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. (Para 23) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Act 1986 – Object – To prevent crime and to protect the society from the anti-social elements and dangerous characters by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities. The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminals, dangerous and desperate outlaws, who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the mortal/moral fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrence for them. (Para 19) Nenavath Bujji v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : AIR 2024 SC 1610 : 2024 Cri.L.J. 1733
Act 1986 – Invocation of Section 3 of the 1986 Act is not justified as mere involvement in a sexual offence, including one under Section 376D, by itself will not be sufficient to invoke Section 3 of the 1986 Act. This is for the reason that the 5 offence must be integrally connected 'with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order'. It is not decipherable from the order of Detaining Authority coupled with the grounds of detention, or from the Confirmation Order dated 09.08.2023, how the offence is connected to prevent the detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. (Para 7) Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254
Guardianship
Habeas Corpus - There is no legal right of an elder sister to exercise guardianship over her sister except when there is an order from a Court of competent jurisdiction. Rita Dwivedi v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 124
Section 17(3) – Guardianship – Importance of preference indicated by minor children – The desire / preference of the children to continue to reside with the Appellant, although in itself cannot be determinative of custody of the children, but it must be given due consideration on account of it being a factor of utmost importance. (Para 14) Col. Ramneesh Pal Singhv v. Sugandhi Aggarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 356
Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus - 25 year old woman detained by her parents - The matter had been adjourned by the High Court on 14 occasions and thereafter postponed for 2025, exhibiting "a total lack of sensitivity" on the part of the court, that too in a habeas corpus matter. When the question of liberty of a person is involved even a day's delay counts. The detenu was a highly qualified, mature woman with an understanding of what was right and what was wrong for her. In any case, a major girl cannot be compelled to do something against her wishes. K v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 52
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
Section 7 – Ceremonies for Hindu marriage – Held, Hindu marriage is a sacrament – Section 7 of the Act uses the word “solemnised” which means to perform the marriage with ceremonies and unless the marriage is performed with appropriate ceremonies and in due form, it cannot be said to be “solemnised”. In the absence of any solemnisation of a marriage as per the provisions of the Act, a man and a woman cannot acquire the status of being a husband and a wife to each other. For a valid Hindu marriage, the requisite ceremonies have to be performed and there must be proof of performance of the said ceremony when an issue/controversy arise. Unless the parties have undergone such ceremony, there would be no Hindu marriage according to Section 7 of the Act and a mere issuance of a certificate by an entity in the absence of the requisite ceremonies having been performed, would neither confirm any marital status to the parties nor establish a marriage under Hindu law. Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 334
Section 8 – Registration of marriage – Held, it is only when the marriage is solemnised in accordance with Section 7, there can be a marriage registered under Section 8. If there has been no marriage in accordance with Section 7, the registration would not confer legitimacy to the marriage. Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 334
Hindu Succession Act, 1956
Admission of the common ancestor to treat the children born out of a void marriage as his legitimate children would be also considered as evidence against his legitimate child, who is claiming through the common ancestor. (Para 16) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : AIR 2024 SC 644
Children born out of a void and voidable marriage shall be considered as legitimate children and be treated as an extended family of the common ancestor for the purpose of deciding a valid share in the property of the common ancestor. (Para 17) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : AIR 2024 SC 644
Once the common ancestor has admittedly considered the children born of void and voidable marriage as his legitimate children, then such children would be entitled to the same share as the successors in the property of the common ancestor as that of children born out of a valid marriage. (Para 16) Raja Gounder v. M. Sengodan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 48 : AIR 2024 SC 644
Section 14(1) – Succession rights of the widow on the joint Hindu family property – The Hindu female must not only be possessed of the property but she must have acquired the property and such acquisition must be either by way of inheritance or devise, or at a partition or “in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance” or by gift or be her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription. Held, it becomes clear that the widow was never in possession of the suit property as the civil suit was filed by her claiming relief of title and possession was dismissed by civil Court and was never challenged. Since, Smt. The widow was never in possession of the suit property, the Revenue suit for partition claiming absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the HSA could not be maintained by her adopted son, by virtue of inheritance. (Patra 24, 25 & 26) Mukatlal v. Kailash Chand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : AIR 2024 SC 2809
Hindu Widow's Remarriage Act, 1856
Section 2 – Right of widow in deceased husband's property to cease on marriage – Hence she could not convey any property over which she did not have any right or title. Held, the plaintiff who is the son of the widow and her second husband cannot claim share in suit property through the widow as the widow had lost her right over the subject property on her contracting second marriage. (Para 17 & 19) Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 293
Section 2 – Validity of lease deed – The validity of lease deed executed by the widow and her two sons is accepted to the extent it was made by the sons (sons of widow and deceased). Held, even if subsistence of a deed is proved in evidence, the title of the executing person does not automatically stand confirmed. If a document seeking to convey immovable property ex-facie reveals that the conveyer does not have the title over the same, specific declaration that the document is invalid would not be necessary. (Para 18) Kizhakke Vattakandiyil Madhavan v. Thiyyurkunnath Meethal Janaki, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 293
