

**NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION  
NEW DELHI**

**REVISION PETITION NO. 1115 OF 2022**

(Against the Order dated 07/06/2021 in Appeal No. 1797/2017 of the State Commission  
Karnataka)

1. HUBLI ELECTRICITY SUPPLY COMPANY LTD. & ANR. ....Petitioner(s)

Versus

1. IRAPPA HANAMAPPA SHEBANNAVAR & 2 ORS. ....Respondent(s)

**BEFORE:**

**HON'BLE DR. INDER JIT SINGH, PRESIDING MEMBER**

FOR THE PETITIONER : MR. SUDHANSHU PRAKASH, PROXY COUNSEL  
-WITH AUTHORITY LETTER FROM MAIN COUNSEL  
MR. CHINMAY DESHPANDE, ADVOCATE

FOR THE RESPONDENT : NEMO

**Dated : 09 April 2024**

**ORDER**

1. The present Revision Petition (RP) has been filed by the Petitioners against Respondents as detailed above, under section 21(b) of Consumer Protection Act 1986, against the order dated 07.06.2021 of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Karnataka (hereinafter referred to as the 'State Commission'), in First Appeal (FA) No. 1797/2017 in which order dated 02.06.2017 of District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Bagalkot (hereinafter referred to as District Forum) in Consumer Complaint (CC) No. 110/2016 was challenged, inter alia praying for setting aside the order dated 07.06.2021 passed by the State Commission.

2. While the Revision Petitioner(s) (hereinafter also referred to as OPs) were Appellants before the State Commission and Opposite Parties before the District Forum and the Respondent(s) (hereinafter also referred to as Complainants) were Respondents before the State Commission in FA/1797/2017 and Complainants before the District Forum in Complaint No. 110/2016.

3. Notice was issued to the Respondent(s) on 01.12.2022. Respondents -1 to 3 filed application IA/14706/2023 for exemption from attending hearing. Petitioner filed Written Arguments dated 13.01.2024.

4. The Revision Petition has been filed with a delay of 341 days as per Registry's calculation. Application for condonation of delay (IA 8170/2022) has been filed. The impugned order was passed on 07.06.2021, Limitation period for filing the Revision Petition ended on 07.09.2021, but the present Revision Petition was filed on 30.08.2022. Even when we exclude the period from 07.09.2021 to 28.02.2022, being the Covid exempted period as per judgement of Hon'ble Supreme Court and allow another 90 days from 01.03.2022 as per said judgment the limitation period ended on 29.05.2022. Hence, still there is a delay of 92 days from 30.05.2022 to 29.08.2024 in filing the RP. In the I.A. seeking condonation of delay, following reasons have been given:-

(i) RP/883/2021 pertaining to the same issue is pending before this Commission and Commission is pleased to issue notice and pass interim order granting stay on 18.11.2021 in the said RP. After order of stay in RP/883/2021, the present counsel at New Delhi brought to the notice of the Commission that there are other similar matters probably pending at various Courts.

(ii) On due examination of the same the Corporation found about the present matter and sent the details about the present matter. Thereafter the Advocate herein asked the Petitioner to send original documents pertaining to the present case.

(iii) Thereafter, original records were applied for in the month of April 2022 and Petitioners herein could not obtain anything apart certified copy of the impugned order.

(iv) There was delay in obtaining/searching of the documents in preparing the present Revision Petition. Thereafter the papers were sent to Advocate herein in the 3<sup>rd</sup> week of July 2022 as the Advocate herein was unwell, hence the matter was filed with delay.

5. In order to condone the delay, the Petitioner has to satisfy this Commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the Revision Petition after the stipulated limitation period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in **Basawaraj and Another. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer** (2013) 14 SCC 81. Hon'ble Supreme Court in this case observed as follows :

*9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.*

*10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".*

*11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible.*

*12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim *dura lex sed lex* which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a*

*situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.*

*13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.....*

*An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches.*

*15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”*

6. Hon’ble Supreme Court in **Esha Bhattcharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy** [(2013) 12 SCC 649], while dealing with the issue of condonation of delay, after taking note of various authorities/earlier judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, culled out broad principles for considering the condonation of delay applications and also added few more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. Relevant paras of these are reproduced below:-

*“15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:*

*x x x x*

*ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact- situation.*

*x x x x*

*iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.*

*v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.*

*x x x x*

*vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.*

*viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.*

*ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.*

*x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.*

*xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.*

*xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.*

*xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.*

*16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:*

*x x x x*

*c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.*

*d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.”*

**7. In Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr.** [(2012) 3 SCC 563], Hon’ble Supreme Court while dealing with the issue of condoning the delay on the part of office of the Chief Post Master General, observed :

*“12) It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department*

*was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.*

*Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.*

*13) In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.”*

8. In **Sridevi Datla vs. Union of India & Ors.** [(2021) 5 SCC 321], Hon'ble Supreme Court observed :

*"25. Much later, in [Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy](#) this court referred to a large number of previous judgments, and observed that adoption of a strict standard of proof sometimes fails to protect public justice and it may result in public mischief. Other decisions have highlighted that there cannot be a universal formula to judge whether sufficient cause has, or has not been shown and the exercise is necessarily fact specific; in [Improvement Trust v. Ujagar Singh](#), the court held:*

*“16. While considering [an] application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not.”*

*26. The court also emphasized that each case has to be balanced on the basis of its facts and the surrounding circumstances in which the parties act and behave.”*

9. We have carefully gone through the reasons for delay/grounds for condonation mentioned in IA No. 8170/2022 as well as those adduced during the hearing. The reasons/grounds given for condonation of delay are not found convincing. Petitioner has not explained the delay for such a long period. The Petitioner has stated in the application for condonation of delay that they applied for the original record in the month of April 2022. The impugned order was passed on 07.06.2021. Petitioner being a public authority ought to have kept a track of its pending cases and monitored the progress periodically especially considering that Petitioner itself was the Appellant before the State Commission.

10. In view of the foregoing, we find that sufficient and good grounds have not been made out by the Petitioner in the instant case for condonation of delay of 92 days. Accordingly, IA No. 8170 of 2022 is dismissed. Consequently, Revision Petition is also dismissed being barred by limitation.

11. The pending IAs in the case, if any, also stand disposed off.

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**DR. INDER JIT SINGH**  
**PRESIDING MEMBER**