Allegations Of Irregularities In Disciplinary Proceedings Must Be Substantiated With Evidence: Allahabad High Court

Recently, while hearing a writ petition pending since 1998, the Allahabad High Court has held that by merely alleging irregularity during a disciplinary procedure, petitioner cannot evade responsibility to show that prejudice has been caused to him. The Court held that the disciplinary proceedings cannot be set aside on mere apprehension or likelihood of causing prejudice to the delinquent employee.

“Prejudice de facto should not be based on a mere apprehension or even on a reasonable suspicion. It is important that the element of prejudice should exist as a matter of fact or there should be such definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from such default, which relates statutory violations. It will not be permissible to set aside the departmental inquiries in any of these classes merely on the basis of apprehended prejudice.” held Justice Om Prakash Shukla.

Factual Background

In 1987, petitioner was hired as a constable in the Central Industrial Security Force. In 1996, while on Election Duty, he was found sleeping during an inspection. Subsequently, he was suspended, and a charge sheet was drawn up against him alleging dereliction, serious indiscipline, and defiance of orders of higher authority.

In the inquiry proceedings, petitioner was found guilty and was dismissed from service on 04.12.1996. Appeal and subsequent revision filed by the petitioner were also dismissed.

Petitioner approached the High Court contending that his representations for change of inquiry officer, on grounds that he was is biased, were ignored by the authorities. It was pleaded that the said inquiry officer had already been a part of a previous departmental proceeding against the petitioner. Further, it was argued that that petitioner was not given a proper opportunity to defend himself as the documents relied on in the inquiry proceedings were not supplied to him.

Lastly, counsel for petitioner argued that under Rule 34(4) of the Central Industrial Security Rules 1969, the Deputy Commander was not the competent authority to appoint an inquiry officer for a departmental proceeding.

Per contra, counsel for the respondent contended that the petitioner had been given a fair trial with sufficient opportunity of hearing. It was submitted that mere allegations of irregularities in the departmental proceedings were not sufficient, and the petitioner had failed to demonstrate as to how exactly prejudice had been caused to him. It was stated that petitioner was provided with all documents and that there had been no bias in the inquiry held by the inquiry officer.

Further, it was argued that as per Rule 34(2) of the CISF Rules, 1969, the term “Disciplinary Authority” includes authority competent under the rules of 1969 to impose upon the member of the force any penalties specified in clause (e) to (h) of Rule 31. Accordingly, it was submitted that the Deputy Commandant was the competent authority to appoint the Inquiry officer.

High Court Verdict

The Court held it had a limited jurisdiction in entertaining these type of petitions. The Court relied on B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others, where the Supreme Court had held that

“Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which the authority reaches is necessarily correct in the eye of the Court.”

Regarding the authority of the Deputy Commandant, the Court observed that the use of the word 'discipline' in rule 7A sub-rule (2) sufficient indicates that the Deputy Commandant is responsible for the conduct of the personnel under him and hence is competent enough to take measures as to ensure that discipline is enforced.

The Court observed that the petitioner had not raised any objection reagrding procedural irregularity either during the inquiry or during the appeal or during the statutory revision preferred by him. This ground was taken up only through amendment after about 22-23 years of having filed the petition. The Court found that petitioner had participated in the inquiry proceedings and had also cross-examined almost seven departmental witnesses and that there had been no report of biasness during the said proceedings.

The Court relied on State Bank of India v. Ram Das, where the Supreme Court held that

“It is an established view of the law that where party despite knowledge of the defect in the jurisdiction or bias or malice of an arbitrator participated in the proceedings without any kind of objection, by his conduct it disentitles itself from raising such a question in the subsequent proceedings.”

The Court held that appointment of the inquiry officer in the case of petitioner was according to the 1969 Rules and that the petitioner had not objected to his appointment during the proceedings.

The Court further relied on Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja where the Supreme Court held that non-supply of report to the delinquent employee does not ipso facto results in proceedings being null and void and punishment as non-est and ineffective. The Apex Court held that the burden to prove that non-supply of the such report would cause injustice was upon the delinquent employee himself.

The Court observed that petitioner was supplied with and was allowed inspection of all records as per the counter affidavit submitted by the respondents. The same was admitted by petitioner by receiving of the counter affidavit on 21.08.1996.

“Additionally, in the present writ petition, the petitioner was not able to point out as to which document was not provided to him in the department proceedings. The contention of the petitioner relating to non-supply of documents, in the absence of any specific enumeration, is devoid of merits and as such the present ground of the petitioner fails.”

The Court held that petitioner was a member of a disciplined armed force and had acted in a manner which was not expected from a member of such a cadre. The Court held that it would be against public interest to let the petitioner continue in public service in light of his conduct.

Having found that the petitioner had failed to point out any illegality, perversity or ambiguity in the order under challenge, the writ petition was accordingly dismissed.

Case Title: Mohd. Asgar Ali v. Union Of India Through Home Secy. and others [WRIT - A No. - 4562 of 1998]

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