Industrial Establishment
Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 (Tamil Nadu); Section 3 – Workmen eligible for permanent status under Section 3 of the Act – Applicability of the Act – Held, both requirements, of the establishment being covered under the definition of industrial establishment as provided and that of the employee having uninterruptedly continued in service for 480 days or more for 24 months, having been met. Held, the Act would apply to the parties to dispute. Further held, there is no reason to disturb the finding of the Inspector of Labour which concluded that the members of the respondent-Union be given permanent employment. When an issue stands already decided then putting those who enjoy an order in their favour, once more of having to re-establish their claim, would be unjustified. Hence, the order of Inspector of Labour be complied with. (Para 27 & 28) Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Employees Welfare Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 402
Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 (Tamil Nadu); Section 7 – Applicability of Act – Exemption of establishments and their workmen engaged exclusively in the construction of buildings and the like or other construction work be it structural, mechanical, or electrical. Held, the construction to be undertaken by the Corporation, is only one of the many activities to be undertaken by it. Hence, it would not allow the Corporation to wash its hands off the responsibilities or obligations under the Act. (Para 23 & 24) Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Medical Services Corporation Employees Welfare Union, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 402
Information Technology Act, 2000
Section 67 – Criminalises the publication and transmission of obscene material in electronic form, covers material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. (Para 7.1) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781
Section 67A – The facts of the present case certainly do not attract Section 67A as the complainant's grievance is about excessive usage of vulgar expletives, swear words, and profanities. There is no allegation of any 'sexually explicit act or conduct' in the complaint and as such, Section 67A does not get attracted. Section 67A criminalises publication, transmission, causing to publish or transmit – in electronic form – any material that contains sexually explicit act or conduct. Though the three expressions “explicit”, “act”, and “conduct” are open-textured and are capable of encompassing wide meaning, the phrase may have to be seen in the context of 'obscenity' as provided in Section 67. (Para 46 & 47) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781
Income Tax Act, 1961
Sections 147 & 148 - For the purposes of tax assessment, an assessee's obligation is limited to making a "full and true" disclosure of all "material" or primary facts, and thereafter, the burden shifts on the assessing officer. If a return is defective, it is upto the officer that he intimate the assessee in order that defects may be cured. But if the officer fails to do so, the return cannot be called defective. (Para 43) Mangalam Publications v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 55 : AIR 2024 SC 813
Section 194H - the assessees would not be under a legal obligation to deduct tax at source on the income/profit component in the payments received by the distributors / franchisees from the third parties/customers, or while selling/transferring the pre-paid coupons or starter-kits to the distributors. (Para 42) Bharti Cellular Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 176
Injunction
Suit simpliciter for permanent injunction – A suit simpliciter for injunction is not maintainable as the title of the property of the plaintiff/respondent was disputed by the appellants/defendants. In such a situation it is required for the respondent/plaintiff to prove the title of the property while praying for injunction. The plaintiff failed to establish their title on the land. (Para 21) Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 153
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016
Pointing out the ambiguities or lack of specific details or data, post acceptance of the resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors, should be rejected, except in an egregious case were data and facts are fudged or concealed. Absence or ambiguity of details and particulars should put the parties to caution, and it is for them to ascertain details, and exercise discretion to submit or not submit resolution plan. (Para 15) Deccan Value Investors L.P. v. Dinkar Venkatasubramanian, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 265
Records of corporate debtor, who are in financial distress, may suffer from data asymmetry, debatable or even wrong data. Thus, the provision for transactional audit etc, but this takes time and is not necessary before information memorandum7 or virtual data room is set up. Financial experts being aware, do tread with caution. Information memorandum is not to be tested applying “the true picture of risk” obligation, albeit as observed by the NCLAT the resolution professional's obligation to provide information has to be understood on “best effort” basis. (Para 16) Deccan Value Investors L.P. v. Dinkar Venkatasubramanian, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 265
Resolution plans are not prepared and submitted by lay persons. They are submitted after the financial statements and data are examined by domain and financial experts, who scan, appraise evaluate the material as available for its usefulness, with caution and scepticism. Inadequacies and paltriness of data are accounted and chronicled for valuations and the risk involved. It is rather strange to argue that the superspecialists and financial experts were gullible and misunderstood the details, figures or data. The assumption is that the resolution applicant would submit the revival/resolution plan specifying the monetary amount and other obligations, after in-depth analysis of the fiscal and commercial viability of the corporate debtor. (Para 15) Deccan Value Investors L.P. v. Dinkar Venkatasubramanian, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 265
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 - Statutory set off or insolvency set off is not applicable to Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings. Regulation 29 of the Liquidation Regulations which provides for mutual dealing and set off, does not apply to Part II of the IBC which deals with CIRP. Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : (2024) 4 SCC 668
