Denying Govt Appointment Solely Due To Pending Criminal Case Not Involving Moral Turpitude Is Unjust And Arbitrary: Rajasthan HC
The Rajasthan High Court granted relief to an aspirant for a government job 9 years after his candidature was rejected, despite being meritorious, on the grounds of a pending criminal case against him.
The Court observed that firstly, denying government employment merely on the grounds of a pending criminal case was illegal, arbitrary and unjust because as per criminal jurisprudence, an accused was considered innocent until proven guilty. Secondly, the Court also highlighted that the offences for which the petitioner was charged were petty, involving no moral turpitude.
The bench of Justice Farjand Ali was hearing a petition filed by an individual who had applied for the post of technical helper at Jodhpur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (“JVVNL”) but even after being held meritorious as per the marks list, was denied appointment on the grounds of a pending criminal case against him.
The Court observed that normally a convict in a case involving moral turpitude should be regarded as ineligible for government services since government servants were expected to be free from any moral stigma, however, present was not the case where the petitioner was convicted.
“Unless a person is held guilty by conviction in a trial held by the Court the presumption of his innocence has to be construed. Mere involvement in a criminal case when the trial is still underway is not a mirror to reflect the criminal or unsound character of a person.”
The Court further referred to a Supreme Court case of Pawan Kumar v State of Haryana in which the Apex Court had laid down the following principles to be considered to decide whether an offence involved moral turpitude or not:
- Whether the act could shock the moral conscience of the society.
- Whether the motive behind the act was a base one.
- Whether based on the act committed by the convict, s/he could be considered a person who shall be looked down upon by society.
In the present case, the counsel for the petitioner had argued that the petitioner was facing trial for criminal trespass and voluntarily causing hurt, for which he had been roped in along with other family members. The Court observed that the offences for which the petitioner was facing trial were based on trivial issues and it was very common, in a village setup, to implicate many family members whether they had actively participated in the act or not. Hence, it was held that the case pending against the petitioner did not involve any moral turpitude.
The Court further highlighted how difficult it was to secure a government job, especially in a populated nation like India and if the petitioner would be denied this hard-earned opportunity due to a pending criminal case against him, that too of a trivial nature, even after acquittal, there was very little chance for him to get government employment.
“In the present time, when the population of our country has increased multifold, it is very difficult to find a Government Job. In such a situation, when a person by his hard work qualifies the competitive examination with his village background where there are customary and recurrent property disputes, feuds etc. and the name of entire family is dragged as accused, such involvement which is yet to be observed as false or otherwise, cannot be taken as a touchstone or determinative factor to hold the character of the person unsatisfactory to deprive him from his hard earned employment…trials in many cases take long time. If a deserving person is denied appointment, then even if later on he is acquitted by the trial court, there is very little scope for him to get the Government employment.”
Accordingly, the Court held that the pendency of a criminal case that did not involve moral turpitude could not be an impediment in the appointment and performance of government duties by a person. The order denying the appointment was observed as illegal, unjust and arbitrary.
Title: Ranveer Kumar v Jodhpur Vidhyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Anr.
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Raj) 205