'Issues Already Engaging HC's Attention': Allahabad High Court Junks PIL Seeking 'Removal' Of Mathura's Idgah Mosque

In its order, a bench of Chief Justice Pritinker Diwaker and Justice Ashutosh Srivastava referred to its May 26 order wherein the HC had transferred to itself all the suits pending before the Mathura Court praying for various reliefs about the Sri Krishna Janmabhoomi-Shahi Idgah Mosque dispute.

The Court noted that the Suits, now pending before the HC, concern declaration, injunction and right to worship at the site of Shri Krishna Janmasthan and also for removal of the structure alleged to be the Shahi Idgah Mosque.

Read more about the details of the cases pending before the HC: Krishna Janmabhoomi-Shahi Idgah Dispute: Allahabad High Court Transfers To Itself All Suits Pending In Mathura Court

Before the Court, opposing the PIL plea, the Counsel for the state had argued that though the petition has been described as a PIL, it is not in the public interest rather, it espouses a personal cause in as much as the petitioner (Advocate Mehek Maheshwari) claims to be a devout Hindu and ardent devotee of Lord Shree Krishna.

The State’s counsel also argued that as many as 10 cases, earlier pending before the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Mathura have been transferred to the High Court and are pending and since the PIL Plea raises the same issues, therefore, the PIL plea should be dismissed.

Against this backdrop, noting that the pending suits before the HC involve the issues relating to the interpretation of various facts of statutes, constitutional law, personal law and common law and since the issues in the PIL plea are also the same, hence, the PIL plea is not required to be entertained. With this, the Court dismissed the PIL plea.

The background of the PIL plea

This PIL plea, moved by Maheshwari in 2020, primarily contended that various historical texts have recorded that the site in question was Krishna Janam Bhumi and even the history of Mathura dates back to Ramayana Kaal and Islam came just 1500 years ago.

The petition had also pleaded that it is not a proper mosque as per Islamic jurisprudence as a mosque can't be built on forcibly acquired land and as per Hindu jurisprudence, a temple is a temple even if it is in ruins.

Therefore, the PIL plea had prayed that the temple's land should be handed over to the Hindus and a proper trust for Krishna Janmabhoomi Janmasthan be formed, for building a temple on the said land.

An additional prayer was also made for a Court-monitored GPRS-based excavation by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) of the disputed structure, allegedly built over Krishna Janma Sthan.

The averments in the PIL plea

The PIL plea submitted that Lord Krishna was born in the karagar of King Kans and the place of his birth lies beneath the present structure raised by the Shahi Idgah Trust.

The petitioner also submitted that in 1968, the Society Shree Krishna Janamasthan Seva Sangh entered into a compromise with the Committee of Management of Trust Masjid Idgah, conceding a considerable portion of property belonging to the deity to the latter.

Disputing the legality of this compromise, the Petition had submitted thus:

"The committee of Management of Trust Masjid Idgah entered into illegal compromise on 12.10.1968 (Twelve Ten Nineteen Sixty-Eight) with the Society Shree Krishna Janamasthan Seva Sangh and both have played fraud upon the Court, the plaintiff Deities and devotees with a view to capture and grab the property in question. In fact, Shree Krishna Janmbhoomi Trust is non-functional since 1958."

In the plea, it was also argued that Masjid is not an essential part of Islam and hence, the disputed land should be handed over to the Hindus for the exercise of their right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion under Article 25 of the Constitution.

The plea also urged the court to strike down Sections 2,3, and 4 of the Places of Worship Act, 1991, as unconstitutional stating that the said provisions abolish the pending suit/ proceedings in which the cause of action had arisen before August 15, 1947, and thus, the remedy available to the aggrieved person through the Court has been denied.