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 - The principle of Set-off recognizes the right of a debtor to adjust the smaller claim owed to him against the larger claim payable to his creditor. There are two exceptions to the application of statutory or insolvency set off to CIRP proceedings. First being, when a party is entitled to contractual set-off, on the date which is effective before or on the date of commencement of CIRP. Secondly, in cases of 'equitable set-off' when the claim and counter claim in the form of set-off are linked and connected on account of one or more transactions that can be treated as one. (Para 3 – 10) Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : (2024) 4 SCC 668
Section 5(7) & 5(8) – Financial debt and financial creditor – Test to determine – The transaction must have the commercial effect of borrowing – Held, the amount raised under the said two agreements has the commercial effect of borrowing. Therefore, the amounts covered by security deposits under the agreements constitute financial debt. Further held, as it is a financial debt owed by the first respondent, Section 5(7) of the IBC makes the first respondent a financial creditor. (Para 16, 17 & 18) Global Credit Capital Ltd. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 331
Section 5(21) – Operational debt – Where one party owes a debt to another and when the creditor is claiming under a written agreement/arrangement providing for rendering 'service', the debt is an operational debt only if the claim subject matter of the debt has some connection or co-relation with the 'service' subject matter of the transaction. It is necessary to determine the real nature of the transaction on a plain reading of the agreements. Held, the payment of the amount mentioned has no relation with the service supposed to be rendered by the first respondent. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, the debt claimed by the first respondent can be an operational debt. (Para 14 & 15) Global Credit Capital Ltd. v. Sach Marketing Pvt. Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 331
Section 30(2)(b) does not support the plea of insolvency set-off, since the provision deals with the amounts to be paid to creditors and not amount payable by creditors to Corporate Debtor. Further, the specific legislative mandate given in Chapter II Part II of IBC, the provisions of IBC relating to CIRP do not recognize the principle of insolvency set-off. The Court would not extend it by implication, when the legislature has not accepted applicability of mutual set-off at the initial stage, that is, the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process stage. Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : (2024) 4 SCC 668
Section 53(1) is referred to in Section 30(2)(b)(ii) with the purpose and objective that the dissenting financial creditor is not denied the amount which is payable to it being equal to the amount of value of the security interest. The entire Section 53 is not made applicable. (Para 43) DBS Bank Ltd. Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : AIR 2024 SC 653 : (2024) 3 SCC 752
The IBC is an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons, partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner for maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interest of stakeholders, etc. The IBC codifies the law of insolvency and bankruptcy. The IBC is a complete code in itself, except where it refers and permits application of the provisions of other enactments. (Para 27) Bharti Airtel v. Vijaykumar V. Iyer, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 11
Section 14 - The imposition of moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC has no effect on the execution of a decree against the Directors or Officers of the Company (Corporate Debtor), which is undergoing Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under IBC. The protection of moratorium under Section 14 of IBC is only available to the Company and not to its Directors or Officers, thus the execution of decree can be done against them even during moratorium. (Para 11) Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association (Regd.) v. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 63
Section 30(2)(b)(ii) - Whether a dissenting financial creditor is to be paid the minimum value of its security interest? – The issue referred to a Larger Bench. (Para 49) DBS Bank Ltd. Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : AIR 2024 SC 653 : (2024) 3 SCC 752
Section 53 - The dissenting financial creditor cannot object to the resolution plan, but can object to the distribution of the proceeds under the resolution plan, when the proceeds are less than what the dissenting financial creditor would be entitled to in terms of Section 53(1) if the corporate debtor had gone into liquidation. This is the statutory option or choice given by law to the dissenting financial creditor. The option/choice should be respected. (Para 45) DBS Bank Ltd. Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Ltd; 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 6 : AIR 2024 SC 653 : (2024) 3 SCC 752
Section 24 (3) (c) - Notice of COC meeting needs to be served on operational creditor having more than 10% dues. (Para 54) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111 : AIR 2024 SC 1227
Ordinarily feasibility and viability of a resolution plan is best decided by the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (“CoC”), however when the resolution plan envisages the use of asset/land not owned by the Corporate Debtor but by a third party, which is a statutory body, bound by its own rules and regulations having statutory flavor, then there has to be a closer examination of the plan's feasibility. (Para 54) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111 : AIR 2024 SC 1227
The Adjudicating Authority (“AA”) i.e., NCLT under Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (“IBC”) has the power to recall its order approving the resolution plan if the resolution plan is not submitted as per the mandate of the Code. (Para 52) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111 : AIR 2024 SC 1227
The claim submitted by the Resolution Applicant (“RA”) under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (“CIRP”) cannot be rejected/overlooked merely on the fact that the claim submitted appears to be in a different form other than the form in which the claim needs to be submitted. (Para 54) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111 : AIR 2024 SC 1227
When charge is created, resolution applicant to be placed as secured creditor in the plan. (Para 54) Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 111 : AIR 2024 SC 1227
Insurance
Contract of Indemnity – Insurance contract – Insurance is a contract of indemnification, being a contract for a specific purpose, which is to cover defined losses. Essentially, the insurer cannot be asked to cover a loss that is not mentioned. (Para 16) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2024 SC 2868
Insurance contract – Exclusion clause of Insurance contract – Exclusion clauses in insurance contracts are interpreted strictly and against the insurer as they have the effect of completely exempting the insurer of its liabilities. Such a clause cannot be interpreted so that it conflicts with the main intention of the insurance. (Para 17) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2024 SC 2868
Insurance contract – Burden of proof for an exclusionary – The burden of proving the applicability of an exclusionary clause lies on the insurer. It is the duty of the insurer to plead and lead cogent evidence to establish the application of such a clause. The evidence must unequivocally establish that the event sought to be excluded is specifically covered by the exclusionary clause. (Para 17) United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 409 : AIR 2024 SC 2868
Insurance Act, 1938; Section 45 – Repudiation of insurance claim on ground of material suppression of information in Proposal Form – The insurer cannot question the policy after the expiry of the time period and if it does, then the burden rests on the insurer to establish materiality of the fact suppressed and the knowledge of the insured about such suppression, so that the repudiation of the claim could be justified by the insurer. (Para 5 & 16) Mahakali Sujatha v. Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : AIR 2024 SC 2019
Insurance Act, 1938; Section 45 and Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Burden of Proof in insurance contracts – In the context of insurance contracts, the burden is on the insurer to prove the allegation of non-disclosure of a material fact and that the non-disclosure was fraudulent. Held, the onus was on the insurer to show that the insured had fraudulently given false information and the said information was related to a material fact. Held, mere mentioning of certain details in an affidavit of evidence is not proof of the facts unless that is supported either by other documentary and/or oral evidence. The respondents have failed to prove the fact that the insured-deceased had fraudulently suppressed the information about the existing policies with other insurance companies while entering into the insurance contracts. Therefore, the repudiation of the policy was without any basis or justification. (Para 17, 38, 45, 51) Mahakali Sujatha v. Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : AIR 2024 SC 2019
Insurance Act, 1938; Section 45 – Suppression of material fact – In order to seek specific information from the insured, the proposal form must have specific questions so as to obtain clarity as to the underlying risks in the policy, which are greater than the normal risks – Held, no suppression of material fact as the query in proposal form was not clear regarding the nature of information that was sought. (Para 31 & 40) Mahakali Sujatha v. Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : AIR 2024 SC 2019
Insurance Contract – Principle of “uberrimae fidei”, i.e., utmost good faith – Law demands a higher standard of good faith in matters of insurance contracts – Insurance contracts are special contracts based on the general principles of full disclosure – When a specific fact is asked for in the proposal form, an assured is under a solemn obligation to make a true and full disclosure of the information which is within the best of his knowledge. Held, whilst the proposer can only disclose what is known to him, the proposer's duty of disclosure is not confined to his actual knowledge, it also extends to those material facts which, in the ordinary course of business, he ought to know. However, the assured is not under a duty to disclose facts which he did not know and which he could not reasonably be expected to know at the material time. (Para 9, 18 & 29) Mahakali Sujatha v. Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : AIR 2024 SC 2019
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (Protection of Policyholders' Interests) Regulations, 2002; Section 2(d) – Definition of material – Any fact which has a bearing on the very foundation of the contract of insurance and the risk to be covered under the policy would be a “material fact”. Test of material fact – Any fact which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer and not a particular insurer is a material fact. The materiality of a particular fact is determined by the circumstances of each case and is a question of fact. Held, insured has a duty to disclose all material facts. (Para 20, 21, 22 & 24 & 26) Mahakali Sujatha v. Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : AIR 2024 SC 2019
Insurer's burden to prove insured suppressed material facts. Mahakali Sujatha v. Future Generali India Life Insurance Company Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 300 : AIR 2024 SC 2019
Date of issuance of the policy would be the relevant date for all the purposes and not the date of proposal or the date of issuance of the receipt. (Para 15) Reliance Life Insurance Company Ltd v. Jaya Wadhwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : AIR 2024 SC 234 : (2024) 2 SCC 427
The date of proposal cannot be treated to be the date of policy until and unless on the date of proposal, initial deposit as also the issuance of policy happens on the same date where, for example, the premium is paid in cash then, immediately, the policy could be issued. Merely, tendering a cheque may not be enough as till such time the cheque is encashed, the contract would not become effective. The drawer of the cheque may, at any time, after issuing, stop its payment or there may not be enough funds in the account of which the cheque is issued and there could be many other reasons for which the cheque could be returned without being encashed. (Para 11) Reliance Life Insurance Company Ltd v. Jaya Wadhwani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : AIR 2024 SC 234 : (2024) 2 SCC 427
Interim Order
Interim order of trial court not violated – Interim order restraining defendants No.1 to 4 from alienating the property was passed by the Trial Court on 31.05.1999 and on that date, defendant No. 7 was not party to the suit as he was impleaded only on 02.01.2001. There is no order passed by the Trial Court thereafter directing that the interim order was further extended qua the newly impleaded defendant also, hence it cannot be said to be a case of wilful violation of the order passed by the Trial Court. (Para 22) Srinivas Raghavendrarao Desai v. Kumar Vamanrao @ Alok, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : AIR 2024 SC 1310
Interim Relief
Interim Relief – Test for grant of interim injunction – The three-fold test is establishing (i) a prima facie case, (ii) balance of convenience and (iii) irreparable loss or harm. This three-fold test must not be applied mechanically, to the detriment of the other party and in the case of injunctions against journalistic pieces, often to the detriment of the public. While granting interim relief, the court must provide detailed reasons and analyze how the three-fold test is satisfied. Merely recording that a prima facie case exists, that the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of injunction and that an irreparable injury would be caused, would not amount to an application of mind to the facts of the case. The three-fold test cannot merely be recorded as a mantra without looking into the facts on the basis of which an injunction has been sought. (Para 5 & 13) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258
Interim Relief – Interim injunction against publication of journalists – The grant of a pre-trial injunction against the publication of an article may have severe ramifications on the right to freedom of speech of the author and the public's right to know. Courts should not grant ex-parte injunctions except in exceptional cases. In all other cases, injunctions against the publication of material should be granted only after a fullfledged trial is conducted or in exceptional cases, after the respondent is given a chance to make their submissions. An additional consideration of balancing the fundamental right to free speech with the right to reputation and privacy must be borne in mind. (Para 7 & 9) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258
Injunction – Difference between prohibitory injunction and mandatory injunction – Prohibitory injunctions vary from mandatory injunctions in terms of the nature of relief that is sought. While the former seeks to restrain the defendant from doing something, the latter compels the defendant to take a positive step. The Courts are, therefore, relatively more cautious in granting mandatory injunction as compared to prohibitory injunction and thus, require the plaintiff to establish a stronger case. (Para 13, 14) State of Kerala v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 269
Power of appellate court to interfere in interim injunction – The grant of an interim injunction is an exercise of discretionary power and the appellate court will usually not interfere with the grant of interim relief. However, appellate courts must interfere if the discretion has been exercised “arbitrarily, capriciously, perversely, or where the court has ignored settled principles of law regulating the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. The grant of an ex parte interim injunction by way of an unreasoned order, definitely falls within the above formulation, necessitating interference by the High Court. (Para 12) Bloomberg Television v. Zee Entertainment, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 258
International Law
International agreements and treaties – It is the duty of the Court to give effect to international agreements and treaties to which India is a party. India's international obligations and commitments have not been enacted in domestic law. Regardless, the Court must be alive to these obligations while adjudicating writ petitions which seek reliefs that may hinder these obligations from being fulfilled or otherwise interfere with India's international commitments as well as the right to be free from the adverse effects of climate change. (Para 56 & 58) M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 286
Internet Shutdown
The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir agreed before the Supreme Court to publish the orders passed by the review committees regarding internet shutdown in the region, except for the internal deliberations. Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 173
Interpretation of Statutes
Concept of reading up and reading down – Held, if a law is unclear about whether it applies to certain types of businesses, a court may choose to read down the statute to only include those businesses explicitly mentioned in the text. On the other hand, reading up involves interpreting a statute broadly, extending its scope or application beyond what is expressly stated in the text. Reading up is a concept that is invoked with great caution within our legal framework because it can lead to judicial activism or judicial overreach, where courts expand the reach of laws beyond what the legislature intended. The practice of reading up a provision can only be justified when it aligns with legislative intent, maintains the fundamental character of the law, and ensures that the resulting interpretation remains consistent with the original context to which the law applies. This holds especially true for subordinate legislation, which require greater scrutiny in this regard. Reading up a provision of subordinate legislation in a manner that it militates against the primary legislation is not permissible. (Para 30 & 32) Sundew Properties Ltd. v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 393
Interpretation of statutes – In interpreting a statute or a rule, the court must bear in mind that the legislature does not intend what is unreasonable or impossible. The expression reasonable means rational, according to the dictate of reason and not excessive or immoderate. If a rule leads to an absurdity or manifest injustice from any adherence to it, the court can step in. A statute or a rule ordinarily should be most agreeable to convenience, reason and as far as possible to do justice to all. A law/rule should be beneficial in the sense that it should suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. (Para 80) Union of India v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : AIR 2024 SC 1820
The courts should not give a hypertechnical interpretation to the clause(s) that would nullify the effect of the corrigendum/instructions. (Para 18) Priyanka Prakash Kulkarni v. Maharashtra Public Service Commission, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 107
If a plain reading of a clause fulfills the object and purpose of the statute, then the rule of 'Reading Down' the clause would not be applied just because the clause imposes harsher consequences. Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962
The rule of 'reading down' the provision should not be applied at the first instance but should always be the last resort, i.e., only when the court finds that a particular provision, if for its plain meaning, cannot be saved from invalidation. Thus, by restricting or reading it down, the court makes it workable to salvage and save the provision from invalidation. (Para 99) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962
“Reading Down” a provision is one of the many methods the court may turn to when it finds that a particular provision, if for its plain meaning, cannot be saved from invalidation. So, by restricting or reading it down, the court makes it workable to salvage and save the provision from invalidation. The rule of “Reading Down” is only for the limited purpose of making a provision workable and its objective achievable.” (Para 99) Authorised Officer, Central Bank of India v. Shanmugavelu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2024 SC 962
Investigation
The power to transfer an investigation is exercised in extraordinary situations. (Para 32) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414
Judgment
Releasing a case after it has been heard over a substantial period and judgment has been reserved compounds not merely the delay, but expense for parties, as well. In such a situation, parties would be required to engage counsel and incur legal fees all over again for a fresh round of hearings. (Para 4) Manbhupinder Singh Atwal v. Neeraj Kumarpal Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 307
Judiciary
Judicial Impropriety - Judgment released after retirement - A judge retaining the case file after demitting office is a gross impropriety - Remitted the appeal to the High Court for fresh consideration. State through CBI v. Naresh Prasad Agarwal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : (2024) 3 SCC 515
Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 (Jharkhand); Rule 14, 18 and 21, Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Regulation, 2017 – “No change in the rule midway” - The High Court administration is seeking to deviate from the Rules guiding the selection process itself - Rule 14, empowers the High Court administration in specific cases to reassess the suitability and eligibility of a candidate and not to take a blanket decision for making departure from the selection criteria specified in the 2001 Rules. Precluding a candidate from appointment is in violation of the recruitment rules without there being a finding on such candidate's unsuitability, such an action would fail the Article 14 test and shall be held to be arbitrary. If the High Court is permitted to alter the selection criteria after the performance of individual candidates is assessed, that would constitute alteration of the laid down Rules. The reasoning behind the Full Court Resolution of (securing 50 per cent marks in aggregate) is that better candidates ought to be found, is different from a candidate excluded from the appointment process being found to be unsuitable. This deviation from Statutory Rules is impermissible. (Para 20 & 24) Sushil Kumar Pandey v. High Court of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 109
Due weightage must be given to protect the purity of the judicial process, particularly when departure from the usual process of assignment of case by the Chief Justice is noticed. As is rightly said, justice should not only be done but seen to have been done. The fairness and the transparency in the functioning of the courts must be discernible to all stakeholders in the justice delivery system. Thiru. K.K.S.S.R. Ramachandran v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 91
Judges are not comparable with the administrative executive. They discharge sovereign state functions and just like the Council of Ministers or the political executive and their service is different from the secretarial staff or the administrative executive which carries out the decisions of the political executive, judges are distinct from judicial staff, and are thus comparable with the political executive and legislature. It would be wholly inappropriate to equate judicial service with the service of other officers of the State. The functions, duties, restrictions and restraints operating during and after service are entirely distinct for members of the judicial service. Consequently, the plea of equivalence has been consistently rejected in the judgments of this Court. We affirmatively do so again. (Para 18) All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : AIR 2024 SC 1110
Judicial service is an integral and significant component of the functions of the State and contributes to the constitutional obligation to sustain the rule of law. Judicial service is distinct in its characteristics and in terms of the responsibilities which are cast upon the officers of the District Judiciary to render objective dispensation of justice to citizens. The State is duty bound to ensure that the conditions of service, both during the tenure of office and after retirement, are commensurate with the need to maintain dignified working conditions for serving judicial officers and in the post-retirement emoluments made available to former members of the judicial service. Members of the district judiciary are the first point of engagement for citizens who are confronted with the need for dispute resolution. The conditions in which judicial officers across the country are required to work are arduous. The work of a judicial officer is not confined merely to the working hours rendered in the course of judicial duties in the court. Every judicial officer is required to work both before and after the court working hours. The judicial work of each day requires preparation before cases are called out. A judicial officer continues to work on cases which may have been dealt with in court, in terms of preparing the judgment and attending to other administrative aspects of the judicial record. That apart, members of the district judiciary have wide ranging administrative functions which take place beyond working hours, especially on week-ends including the discharge of numerous duties in relation to prison establishments, juvenile justice institutions, legal service camps and in general, work associated with the Legal Services Act 1987. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : AIR 2024 SC 1110
Registry – The Supreme Court expressed displeasure at members of the Registry staff for violating a judicial order regarding the listing of the matters on Regular list. Commander N. Rajesh Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 49
The High Courts shall constitute a committee named 'Committee for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary' to oversee the implementation. The composition of the committee shall be: (i) Two Judges of the High Court to be nominated by the Chief Justice of which one should be a Judge who has previously served as a member of the district judiciary; (ii) The Law Secretary/Legal Remembrancer; (iii) The Registrar General of the High Court who shall serve as an ex officio Secretary of the Committee; and (iv) A retired judicial officer in the cadre of District Judge to be nominated by the Chief Justice who shall act as a nodal officer for the day to day redressal of grievances. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : AIR 2024 SC 1110
The state governments pay the arrears to judges in terms of enhanced pay scales as per the recommendations of the Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC). All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : AIR 2024 SC 1110
The work of a Judge cannot be assessed solely in terms of their duties during court working hours. The State is under an affirmative obligation to ensure dignified conditions of work for its judicial officers and it cannot raise the defense of an increase in financial burden or expenditure. Judicial officers spend the largest part of their working life in service of the institution. The nature of the office often renders the incumbent incapacitated in availing of opportunities for legal work which may otherwise be available to a member of the Bar. That furnishes an additional reason why post-retirement, it is necessary for the State to ensure that judicial officers are able to live in conditions of human dignity. It needs to be emphasized that providing for judges, both during their tenure and upon retirement, is correlated with the independence of the judiciary. Judicial independence, which is necessary to preserve the faith and confidence of common citizens in the rule of law, can be ensured and enhanced only so long as judges are able to lead their life with a sense of financial dignity. The conditions of service while a judge is in service must ensure a dignified existence. The post-retirement conditions of service have a crucial bearing on the dignity and independence of the office of a judge and how it is perceived by the society. If the service of the judiciary is to be a viable career option so as to attract talent, conditions of service, both for working and retired officers, must offer security and dignity. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 25 : AIR 2024 SC 1110
In the current case, the High Court's judgment from the initial round dated 30.03.1990, noted that the disputed property included 8 cents of land, not just the building structure on it. As per the Doctrine of Merger, the judgments of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court from the first round of litigation are absorbed into the High Court's judgment dated 30.03.1990. This 1990 judgment should be regarded as the conclusive and binding order from the initial litigation. Following the principles of judicial discipline, lower or subordinate Courts do not have the authority to contradict the decisions of higher Courts. In the current case, the Trial Court and the High Court, in the second round of litigation, violated this judicial discipline by adopting a position contrary to the High Court's final judgment dated 30.03.1990, from the first round of litigation. (Para 20) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224
The rule of 'Judicial Discipline and Propriety' and the Doctrine of precedents has a merit of promoting certainty and consistency in judicial decisions providing assurance to individuals as to the consequences of their actions. The Constitution benches of this court have time and again reiterated the rules emerging from Judicial Discipline. Accordingly, when a decision of a coordinate Bench of same High court is brought to the notice of the bench, it is to be respected and is binding subject to right of the bench of such co-equal quorum to take a different view and refer the question to a larger bench. It is the only course of action open to a bench of co-equal strength, when faced with the previous decision taken by a bench with same strength. (Para 1) Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 12 : AIR 2024 SC 714 : (2024) 3 SCC 224
Judicial Review
Courts do not and cannot act as appellate authorities examining the correctness, suitability, and appropriateness of a policy, nor are courts advisors to expert regulatory agencies on matters of policy which they are entitled to formulate. (Para 17 (a)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414
The scope of judicial review, when examining a policy framed by a specialized regulator, is to scrutinize whether it (i) violates the fundamental rights of the citizens; (ii) is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution; (iii) is opposed to a statutory provision; or (iv) is manifestly arbitrary. The legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review, (Para 17 (b)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414
When technical questions arise – particularly in the domain of economic or financial matters – and experts in the field have expressed their views and such views are duly considered by the statutory regulator, the resultant policies or subordinate legislative framework ought not to be interfered with. (Para 17 (c)) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : AIR 2024 SC 414
Judicial Service
Appointing serving judicial officers of Delhi Higher Judicial Services as legal advisors of the DDA completely violates the principle of independence of judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers. The position of the Judicial Officers working as the Law Secretaries is completely different. (Para 12) Bindu Kapurea v. Subhasish Panda, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 427
Vacancy arising due to elevation of judge not anticipated vacancy. Nitin Mittal v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 432
There cannot be any discrimination between the retired High Court judges, depending on their source of elevation (whether from the bar or the District Judiciary), while computing their pensionary benefits. Union of India v. Justice (Retd) Raj Rahul Garg, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 277
Pensionary payments to Judges constitute a vital element in the independence of the judiciary. As a consequence of long years of judicial office, Judges on demitting office do not necessarily have the options which are open to members from other services. The reason why the State assumes the obligation to pay pension to Judges is to ensure that the protection of the benefits which are available after retirement would ensure their ability to discharge their duties without “fear or favour” during the years of judgeship. The purpose of creating dignified conditions of existence for Judges both during their tenure as Judges and thereafter has, therefore, a vital element of public interest. Courts and the Judges are vital components of the rule of law. Independence of the judiciary is hence a vital doctrine which is recognized in the constitutional scheme. The payment of salaries and dignified pensions serves precisely that purpose. Hence, any interpretation which is placed on the provisions of the Act must comport with the object and purpose underlying the enactment of the provision. (Para 25) Union of India v. Justice (Retd) Raj Rahul Garg, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 277
Juvenile Justice Act, 1986
Section 2 (h) and 21 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 302 and 201 r/w. 34 – Murder - Issue of juvenility was raised in Appeal - On the date on which the incident constituting the offence took place, the age of the appellant was less than 18 years. The 2000 JJ Act was admittedly not in force when the incident occurred. Therefore, the case will be governed by the 1986 JJ Act. Under clause (h) of Section 2 of the 1986 JJ Act, a 'juvenile' has been defined to mean a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. Thus, on the date of occurrence of the offence, the appellant was a juvenile. As per Section 22(1) of the 1986 JJ Act, there was a prohibition on sentencing a juvenile to undergo imprisonment. As the appellant has undergone incarceration for a period of more than eight years, no purpose will be served by sending the appellant before the Juvenile Justice Board. Pramila v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 57
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
Section 7 – Procedure in relation to the Board – The Principal Magistrate passed the order, that the child in conflict with Law (CCL) is to be tried by the Children's Court as an adult. Held, at the time of final disposal of the case or making an order under Section 18(3) of the Act, there shall be at least two members including the Principal Magistrate. When the arguments in the matter were heard with reference to the order under Section 18(3) of the Act, the Board consisted of a Principal Magistrate and a Member. Further held, even if the other member of the Board had not signed the order and had merely mentioned that he had a dissenting view, without any reasons being recorded, the order of the Principal Magistrate will prevail. Order passed by the Board as signed by the Principal Magistrate was final. However, the same is subject to right of appeal of the aggrieved party. (Para 15.2, 15.3, 15.5 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353
Section 14(3) & 15 – Time limit for preliminary assessment is directory in nature – Section 15 of the Act enables the Board to make preliminary assessment into heinous offences alleged to have been committed by a child between 16 and 18 years of age, with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such an offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which the offence was allegedly committed. Section 14(3) of the Act provides that the preliminary assessment in terms of Section 15 is to be completed by the Board within a period of three months from the date of first production of the child before the Board. Held, the time so provided in Section 14(3) cannot be held to be mandatory, as no consequences of failure have been provided. Where consequences for default for a prescribed period in a Statute are not mentioned, the same cannot be held to be mandatory. (Para 9, 9.2, 9.14, 9.15 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353
Section 101(1), 101(2) & 15 – Time for filing appeal against order of the Board under Section 15 – Appeal, under Section 101(2) of the Act against an order of the Board passed under Section 15 of the Act, can be filed within a period of 30 days. The appellate court can entertain the appeal after the expiry of the aforesaid period, provided sufficient cause is shown. (Para 13.1 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353
Section 101(2) and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2016 – 'Children's Court' or the 'Sessions Court' – Section 101(2) of the JJ Act provides that against an order passed by the Board the appeal is maintainable before the Court of Sessions – Held, the words 'Children's Court' and 'Court of Sessions' in Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 and the 2016 Rules shall be read interchangeably – Where Children's Court is available, even if the appeal is said to be maintainable before the Sessions Court, it has to be considered by the Children's Court. Whereas where no Children's Court is available, the power is to be exercised by the Sessions Court. (Para 12.2 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353
Section 102 – Maintainability of revision petition – Section 102 of the Act enables the High Court to exercise its revisional powers with reference to any order or proceeding by the Board or the Children's Court. The High Court can exercise its revisional powers for satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any order and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit. (Para 10.2, 10.4 & 18) Child in Conflict with Law through his Mother v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 353
The plea of juvenility of the accused may be raised before any court at any stage, even after final disposal of the case, such a plea of juvenility couldn't be rejected without conducting a proper inquiry. Delay in raising the plea of juvenility cannot be a ground for rejection of such a claim. For making a claim with regard to juvenility after conviction, the claimant must produce some material which prima facie may satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to be discharged by the person who claims juvenility. (Para 10 - 13) Rahul Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : AIR 2024 SC 2739
The Supreme Court prescribes 30 days time limit to prefer appeal against the juvenile justice board preliminary assessment order. Rahul Kumar Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 341 : AIR 2024 SC 2739
Section 15(1) & 19(1) – The procedure provided under Sections 15 and 19 has been held to be mandatory by this Court in the case of Ajeet Gurjar v. State of Madhya Pradesh. Held, there has been a flagrant violation of the mandatory requirements of Sections 15 and 19 of the JJ Act. Neither was the charge sheet against the accused appellant filed before the Board nor was any preliminary assessment conducted by the Board under Section 15, so as to find out whether the accused appellant was required to be tried as an adult. In absence of a preliminary assessment being conducted by the Board under Section 15, and without an order being passed by the Board under Section 15(1) read with Section 18(3), it was impermissible for the trial Court to have accepted the charge sheet and to have proceeded with the trial of the accused. All the proceedings taken against the accused appellant are vitiated as being in total violation of the mandatory procedure prescribed under the JJ Act. (Para 37 & 38) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262
Section 15(1), 18(3) & 19(1) – Section 15(1) provides that in case where a heinous offence/s (defined under Section 2(33) of the JJ Act) are alleged to have been committed by a child who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he committed the offence. Section 18(3) provides that where the Board after preliminary assessment under Section 15 opines that there is a need for the said child to be tried as an adult, then the Board may order transfer of the trial of the case to the Children's Court having jurisdiction to try such offences. By virtue of Section 19(1), the Children's Court, upon receiving such report of preliminary assessment undertaken by the Board under Section 15 may further decide as to whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult or not. (Para 32, 33 & 34) Thirumoorthy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 262
Section 94(2) – Mode for determination of age – In the order of priorities, the date of birth certificate from the school stands at the highest pedestal in determination of age. The ossification test has been kept at the last rung to be considered, only in the absence of both certificate from school and birth certificate issued by a Corporation/Municipal Authority/Panchayat. Opinion of medical board that estimation of age based on X-ray examination becomes uncertain after 25 years is accepted. (Para 19 & 20) Vinod Katara v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 210 : AIR 2024 SC 1430